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This publication is devoted to papers written by cadets at the US Air Force Academy and represents an excellent cross section of thinking from the classes that the Department of Military Strategic Studies conducts. The Airman-Scholar devotes a large percentage of its space to showcasing USAF Academy cadet writing on military strategy, operations, and the profession of arms. To this end we include the best papers obtainable from our academic programs. We welcome all departments focusing on the general theme of Contemporary Military Thought which guides the Airman-Scholar.

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2. Articles should be submitted as hard copy with accompanying CD (not returned)

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Common Themes Regarding The Nature Of Future Conflict: A Literature Review

By Captain Monte Carpenter

Abstract

This paper is intended to provide an outline of common themes seen throughout selected published works surrounding the general topic of 'Future Conflict' forecast out 15-20 years into the future. For ease of reading, this paper has been separated into four main sections: Policy/Globalization, Predicted Migration of Conflict Toward Asia, Technology, and Future Conflict. Despite 'Future Conflict' being the main theme of the paper, the areas of Policy/Globalization and Technology are so heavily tied to the main theme that this writer felt that they could not be ignored. The United States is poised to maintain the lead in the areas of military strength, technology, and diplomacy, but doubts remain on whether or not the US can keep this lead. The dispersion of technology into second and third world nations has the potential to both help and hurt the US in a number of ways. Asymmetric threats constitute the predominant danger for the US requiring a radical shift in military spending and organization. Nothing is set in stone, and with the knowledge outlined in this report, the US can start to take the necessary precautions to ensure its security and standing in the world.

Politics, Policy, and Globalization

One of the biggest issues that the US will have to deal with in the future are the effects, both direct and indirect, of globalization. The pace of globalization will continue to increase over the next several decades, the overall effect of which will benefit the majority of the world's population, but not everyone. Those countries/regions that are left behind will face isolation and economic stagnation, leading to possible religious and political extremism, and/or violence (Yergin, et al). Globalization has the potential to shake up the political/global status quo, bringing into power those previously dismissed, and shutting out countries that are thought of as strongholds of economic power and stability. However, the US is expected to maintain an advantage in a wide variety of areas such as economics, technology, military strength, as well as in the political realm. US relative advantage does not mean that the US will be safe from potential threats. The economic effects of Globalization will allow more countries to threaten the US using conventional, biological, chemical, and possibly even nuclear weapons. Disaffected countries, along with terrorist groups, could and/or would use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to oppose US policy (Hutchings).

The relative certainties of the effects of Globalization are a combination of different issues, all related to its larger global effects. Globalization itself is, for the most part, a movement that cannot be reversed. The reasons for this are complicated, and interrelated. Businesses that operate on a global scale will aid in the spread of new technology. Asia will become a more prominent actor on the world stage, both politically and economically. Along with the rise of Asia, the US will see that Globalization will become less Western over time. Most experts see this increasing influence bringing about an arc of instability across the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. This rise in influence will also do little to diminish the power of Political Islam in the aforementioned areas. Ethical and environmental issues will become even more important in the near future. Aging populations within established first world nations will cause an economic strain as the birth rates in these countries drop, causing the working population to support an ever increasing number of senior citizens, especially in Japan and Russia. Pressure will be greatest in the areas of health care and social security programs. Issues such as low birth rates, aging populations, and immigration fall into an area of concern referred to as 'demographic time bombs'. If a country that confronts these types of issues does not deal with them before they erupt as a problem it might find itself in situations that have no

easy answers, resulting in possible economic, political, or military upheaval. (Hutchings).

China and India will play the largest part in the growth of Asia's influence. These two countries in particular have the potential to close the economic gap between Asia and the West. China and India are poised to become leaders of technological development, allowing even the poorest countries in the region to reap the benefits of cheap technology, which will in turn aid their development. This proliferation of technological development has the potential to cause severe problems for China and the US. China will continue to contest US influence in order to maintain and expand its own. China is also most likely to risk war with its neighbors in order to secure its power base. Ever greater openness of the economy, and the wider availability of information technology could create severe issues for the communist government of China and its ability to maintain current social policies. The general population of China might get to a point at which they are unwilling to accept the restrictions placed on them, causing a major disruption politically, economically (or some combination of the two), along with other unknown factors (Hutchings). Other areas of concern include Russia, and the Korean Peninsula. Russia will continue to see the US and the West as the main threat to its interests, while losing its ability to maintain a large conventional military. Despite the fact that Russia is reducing its nuclear force, it will continue to invest in additional WMD programs to counter the perceived Western threat. On the Korean Peninsula, South Korea will continue to spend time and money on unification, while North Korea will continue its nuclear weapons program. All of these areas in Asia have the potential to turn into armed conflict involving the US (Yergin, et al).

Predicted Migration of Conflict Towards Asia

There is a large amount of circumstantial evidence to suggest that the US will inch ever closer to conflict with Asia. The level of trade the US pursues with Asia is twice that of Europe. China has the fourth largest economy in the world, and it appears that it will continue to keep growing. Issues involving Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia will not be resolved easily or anytime soon (Bowie, et al). In dealing with these potential issues, there are policies that the US should begin to pursue now, in order to circumvent future tactical and logistical issues. Some of the following suggestions may require a shift in current policy. The US needs to start the process of establishing more military bases in the region in preparation for potential conflict. Along with establishing new bases, the US military must make a shift towards developing fighting forces that are flexible (have the ability to operate in nearly any environment), and immediately employable (ready at a moment's notice); based on the need for contingency operations. Along with this shift in fighting forces, the US must alter the way it goes about planning military operations (Bowie, et al).

The Cold War way of planning military operations was to use overwhelming military force in order to defeat an enemy. This type of planning will no longer work in the future environment. With the migration of conflict moving toward Asia and the scope of military operations shifting to contingency operations, one can not plan on fighting a known enemy with known capabilities in a known environment. Planning must move from a deliberate, rigid nature to one of more flexibility, allowing for the ability to deal with anything, anywhere, at anytime (Bowie, et al).

Because of the shifts in both military structure and planning, there must also be a shift in the types of weapons the US relies on. The most recent Nuclear Posture Review stated that the US must rely less on its strategic nuclear forces, and more on a combination of both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defenses to produce synergistic effects in order to deal with any type of contingency. This capability gives the US the ability to perform strategic strike operations (can be non-nuclear) to resolve the conflict quickly, and with minimal effort. In other words, the US must move to a capabilities based approach when it comes to weaponry and away from a known threat-specific sce-

nario (Schneider).

Military partnerships in the future will look drastically different than they have in the past. Partnerships will take on a much more temporary feel. Gone will be the days of permanent alliances and treaties between nations. Partnerships will solidify out of necessity, and then dissolve once the threat has been neutralized. These so called 'ad hoc' coalitions will become the dominant form of military partnerships. Instead of lending military troops to coalitions, partners will lend out access to resources, and access to military bases, the latter of which constitutes a key strategic challenge for the US in the future (Bowie, et al).

There is a very real concern that the area denial/anti-access issue will do nothing but become an even bigger problem in the near term. The US already has to overcome obstacles with established bases in Europe and the Middle East when it comes to getting permission to increase troop levels and gaining approval for striking military targets. This situation already presents a giant logistical issue for the military, including the added costs for flying around airspace they were not given permission to penetrate. There is even concern that an enemy would use WMD's in order to slow or halt a US deployment. Issues such as these will not go away anytime soon, and there is evidence they will only get worse. In particular, China is currently meeting with some Asian nations to establish political and economic relationships, partly with the intent of developing some kind of leverage to use against said nation if they allow US access to their land, bases, resources, etc. (Bowie, et al).

Although the issue of area access should be one of immediate concern, there is evidence that the US cannot rely on the security of overseas bases. Globalization's effects on the availability of cheap technology and the rise of economic middle weights means that weapons will be more easily acquired by nations unfriendly to the US. Several studies conclude that a nation or terrorist group needs to invest just $1 billion dollars in standoff weapons in order to destroy an entire US military base. Thus, the US should plan on flying longer missions (in flying time) and expect an ever increasing demand on the tanker fleet, and more tanker sorties (Bowie, et al). This requirement, and the fact that military planners (both civilian and military) are making decisions to deliberately avoid battlefield casualties indicates a trend that the US will look more and more to standoff weapons as the preferred method of engaging the enemy. The downside to this approach is that there is a cost associated with standoff weapons, in that the longer the range, the greater the cost. The US cannot solely rely on standoff weapons nor can it engage the enemy for an extended period of time due to cost and inventory restrictions (Bowie, et al).

There is a general perception in the world that the US has a high sensitivity to casualties. The fact that US military planners create operations designed to minimize both military and civilian casualties gives credence to this idea. Past experience shows that hostile propaganda put out by the adversary DOES in fact work to limit US military action in some cases. Relating closely to this is the fact that the enemy knows the US rules of engagement (ROE) and uses them against us. For instance, there have been several documented cases in Iraq in which enemy forces have moved fighters and weapons into restricted areas, such as hospitals and mosques, knowing that the US would do everything possible to avoid striking such targets (Bowie, et al).

Technology

One of the biggest issues the US will have to face in the near future will be the fact that the effects of Globalization will gradually erode the advantage it has in the technology sector. Although the US will be looked to continue to lead the technological revolution, the pace of technological development will continue to accelerate for the foreseeable future; possibly beyond the ability of the US to control it. The gap in technology between the US and its allies will widen. Despite this fact, the availability

of cheap technology from unregulated sources presents a problem for the US. Information technology (IT) will become the most important type of technology in the near future. IT, as well as other types of existing technology (to include WMD technology), will seep its way into untapped markets, benefiting both US allies and adversaries. Enemies, neutral parties, and friends will all have access to high fidelity knowledge, data, and information at minimal cost. Tied heavily into this type of cheap technology is access to space. Adversaries will have access to data acquired from space systems for little money. Worse, adversaries can be expected to use cheap available technology to degrade US space systems. Attempts to limit this transfer of technology will become less effective and more difficult to maintain over the long term. The US military's ever increasing reliance on computers and information systems makes those systems more vulnerable over time. Enemies will do anything to destroy or degrade our tech systems in both the physical world, and in cyberspace (Yergin, et al).

Network-Centric warfare will play an even bigger part of military operations in the future. The technology that will become available in the near future will allow for the fusion of data from multiple systems, regardless of the source, to give commanders a complete real time picture of the battlefield. Advances in IT have already brought about nearly a full order of magnitude increase of battlespace awareness. This increased awareness allows for the shrinking of the 'kill chain' by reducing the time needed to identify and strike targets. However, there is a drawback to this increased awareness; in that there is such a thing as too much awareness. When top levels of commanders get more and more information, there is a tendency for them to get involved in lower level decision making; thereby lengthening the kill chain (Bowie, et al). Despite the concerns of involving higher ranking commanders in the kill chain, there could potentially be a huge benefit. The technology is getting to the point where battlespace awareness could lead to the ability of CENTRALIZED CONTROL, CENTRALIZED EXECUTION. Commanders on the opposite side of the world could control remotely operated weapon systems, removing the middleman so to speak. Instead of the kill chain being six or seven links, it could be reduced to three, or even two (Watts).

Because of the advances in technology over the last several years, the US has been able to further increase our military advantages. Precision weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV's) are assuming a bigger role in our military. These two systems in particular allow the US to engage the enemy from a greater and greater distance, putting fewer of our military personnel at risk, which in turn gives the enemy less of a chance of engaging US forces directly, and lowering the risk of US casualties. Further development of UAV's can lead to systems that are capable of air superiority, intelligence, long range strike, and electronic warfare. Despite advancement in these systems, there is a technological hurdle that remains to be cleared: the issue of deeply buried underground bunkers. Some nations harbor underground facilities that are buried so deep that not even our current ground penetrating bombs can reach them. Suggestions have been made on how to deal with the issue (such as using very small nuclear devices), but the problem remains. Much more research and development needs to be done to ensure we hold these targets at risk (Bowie, et al).

Future Conflict

Demographics, especially the cultural makeup of a particular region, will be an important contributing factor to the likelihood of conflict. Culture will also be a contributing factor, but culture itself does not cause conflict. It is the clashing of two differing cultures that create the ingredients for the possibility of conflict. Because the US will become more involved in crisis management, working more often in complex terrain such as urban environments, commanders must have an even greater awareness of the area of operation (AO). Gaining knowledge of the enemy's conventional and unconventional weapon systems, demographics of the area, and the level of an adversary's IT, will be necessary in

order to be able to exploit them effectively (The Joint Operational Environment).

For the foreseeable future, the most common type of military engagement for the US will be of an asymmetric nature. The US must ensure it holds both high and low level threats accountable in order to minimize casualties, both civilian and military. Established nation-states, as well as non-state actors, will continue to avoid any direct confrontation with the US, but they will develop strategies to minimize our strengths and exploit our weaknesses. States that should be of the most concern are ones that suffer from poor governance, cultural, religious, and ethnic tensions, have porous borders and weak economies. States that fall into one or more of these categories will be the ones that have the highest risk of breeding terrorism (Yergin, et al). Terrorism itself will also undergo a transition in the near future.

Terrorism will move away from being directly state-sponsored to one of a more loosely connected trans-national network. Along with this change, acts of terrorism themselves will increase in lethality. Terrorists will not hesitate to use conventional, cyber, and WMD's (if they can get them) to attack not just our military, but our civilians and infrastructure as well. The biggest concern is that a terrorist group would acquire, and use, a biological, or nuclear device. Either of these two types of WMD's would cause mass casualties (Hutchings). The strategy to deal with terrorist or rogue state's WMD's would be to disable or destroy their WMD systems before they have a chance to use them against us. The military should be developing plans and weapons to give leaders a reliable set of strike options with flexibility that extends to a global scale (Schneider). In order to give the leadership this type of flexibility on a global scale, the military, particularly the Air Force (AF), must start to develop a new Long Range Strike (LRS), capability.

Tying heavily into the need for a new LRS platform, the US lacks the ability to strike time sensitive/emerging targets on a routine basis. The enemy will do everything it can in order to prevent us from achieving precision engagement. If the enemy is able to get inside our OODA loop (as they did in the Balkans in the 90's), we will not be able to strike time sensitive targets (Watts). Looking at the trends in spending by the AF, it is clear that they are more concerned with short range strike capabilities (F-22, F-35), which are not proven to be able to hold time sensitive targets in check. Considering that it takes 20-25 years to develop a plane, let alone any other weapon system from the concept stage to fully manned squadrons, and that the current bomber fleet is aging, and only thought to be able to last somewhere between 2035-2050, the AF needs to start looking at future long range, time sensitive strike options NOW (Watts).

Some recommendations to bridge the gap between now and when a new time sensitive/long range strike capability comes on line include:

- Reactivate 50 Peacekeepers with conventional warheads
- Have the navy develop non-nuclear ballistic missile systems for both subs and surface ships
- Maintain and extend the life of the current ground based ICBM fleet, fitting some with conventional warheads (Schneider)

Conclusion

This report is a synthesis of the common arguments made about the nature of future conflict garnered from multiple sources and different authors. Areas of Globalization, policy, demographics, technology, and future conflict were all shown to be interrelated and must all be looked at together in order to gain the best possible picture of the future operating environment. Also included in this report are recommendations of places to start or issues to be concerned about in order for the US to hold and strengthen its place on the future strategic landscape. Specific details on differing courses of action were not addressed since those are matters best left to the subject matter experts, and was

beyond the scope of this report.

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THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR STRATEGY

By

C1C Ronald Barnhart

"The object of the project is to produce a *practical military weapon* in the form of a bomb in which energy is released by a fast neutron chain reaction in one or more of the materials known to show nuclear fission."[1]

With this simple, broad statement in 1943, the United States began to research in earnest the manufacturing of a nuclear weapon. Theoretical research had been going on since the late 1930s. However, in the depths of World War II, tens of thousands of scientists and workers were mobilized under the Manhattan Project to research, design, and build a weapon that would "probably end the war".[2] And end the war it did. When nuclear weapons were detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945, Japan surrendered almost immediately.

The use of this frightening new technology by the United States ushered in a new world era. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would divide the world across the Iron Curtain using nuclear weapons as major strategic nuclear deterrents.

Using a chronological approach, this paper will analyze the development of United States nuclear weapons and tactics from their inception until the modern day. Within this broad framework, specific aspects of United States nuclear tactics will be discussed. The foundations of United States nuclear strategy and the relation to classical theory will be used as a springboard to launch into Cold War theory evolution. The bipolar world atmosphere of the Cold War will be compared and contrasted with the today's increasingly multipolar nuclear atmosphere.

The implications of nuclear proliferation and the changing threshold of nuclear operations will be discussed with regard to several countries that have become or may become nuclear powers. After exploring the current situation, a brief foray into

the future of nuclear weapons and tactics will be undertaken. This last point of discussion is meant to present the questions and difficulties posed by the ever-changing face of the world nuclear environment. How the United States responds to this environment may well determine its world standing in the coming century.

Foundations

The foundations of United States nuclear strategy are simple. The only thought was that a powerful weapon was needed to bring an end to World War II. Despite the relatively simple idea behind their development and use, as soon as the first bombs were dropped, the face of international relations and wartime strategy were changed forever.

From the end of the War until 1949, the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. Because of this fact, there was little thought given to improving their functionality or the tactics for their use. However, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) detonated their first nuclear weapon in August of 1949, an ever-escalating arms race was instigated.[3] The United States and the USSR began rushing to build a larger, more destructive arsenal. The first step towards the defeat of the USSR, according to President Truman, was the development of a thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb. His reasoning was that, "It is part of my responsibility as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces to see to it that our country is able to defend itself against any possible aggressor."[4]

Robert Oppenheimer, the scientist who was head of the Manhattan project, abhorred this idea. He opposed a reliance on nuclear weapons stating that:

> It seems likely to me even further to worsen the unbalance of our war plans. What does worry me is that this thing appears to have caught the imagination, both of the Congressional and military people, as the answer to the problem posed by the Russians' advance. It would be folly to oppose the exploration of this weapon. We have always known it had to be done…But that we become committed to it as the way to save our country and the peace appears to me full of dangers.[5]

Despite opposition from many scientists and national and international agencies, nuclear weapons development continued at a healthy pace in both countries. Oppenheimer's contemporary in Russia, Andrei Sakharov, said of his country's nuclear program: "Every day I saw the huge material, intellectual, and nervous resources of thousands of people being poured into creating the means of total destruction, a force potentially capable of annihilating all human civilization."[6]

This new mass of destructive weapons completely changed the traditional ideas surrounding military force. According to Bernard Brodie, America's first nuclear strategist, "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose."[7] This opinion was based on the idea that there could be no victory in a nuclear war. He assumed correctly that a nuclear exchange would have to involve hundreds or thousands of weapons fired by each side. The complete devastation caused by such an exchange requires that deterrence and prevention be the only two important roles of the military in the new era.

Brodie centered his nuclear theory on the concept of deterrence, defined as the maintenance of military power for the purpose of discouraging attack.[8] He asserted that:

> The only thing that will keep diplomacy from breaking down ultimately is the conviction *on all sides* that war is far too horrible to be contemplated. And the great dilemma is that that conviction can be sustained only by our making every possible effort to prepare for war and thus to engage in it if need be.[9]

Brodie's belief in deterrence as a national strategy was further strengthened when the Cuban Missile crisis did not escalate to general or nuclear war. The Soviet removal of the missiles signaled that though the Russians had the capability to attack, the United States' deterrent force was such that the Soviet leaders were willing to accept a tactical retreat to protect their country from American attack.

Deterrence was the central insight of Brodie's theoretical writings and probably the most prevalent strategic suggestion of the nuclear age. The revelation that a "state could guard itself against nuclear attack if it had the ability to retaliate in kind" became the core of the United States' Cold War policy – the foundation of American nuclear weapons strategy.

Brodie also said that a strategic campaign of atomic bombing could effectively yield decisive victory. He said that the only requirement for such a victory was a "sufficient supply of atomic bombs" and delivery systems.[10] Because of the massive destructiveness of nuclear ordinance, even a one-in-ten success rate could wipe out the enemy if enough bombs were available.[11] This assertion contributed greatly to the United States' continued arms race with the Soviet Union. Both sides subscribed to the doctrine of "more is better" and produced atomic bombs in according numbers.

Because of Brodie's influence, the United States has had two central objectives in relation to nuclear strategy: first, to use the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter Soviet attack against United States territory and that of our allies; second, to limit the damage to the American homeland, should war occur.[12]

From Brodie and other military planners of the late 1940s, the United States' nuclear strategy underwent five major shifts. Before 1949, the United States assumed that its nuclear weapons monopoly was secure and that strategy for nuclear employment would consist mainly of World War II tactics. America's small arsenal could be used to take out important Soviet population centers, deterring the USSR from taking aggressive action for fear of reprisals.[13]

Once the Soviet Union detonated their first bomb in 1949, the first fundamental shift in United States nuclear strategy took place. The importance of targeting population centers decreased, while emphasis came to be placed on destroying Soviet nuclear weapons. This remained the top priority until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Preemptive strikes against Soviet nuclear forces were proposed by military leaders and rejected by President Truman as "inconsistent with American values."[14]

Under the Eisenhower administration, a program of "massive retaliation" was adopted. "Massive retaliation" focused on destroying both Soviet nuclear capability as well as hitting important infrastructure and civilian targets in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe or an attack on American territory. Targets for this strike were organized under the Single Integrated Operational Plan 62 (SIOP-62) so that different services did not launch at the same targets in the case of a nuclear exchange.[15]

When President Kennedy took office, the second fundamental shift in American nuclear strategy took place. Under SIOP-62, the President and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, realized two critical flaws. First, SIOP-62 called for the United States to inflict as much damage as possible on the Soviets, leading to unchecked growth of the American nuclear arsenal to support this end. Second, since SIOP-62 was the only workable nuclear contingency plan, it allowed the President only two choices in the event of a nuclear conflict: either he launched all of the United States' nuclear weapons or he launched none. There was no middle ground.[16]

Kennedy and McNamara made a number of revisions to United States policy and to the plan set out by SIOP-62. They modified "massive retaliation" into a concept called "assured destruction" in which a smaller percentage of Soviet population centers and essential infrastructure were targeted. They considered 20-30 percent of the USSR's population and 50-66 percent of its industrial capacity was a sufficient deterrent to any Soviet aggression.[17] McNamara also introduced the "city hostage" option, in which the United States would target only military and industrial facilities in the event of Soviet aggression in West-

ern Europe or abroad, leaving populations centers mostly intact. Coupled with the strike, however, would be the warning that the Soviet population would be the next target, should the USSR launch a counterattack against allied or American territory.[18]

The Johnson administration continued the trend towards more flexible use of nuclear force, though the smallest attack possible was a major strike against all Soviet nuclear forces. Under Johnson, the concept of "mutually assured destruction" (MAD) became popular. In MAD, war was deterred because both sides would be completely destroyed, no matter which struck first with nuclear weapons.[19]

The third fundamental shift in United States nuclear strategy occurred under the Nixon administration. Using a doctrine called "limited nuclear options" and a document called National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242, the Nixon administration shrunk the smallest nuclear strike from thousands (the smallest possible under Johnson) to tens of warheads. This was made possible by more accurate delivery systems and reduced yield (less civilian collateral damage). The Nixon administration also added the objective of destroying Soviet infrastructure that would aid in economic recovery after a conflict. The effect of the Nixon-era changes were to increase the number of targets (and hence, the size of the United States arsenal), but giving the President more flexibility in how to employ his nuclear capability.[20]

The fourth change to United States nuclear strategy came in the 1980s. President Carter's administration removed from the strike list most of the "economic recovery" targets put in place by Nixon while placing more emphasis on Soviet senior leadership, as well as their nuclear and conventional forces. This was termed the " countervailing doctrine." President Carter also stressed the importance of improving American command and control systems to allow for the possibility of fighting a prolonged nuclear war with the Soviets.[21]

Also in the 1980s, President Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a program to make the American homeland inviolable to Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), submarine-launched missile, and long-range bomber attacks.[22] The SDI was not feasible at the time Reagan introduced it, and is still not within America's grasp today, though programs like the Airborne LASER, which engages and destroys enemy missiles in the early stages of their flight, are making headway in that direction.[23]

The fifth and final change in United States nuclear strategy has occurred gradually since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The threat of apocalyptic nuclear war between the United States and Russian has decreased drastically. However, the United States does not enjoy greater security because of this. Because of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology in thee 1990s, the United States now faces increased risk of terrorists (non-state actors) or rogue states using nuclear weapons against American or allied targets.[24]

The current Bush administration believes that to combat this changing threat, a "variety of credible deterrent capabilities [are] required to deter a range of actions while still providing a capability to preempt a looming threat or to terminate a war quickly if deterrence should fail."[25] In short, the United States' traditional reliance on deterrence by massive numbers of offensive weapons no longer applies. Non-state actors and rogue states are not going to be deterred by an enormous nuclear arsenal; their aim is only to inflict minimal damage on the United States and its allies to achieve limited political objectives. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2002 calls for "a fundamental change in U.S. nuclear weapons policy and a departure from the traditional U.S. approach to deterrence" while emphasizing "a more broad-based *strategic* deterrent that now includes nuclear weapons, conventional precision-strike forces, and missile defenses."[26] This new approach will keep nuclear-armed strike aircraft and

submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) at the core of the United States' nuclear capability, but "has the potential to reduce the dependence on nuclear weapons in the strategic deterrent."[27] This reduced dependence is necessary for one simple reason: the credibility of nuclear deterrence relies on the measure of current nuclear capabilities, and there are serious questions about whether or not United States' capabilities will be able to keep up in the new world of WMD proliferation and terrorism.[28]

Classical Perspective: Clausewitz and Nuclear Strategy

An interesting issue to explore with regards to nuclear strategy is how well modern policies stand up to scrutiny under the lens of historically respected military theorists. Carl von Clausewitz is often referred to as the father of Western military theory. His book, *On War*, is one of the most studied books of Western literature. Though he wrote long before the advent of nuclear fission or nuclear weapons, there are still many lessons that can be gleaned from his great work with regards to present-day strategy. Also, Clausewitz was a firm believer in the ultimate destructiveness of war, making application of his theories to nuclear war seem that much more valid.[29]

One telling passage from Clausewitz is especially applicable:

> Consequently, it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine a war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion, so that in the end one would never really need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces – comparative figures of their strength would be enough. This would be a kind of war by algebra.[30]

"War by algebra" is nearly an exact descriptor for the theory of deterrence the United States relied on throughout the Cold War and for several years afterwards. Nuclear strategists and national policymakers adopted models and figures and statistics to describe the balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. But all their calculation and comparison of megatonnage and lives destroyed did nothing to ease the tension between the two countries. The "war by algebra" is not enough to solve conflict, especially when such passions are involved as those between the democratic Americans and Communist Soviets.

Clausewitz also talks at length about the "fog and friction of war." He defined friction as an unavoidable gap between planning and operations.[31] In conventional war, Clausewitzian friction takes hold once fighting has begun and acts as a weakening force, making commanders unsure of themselves and their soldiers. This loss of confidence makes commanders act with less audacity, restraining war from reaching its absolute form.[32] On the other hand, friction in nuclear war could easily have the opposite effect. While friction in conventional war causes hesitation and de-escalation, friction in a nuclear conflict will often push nuclear-armed adversaries up to and over the brink of a total nuclear exchange.[33]

This dichotomy because of the differing time scales involved in the two types of conflict. In conventional war, there is almost always a reasonably long period of time in which the commander can contemplate his options and make a decision about how to proceed. Having this time to think often has a softening effect on the response given. On the other hand, in a nuclear exchange, the decision time for a national leader or a commander is only in the matter of minutes. The speed of ICBMs and SLCMs denies the decision-makers a proper amount of time to contemplate their options and ascertain the accuracy of their intelligence. This lack of time precludes a rational decision from being reached. The commander will act rashly, likely either launching his retaliatory strike or freezing up and doing nothing at all – both before taking all factors into consideration.

Irrational deployment of nuclear weapons shows "a gap between what goes on in the day-to-day military planning process and what leaders may or may not do in a crisis or wartime operation."[34] Therefore, even if there is a policy (or a set of policies) in

place to regulate government action in a nuclear crisis, the priority has to be to prevent nuclear war from breaking out. Here, Clausewitz finds his views echoed by Bernard Brodie, lending modern support to a classical theory.

Clausewitz describes an added burden on the commander during combat that is especially poignant when applied to nuclear engagements:

> It is the impact of the ebbung and flowing of moral and physical strength, of the heart-rending spectacle of the dead and wounded, that the commander has to withstand- first in himself, andthen in all those who, directly or indirectly, have entrusted him with their thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears. As each man's strength gives out, as it no longer responds to his will, the inertia of the whole gradually comes to rest on the commander's will alone. The ardor of his spirit must rekindle the flame of purpose in all others; his inward fire must revive their hope. Only to the extent that he can do this will he retain his hold on his men and keep control.[35]

This psychological burden on the commander must weigh especially heavy in a nuclear engagement. The catastrophic effects of a nuclear attack would severely cripple the morale of any unit. With whole cities decimated, the commander must show remarkable strength to pull his soldiers through the pain and continue to accomplish the mission.

Clausewitz states that "the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive," and, "war serves the purpose of the defense more than that of the aggressor."[36] There are several reasons that Clausewitz favored the defense. To take territory, the attacker must make the first move, revealing his strategy and possibly his weaknesses in doing so. The defender must only sit back and "await the blow."[37] The defense is inherently stronger and is only strengthened by the addition of nuclear weapons to both sides. With nuclear weapons, the attacker faces much swifter and surer retaliation than with any other form of weaponry. In the time it takes for the aggressor's weapons to reach the defender, it is likely that a swarm of missiles is already flying the opposite direction to destroy him. If there is no way to wipe out the defender's retaliation capability, the deterrence against attack is very strong.

Other factors favoring the defense are time and friction. Time because the defender can use it to regroup and draw upon the additional reserves of the nation, friction because the attacker gives away his strategy before the defender, and will thus have great uncertainty as to how the defender will react.[38]

Also, the transition to the counterattack "must be accepted as a tendency inherent in defense." "Flashing the sword of vengeance" after using the defensive shield is the "greatest moment" for the defense.[39] Clausewitz again sees himself born out by modern theory. The NPR of 2002 stated that United States nuclear deterrence meant nothing without the ability to back it up with corresponding capabilities. In Clausewitz's terms, the shield is useless without the sword.[40]

However, the nuclear variable blurs the line between offense and defense considerably. Nuclear engagements, because of their massive and disproportionate effects, cannot be tied to Clausewitz's "war is politics by other means" idea. "With nuclear weapons, the suitability of armed forces for attaining political objectives has been radically circumscribed."[41] There are no legitimate political objectives for a superpower to gain with the use of nuclear weapons. The only time when employment of these weapons will happen is when they are completely separated from the political realm and connected totally to the sphere of rash emotions in the leaders on either side.

Finally, war tends toward extremes. "There is no logical limitation to the application of force; war is the collision of living forces; and in was each side will endeavor to break the will of the other, as well as to defeat the opponent's forces."[42] This ties in with Clausewitz's idea of the trinity. The passions and emotions lie with the people, the exploitation of uncertainty and chance with the military commander, and the articulation of policy with the government. In nuclear war, the confusion of roles (the government acting emotionally and taking control of chance

and uncertainty away from the military, for example) leads to increased friction, which in turn generates escalation of the conflict, as discussed previously.

> Kind-hearted people might of course think that there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat the enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, this is a fallacy that must be exposed; war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.[43]

Now that we have the ability to make absolute war with nuclear weapons, the "extreme" that Clausewitz predicted can finally be reached. This necessitates again that prevention of nuclear war be the utmost objective of the military and of the policymakers that support it. Americans must not give in to the prevailing perception that nuclear weapons are somehow distant from them – that they are a bloodless way to accomplish objectives without the use of human passions and emotions on the part of the American public. If the people allow the technology of the nuclear bomb to replace their trinity connection with the military and the government, they will be the ones to suffer the consequences when war in its absolute form is unleashed upon the world by unfeeling governments and militaries hungry to exploit an opportunity to gain superiority without regard to human conscience or feelings.

If Clausewitz is right, and war does tend toward an "extreme", then the United States must take that lesson and build on it. Nuclear war must be avoided, but Clausewitz says little about de-escalation, focusing instead on the forces which push war to the extreme. Political leaders must understand these forces, but also have the psychological and physical strength to oppose them and to avoid nuclear war at all costs.

U.S. Nuclear Strategy with Regard to Other Nations

Russia

The United States and the Soviet Union were locked in an arms race mainly centered around the development of nuclear weapons from 1949 until the collapse of the latter in the early 1990s. Both sides employed land-based and submarine-based ballistic missiles, as well as long-range bomber delivery systems. In the time period previously mentioned, the Soviet Union was the United States' primary foreign concern, and vice-versa. Nearly all actions taken by either nation were undertaken with the other nation's reaction carefully predicted and gauged. Much thought and effort went into projecting power through the posturing of their respective nuclear arsenals.[44]

Both nations took six factors into consideration when deploying warheads: survivability against a first strike, alliance commitments, hard-target-kill capability, low-collateral-damage attacks on military targets, throw-weight (how many warheads a delivery system can carry), and penetration capability.[45]

Both sides increased their numbers of warheads and delivery systems continuously into the 1990s when the economic pressure of trying to keep up with the United States in military spending became too much for the Soviet Union to bear. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had more ICBMs than the United States. The U.S., however, was always comfortably in command of the arms race with considerable advantages in both submarine and bomber delivery systems.[46]

Today, the Russian successor state to the Soviet Union has become much less of an enemy to the United States. While both nations still possess large arsenals, the possibility of nuclear war between the two nations has decreased substantially. At this time, the largest threat posed by the Russian nuclear program is the insecurity of their nuclear facilities which are now under the control of some unstable Soviet satellite republics. These unsecured facilities are prime targets for terrorists to use to obtain nuclear WMD.[47]

China

China detonated its first atomic weapon in 1964, but it was not until the mid-1980s that it began to think about forming a coherent nuclear strategy.[48] Chinese leaders view deterrence as

basically a psychological battle between itself and other nuclear countries. It will present its willingness to attack openly and to not be coerced by threats; perception of its nuclear might is very important to the Chinese. This is in contrast to the traditional view of American and Soviet nuclear planners where numbers are the most important feature. China also places great importance on its use of concealment and deception to hide the true power of its nuclear arsenal. As long as the Chinese garner the perception that they can inflict considerable damage to an adversary, they are satisfied.[49]

This extremely broad overview of China's nuclear strategy will serve as a basis to discuss the relations between China and the United States in the nuclear arena. In fact, most of China's nuclear concerns center around the Taiwan conflict and United States actions in such a conflict. China is concerned that the United States' development of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program could weaken China's deterrent force in a Taiwan conflict in which the United States became involved. Also of concern is the 2002 NPR released by the Bush administration, in which America's new emphasis on accurate long-range delivery systems is spelled out. Combining this with the BMD issue, China believes that the United States is setting itself up to have nuclear strike capability in any war without fear of reprisals. The Bush administration's preemptive strike policy also adds to China's anxiety in this area. Finally, China fears new developments made by the United States (mini-nukes, for example) and the failures of non-proliferation, which ensure the continued importance of nuclear weapons and the continued supremacy and leverage of the United States.[50]

From the United States' side, China's deception and secrecy, as well as internal uncertainty over nuclear strategy are troubling, but not debilitating for American foreign policy. "Chinese nuclear doctrine…may change shape, color, and contour in the coming years, and there developments hold direct implications for US national security and Asian stability."[51]

The United States is trying to ensure stability in the region by preventing an armed conflict between China and Taiwan.[52] This conflict holds the greatest potential for precipitating a nuclear exchange between the United States and China. China wants to deter the Americans from entering such a conflict by making forceful proclamations of its willingness to use nuclear force, however Washington holds such a high degree of superiority in nuclear and most conventional forces that such deterrence is hard to come by. The serious question is whether either side is serious enough in its deterrence to actually use nuclear weapons if the United States becomes involved in a Sino-Taiwanese conflict. The United States would like to avoid the escalation to nuclear exchanges if at all possible, especially since the Chinese have expressed willingness to use neutron bombs (which the United States refuses to use out of concerns) on the Taiwanese resistance.[53]

The United States hopes to prevent a China-Taiwan war if at all possible. But if prevention and deterrence fail, confining the conflict to strictly conventional means becomes the next highest priority for United States policymakers and military forces.[54]

North Korea

North Korea has been at odds with the United States since basically the end of World War II. Tensions have always been high, but have been much worse in the past fifteen or twenty years because of North Korea's nuclear aspirations. Following years of hardship at the hands of American sanctions and encroachment on their border by American troops, North Korea began to develop a nuclear program either as a way to strike back or, more likely, as a way to gain legitimacy and respect in the international world.[55]

North Korea's nuclear program has not been easy to deal with or to make disappear. Since announcing the unfreez-

ing of its plutonium-based reactor along with the disclosure of its highly-enriched-uranium (HEU) program, the North Korean problem has come back into the international limelight. Labeled as part of the "Axis of Evil" by the Bush administration, North Korea has been deemed a threat to international security and stability.

A nuclear North Korea is out of the question for United States policymakers, but a solution to the problem has been hard to come by. One proposed solution consists of two steps. The first step would require the United States, Russia, China, and Japan to guarantee the safety of the Korean peninsula. After security is assured, stage two would consist of the North abandoning its nuclear program and drawing down its forces on the border with South Korea. After the completion of this proposed solution, outside countries would normalize their relations with North Korea, end all sanctions, and increase trade and investment that the poor country direly needs.[56]

Another, much poorer solution would require the United States to lead a coalition (or to act unilaterally) to forcibly ensure that North Korea does not develop nuclear weapons. Inflicting that sort of hardship on an already downtrodden people would only hurt international opinion of the United States and likely cause more instability in the region in the long term. However, a non-nuclear North Korea would warrant such an intervention.

The bottom line for this issue is that the North Koreans must not develop nuclear weapons capability, no matter what the cost.

Iran

Another member of the "Axis of Evil", Iran is also another country that the United States does not want to gain nuclear capability. The Iranians, however, see a strong reason to improve their nuclear capability: "When the Bush administration invaded Iraq, which was not yet nuclearized, and avoided using force against North Korea, which already was, Iranians came to see nuclear weapons as the only viable deterrent to U.S. military action."[57] Another reason gleaned from the North Koreans was that having a nuclear capability might bring the United States to the bargaining table and hopefully yield positive dividends for Iran.

A further, much darker explanation for Iran wanting the bomb is Israel. According to most Iranians, Israel is a nuclear power and an aggressor. Iran, according to many of its citizens, needs a nuclear deterrent to protect itself from the Israelis.[58] Another, slightly less common fear is that a revitalized and reconstructed Iraq may get territorial again like in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. The Iranian people believe that a plausible deterrent force would go a long way towards keeping out territory-hungry neighbors and keep them out of bloody conflicts.[59]

However, the United States does not want Iran to have a nuclear bargaining chip. A very strong plan for satisfying both United States and Iranian interests is presented by Kenneth Pollack in his article entitled "Dealing With Tehran". By using the "carrot and stick" or "guns or butter" strategy, the United States provides strong incentives for Iran to avoid the development of nuclear weapons, while Iran benefits by getting the economic aid it direly needs to improve the standard of living for its people. If, on the other hand, the Iranians go against United States and world opinion and continue to seek nuclear weapons, their people's suffering will only continue and increase. Harsher sanctions from the rest of the world, as well as the United States, are a strong incentive to give up their nuclear program. The "carrot and stick" strategy leaves the Iranian rulers with little choice. If they continue their nuclear program and choose the "stick", they will likely be committing regime suicide because their people would suffer too much. The only politically viable option would be to accept United States and other foreign aid in exchange for giving up their nuclear aspirations.[60]

For the United States, this "carrot and stick" strategy is also the only really viable choice. Invasion is out of the question

at this point, as are other forms of unilateral pressure. Without international support, United States actions are ultimately futile, since they all have the possibility to be undermined by other nations. "Advocating regime change might be a useful adjunct to a new Iran policy, but it will not solve Washington's immediate problems with Iran's nuclear program and its support for terrorism." The only way we can solve our Iran problems is through international cooperation and a plan that is strictly adhered to.[61]

A Brief Future of United States Nuclear Strategy

The future of United States nuclear strategy is centered on the actions of terrorist groups, non-state actors, and nuclear aspiring states.[62] The nuclear threat to the United States from one of these types of groups is very real, especially with the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons facilitated by the breakup of the Soviet Union. Nuclear detection and disaster control will become increasingly important to combat the use and to mitigate the effects of such weapons being used on United States' soil.

The future of the United States' nuclear arsenal no longer lies with huge numbers of offensive warheads and bombs with massive yields. Instead, like the terrorists and non-state actors, we are moving down the size chain to more easily manageable and employable nuclear weapons. Tactical nukes have been around since the 1970s, but the newest interest of American strategic planners is something called "mini-nukes."[63] These small, earth-penetrating, low-yield warheads were thought up to combat the trend in many enemy countries of "going underground" – that is, building hardened underground shelters to house command and control or NBC production facilities.[64]

Development of such a low-yield nuclear weapon, while strategically viable, raises a significant objection from many in government and the military. A nuclear bomb designed for "bunker-busting" would almost require that such a weapon to be used. This would break a sixty-year hiatus in the use of nuclear weapons in wartime operations. Such a lowering of the nuclear threshold can have only the direst of implications for the United States and the rest of the world. Using a mini-nuke in Iraq or Afghanistan to destroy an underground terrorist command and control center could easily spark reprisals from other terrorists in the form of a full-sized nuclear weapon. The United States can not give terrorists justification to use nuclear weapons just because the American military decides it is strategically favorable to employ nuclear weapons, simply caveated with the fact that they are low yield and detonated underground.

Instead of trying to lower the nuclear threshold to gain the marginal utility of enhanced bunker busting, the United States should focus on molding the existing nuclear arsenal into a strategic deterrent force to meet the emerging security challenges and opportunities of our ever-changing world.

Future Research

Future research into United States nuclear strategy should focus on the 2002 NPR and its implications to United States security strategy as a whole. Special attention should be paid to the provision that specifies "revitalized nuclear weapons research and development."

A primary topic to be addressed will be, "What are the policy implications of raising or lowering the nuclear threshold?" Under this broad topic heading, further questions will include, but not be limited to: How would you raise or lower the nuclear threshold? Under what circumstances would you raise or lower the nuclear threshold? Would the development of smaller-yield nuclear weapons make it easier/more likely to cross that threshold? What are the differences between today's threshold and that of the Cold War (general nuclear war versus limited employment scenarios)? And what would steps in a contemporary escalation ladder look like?

This area of study will be of utmost importance as the

United States continues to adapt to the international environment after September 11. Control and exploitation of nuclear power will continue to be essential to continued American predominance in world affairs, as well as to the safety, security, and stability of the world of which we are a part.

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POWER BY PALLETS: THE RISE OF THE MOBILITY AIR FORCE?

BY

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Introduction

America's efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been remarkable because they are the first time since the Operation Desert Storm that American conventional ground troops have been used offensively, as well as being the first operations in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). As part of the offensive ground operations (and continuing with nation-building), the use of the United States Air Force's (USAF) transport assets has been critical. The service's heavy lifters have moved everything from ammunition to school supplies in support of the Army, Marine, and coalition ground forces in both countries. Aside from conventional ground operations, the Air Force has used its transports in support of unconventional missions against terrorists, insurgents and their organizations by delivering and retrieving Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their equipment all over the world.

With such a focus on the missions taking place on the ground, many in the Air Force wonder whether the service will encounter a shift in mission focus. Long-touted as the master of offensive operations, it seems that the GWOT has caused the tide to turn, making the Air Force's bombs and missiles less useful than the cargo pallets of its airlifters. ***Thesis:*** *This assertion is incorrect, as the USAF is and will remain an offense-centric fighting force for years to come. The world leader in aircraft development, tactics, and weapons technology, the United States cannot forfeit these capabilities and still retain its status as the world's remaining superpower. Furthermore, complete victory in the GWOT is dependent upon the protective overhead umbrella provided by offensive airpower - something that land forces cannot function without in modern conflict*.

Force Focus-Based Leadership

Though the Air Force is not yet sixty years old, much has changed in its short lifetime as an armed service. Born two years after the end of World War Two, the USAF started out as a collection of aircraft left over from its days as the Army Air Corps, struggling to make a name for itself and shed its prior association with the United States Army. As the Air Force entered the 1950s, relations with the Soviet Union increased in intensity as the Cold War became a reality to the average American. The Soviets had entered space before the United States, and applied this rocket technology towards the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) - weapons which could reach the major population centers of the United States and attack them with multiple nuclear warheads. In order to combat such a threat, the Air Force leadership decided to take on the mission of nuclear deterrence, which resulted in a large nuclear buildup that was meant to keep the Soviets from launching their own weapons, for fear of American and NATO reprisals.

As part of the great arms race with the Soviets, the USAF began assembling the largest strategic bomber force in the service's history, along with hundreds of ICBMs stationed around the country. To ensure the success of such a drastic force transformation, General Charles E. LeMay was selected as the Commander of Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1948. Selected for his experience with strategic bombing in World War Two, LeMay's vision and drive had transformed the organization from humble beginnings to a highly-disciplined, well-respected command. Because of the great importance put in the nuclear deterrence mission, SAC and its generals became the most highly-regarded personnel of the USAF during the 1950s and 60s. For this reason, General LeMay was selected as Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) in 1961,[1] leading the Air Force at a time when the focus on strategic airpower was at its peak. This trend continued for many years, as every CSAF from 1947 to 1982 had his roots in the strategic bomber community.[2]

The mission of SAC was the central focus of the Air Force until a transition period in the 1960s and 70s (Vietnam-

era), when the force made a shift towards a tactical orientation. Along with this shift came the development of new tactical fighter and attack aircraft (A-10, F-15, and F-16) for the USAF after its experiences in Vietnam with the aging F-4, F-100, and F-105 platforms. This new mission focus of the 1980s and 90s resulted in fighter and attack pilots rising through the ranks to assume positions of great responsibility throughout the Air Force instead of the bomber pilots. Since 1982, all Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force have been fighter pilots,[3] as the USAF presently continues its emphasis on tactical operations.

With the GWOT ensuring a focus on small-scale, counter-insurgent warfare until the worldwide terrorist threat has been eliminated, it is natural to speculate that the leadership of the Air Force will remain under the control of a combat aviator and not one from the air mobility community. However, an interesting question that may be posed is whether future Air Force senior leaders will continue to be drawn purely from the ranks of fighter pilots or whether bomber pilots will be given a greater chance at leadership and influence within the service. To answer this question, it is likely that bomber pilots may soon have the opportunity at senior leadership in the US Air Force, but will be filling the roles as a tactical aviators (not strategic as in the 1950s) since today's mission focus requires USAF bomber aircraft to perform tactical missions such as close air support and on-demand precision strike.

In order for bomber pilots to take on very senior leadership roles in the Air Force, the current population of Vietnam and late Cold War-era fighter pilots must have already retired, and the generation of combat aviators (fighter or bomber) who began their careers at the end of the Cold War (early 1990s) must be in positions of influence. These officers are likely to be more liberal in their choices for senior leadership, as they entered the Air Force at a time when SAC and Tactical Air Command (TAC) became one organization: Air Combat Command (ACC). It is this blending of mission areas that fosters a true sense of unity between the two mission areas – united in their involvement in tactical-level operations regardless of the type of combat aircraft they fly.

Offensive Aircraft in the War on Terror

Today, offensive airpower operations are the premier aerial mission in the GWOT because they preempt all other movements, whether in the air or on the ground. Their actions are necessary in order to clear the way for follow-on forces, which traditionally include ground troops and unarmed support aircraft. In the beginning of major combat operations in Iraq, the first aerial missions against the Iraqis were attempting to decapitate the leadership with strikes against Saddam Hussein by two USAF F-117 Nighthawks.[4] This use of one of our offensive capabilities, although unsuccessful, could have changed the course of the war and made victory more-easily won had the Iraqi leader been killed.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began with an effort to capture Iraqi oil terminals before they could be destroyed by enemy forces and cause harmful environmental and financial effects. USAF A-10s and AC-130s provided close air support while Navy SEAL and British Marine air-assaulted these facilities and offshore rigs on the tip of the Faw peninsula and in the Persian Gulf, respectively.[5]

As USAF F-15s protected the skies in conjunction with their Navy and coalition counterparts, the air war shifted its focus onto precision strikes on the second day of fighting. Using platforms such as the B-1, B-2, F-15E, and F-117, the laser and GPS-guided munitions carried by these aircraft made short work of their assigned targets after they were located and illuminated by SOF ground units. These targets included command and control installations, buildings, and structures, along with military targets in Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tikrit.[6] These offensive actions denied situational awareness to the Iraqi forces, lowering their preparedness for the massive ground invasion to come. However, while

the Army's Third Infantry Division (ID) and the First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) made their push towards Baghdad, the offensive capabilities of coalition airpower were further utilized to clear the battlefield. As part of these clearing efforts, USAF A-10s, B-1s, B-52s, F-15Es, and MQ-1s[7] were used in order to soften Iraqi resistance ahead of the American ground advance. This played a major part in enabling the ground forces to reach Baghdad so rapidly, as the battlefield had already been prepared for them. Though all of the airlift aircraft in the USAF inventory played a large role in moving these troops and supplies to and within Iraq, such operations would not have been possible without the protection and battlefield preparation of attack, bomber, and fighter aircraft.

World Leader in Offensive Operations

As the world's sole remaining superpower, the United States has been put into a role of leadership when nations decide to commit to military action. In a world dependent on consensus before such actions are made, America must often take the lead in forming a coalition for military operations. Traditional Cold War alliances aside, the coalition warfare concept became very common after the capitulation of the Soviet Union and the world entered a new era of threats in the 1990s. In each major military action from the beginning of the decade, the United States has taken the lead role in forming the coalition associated with the operation. This first began in 1990 when America led an eleven-nation coalition in an effort to liberate Kuwait from its Iraqi aggressors in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.[8] This continued in 1994 as the United States led the NATO bombing campaign over Bosnia against the Bosnian Serbs in Operation Deliberate Force.[9] These efforts against the Serbs continued again four years later in 1999, this time in the skies over Kosovo in a 78-day NATO effort to bring down then-Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic for his human-rights atrocities against the citizens of the Kosovo province in Yugoslavia.[10]

Most-recently, the United States took the lead in forming a coalition in 2001 for the start of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), an effort aimed at rooting out the al-Qaeda terrorist network responsible for the September 11 attacks. With their sanctuary in the high, snowy peaks of Afghanistan, coalition troops still faced a great challenge in attempting to rid the country of the Taliban, the dominant tribe in Afghanistan which allowed al-Quaeda to remain in the country. In 2003, the United States spearheaded Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) against Saddam Hussein's regime and its presumed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and ties to Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. Though lacking the widespread international support that is normally associated with a coalition, a select number of American allies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Poland, and the United Kingdom) have contributed their support to the operation, along with smaller contingents from other countries.[11]

A Legacy of Respect

Without its robust offensive capabilities, the United States would not have been able to take the lead role in many of the conflicts above. While war is always the least-desirable option following exhaustive attempts at diplomacy and negotiations, it is often the only method to communicate the intent of our respective governments. However, many of the adversaries that the United States and its allies have faced over the years have been led by fanatics whose only sources of power or persuasion come in the form of fear and violence. In order to combat these radicals on behalf of the United States government and the free world, the USAF has retained air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities that are unparalleled by any other nation in the world - the result of superior training, equipment, funding, doctrine, and experience.

The effectiveness of USAF fighter, bomber, and attack aircraft has been witnessed in numerous post-Cold War operations throughout the past fifteen years, but none more so than in Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. During these conflicts, many Air Force aircraft earned very destructive reputations

among the enemy, with the A-10 becoming the most-feared aircraft by the Iraqi Army. With its large 30mm cannon and AGM-65 Maverick missiles, this "tank-buster" was able to decimate Iraqi tanks, vehicles, and troop concentrations.[12] The B-52G also became an object of fear with Iraqi troops as they were startled by the bombers' low approaches and screeching engines, their tanks and artillery suddenly becoming charred hulks of scrap metal as a result of the "BUFF's" lethal payload.[13] Desert Storm also marked the "official" debut of the F-117 – the Air Force's first stealth platform (the Nighthawk first saw combat in Panama in 1989, secretly assisting in Operation Just Cause). Nicknamed *shaba* (ghost) by the Saudis, the F-117 wreaked havoc over the skies of Baghdad, striking targets undetected and causing great fear and confusion among the Iraqi air defense units.[14]

The US Air Force's air-to-ground aircraft were not the only ones to garner a fearsome reputation. In Desert Storm, the Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) suffered thirty-five air-to-air losses at the hands of coalition fighter pilots, with thirty-three of them coming from USAF F-15Cs.[15] The "Eagle Drivers" of Iraqi Freedom expected to find the same target-rich environment, but were disappointed to see that the IQAF had opted to not fly a single offensive sortie against the American aerial armada sweeping the skies of the country.[16] Once a proud air force boasting then-modern Soviet equipment and pilots trained in Soviet tactics, the IQAF found itself burying its fighter and attack aircraft in the sands of the desert, hoping to preserve them in order to fight another day (though the wings and tails had been plasma-torched from the fuselage and the internal systems ruined by the sand).

The USAF has built an impressive reputation throughout the years by its superior training, aggressive nature, performance in battle, and is presently regarded as the most-skilled group of combat aviators in the world. It is this mystique of invincibility that discouraged the IQAF from rising to meet the USAF aircraft, allowing for unhampered air dominance in the opening days of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Foreign Military Sales Benefits

The offensive nature of the US Air Force has allowed it to lead the world in not only the aerial arena, but in aircraft development as well. With such a focus on aerial supremacy and dominance, the United States has developed an aerospace industry unrivaled anywhere in the world. This industry has produced such successful combat platforms as the McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom II and F-15 Eagle series, and the Lockheed-Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon and F-35 series. The production of these aircraft offered quality aircraft systems not only to the USAF, but also to the air forces of other nations, fostering friendships that have come to benefit the United States over the years in terms of diplomatic initiatives and continuing defense contracts.

One such example is the Israeli Air Force (IAF), which purchased the F-4 in the 1960s and used them effectively in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This success encouraged the further purchase of the F-16A/C and the F-15A/C/I models in the 1980s and 90s. The IAF F-16s became famous for the 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor,[17] while the F-15s distinguished themselves with over sixty aerial victories against Syrian aircraft over Lebanon in 1982.[18] This legacy of successful combat aircraft has encouraged Israel to take interest in the F-35 program as a foreign military sales participant in the Systems Development and Demonstration phase of the program,[19] and they remain a close ally in a region which has become increasingly hostile towards the United States.

Another instance of friendship bolstered by the sale of American combat aircraft is that with South Korea. After coming to its aid in the 1950s fight against North Korea and China, the United States has maintained a long-term presence on the southeast-Asian peninsula ever since. This relationship resulted in the South Korean purchase of the Northrop F-5 Tiger II, along with the F-4 and, eventually, the F-16C as the weapon of choice for its

premiere multi-role fighter aircraft.[20] In 2002, the Koreans agreed to purchase forty F-15K fighters (export version of the F-15E Strike Eagle), with the first production aircraft arriving in 2005.[21] These purchases are part of what has helped the United States maintain a continuing military presence in South Korea, which is of great strategic value in the increasingly-unstable Pacific region.

The bonds of friendship and cooperation with the Israelis and South Koreans have been forged in part by these aircraft purchases, as the United States has played a role in assisting these nations in properly equipping their militaries to deal with neighboring aggressor states. Many other instances of similar relationships can be seen with many other allied nations around the globe.

Conclusions

The existence of terrorism in the world will ensure the continuing American efforts in the Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. As part of these campaigns in ridding the world of fear and oppression, the United States must take an offensive stance to be effective against her enemies. The Air Force's contribution to these offensive efforts will be in the form of fighter, bomber, and attack aircraft assigned to satisfy the strategic goals of the United States. As long as this offensive mission is relevant, combat aviation will be the main focus of the Air Force, with air mobility operating in support of this function.

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"LET'S ROLL:" BRINGING USAF CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE UP TO DATE

BY

C1C Walter J. (Trey) Darnell III

The events of 9/11 showed the US Air Force that there are many improvements that must be made in the realm of continental air defense. Some of these improvements involve the relocation of air defense forces and updates to their equipment, along with a heightened awareness to emerging threats that come in the form of cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft. However, the greatest lesson which can be learned from 9/11 is the importance of partnerships between not only the United States armed services, but with international partners as well. The following pages will outline the manner in which all of these improvements can be implemented into today's USAF air defense forces, in hopes of securing safer skies for years to come.

The Basing Solution

As outlined in the literature review, the USAF air defense aircraft distribution and their respective quantities are in need of review in order to remain relevant to the threats currently posed to the United States. Their orientation throughout the country should be more evenly distributed, though greater concentration near heavily-populated areas should be stressed. In accomplishing this, more cooperation between the Air Force and FAA must occur, as the issue of continental air defense is no longer only a military problem. Civilian airliners were used against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 9/11, making it clear to see that any aircraft - military or civilian - can be used as a weapon. As a result of this, the current tri-region structure of ANG air defense (Northeast, Northwest, and Southeast Air Defense Sectors)[45] should be traded for a more localized command structure. The air defense sectors should be divided in accordance with each of the sectors monitored by the FAA's twenty-two Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC).[46] Within each of these sectors, one ANG fighter squadron will be placed in charge of the air defense for their respective airspace. Each squadron will supply two fighters for round-the-clock air defense alert, with an additional two fighters readied as spares. Upon being alerted of an unknown aircraft within their airspace, the pilots will coordinate with their local FAA radar center for aircraft tracking information and coordination. This lower-level focus will allow for a closer working relationship between the ANG and FAA, aiding in the expedient exchange of information which is critical in an emergency situation. Such an approach will also require only eighty-eight aircraft for nationwide air defense coverage, as opposed to the 150 that are used in today's air defense configuration.[47]

If a potential target is intercepted by a center's fighters and continues into another region, a simple radar "handoff" can be accomplished between the neighboring FAA centers (a common practice with thousands of aircraft traversing the country daily). This allows the contact to remain under constant monitoring and supervision through radar and visual identification by the fighters. Though interceptor aircraft cannot be directly controlled by FAA air traffic controllers, an Air Force liaison will be present at all times in each FAA control center in order to coordinate the actions of the fighters. The presence of this liaison will also allow for a faster decision on whether to destroy the contact if it is deemed hostile. This saves precious minutes in the decision process, possibly preventing the aircraft from reaching its final target destination.

Ground-Based Protection

Despite the need for better distribution of air defense coverage within the United States, it is still essential that particular attention be given to the defense of larger American cities. It is more likely that a domestic incident will involve a target within a heavily-populated area, as today's threats are likely to involve terrorists conducting attacks within America's borders to inflict the greatest possible psychological damage to the Ameri-

can people. In order to supplement the USAF air defense forces in protecting the nation, the DOD should consider a role for surface to air missile (SAM) systems in defending large population centers. Though it is not cost-effective to post SAM sites in every large city, an analysis could be done to assess which cities are in the greatest need of protection. With possible asymmetric threats including general aviation aircraft, hijacked airliners, SLCMs, and hostile UAVs, these weapons are likely to be used against targets where they will have the greatest effect on American morale. Likely targets in a domestic terrorist incident could include attacks on a city's population, critical infrastructure (bridges, power plants, water treatment facilities), centers of trade and commerce, national landmarks, or government facilities.

Such facilities are essential to the daily operations of a city, and must be protected from internal and external aerial attack. Rather than assign these protective duties to the Air Force, the US Army would be better-qualified to fill this role. The Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Corps of the Army is equipped with the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM), representing the latest combination in air defense radar and weapons technology. The Army's MEADS is specifically designed to detect manned and unmanned aircraft, as well as low-flying cruise missiles.[48] Upon detection, the SLAMRAAM missile would be employed to engage and destroy these targets.

The Army already has experience utilizing its battlefield air defense systems in large cities, as can be seen in the ADA presence in and around Washington D.C. for the defense of the critical nodes of American governmental and military infrastructure.[49] Such experience makes the ADA Corps the natural choice for the defense of America's large cities, relieving a great burden from USAF air defense forces as they patrol the skies of America's interior.

Tired Airframes and Outdated Systems

The issues of basing locations and protection of large cities are not the only problems which plague the USAF air defense force, with most ANG fighter aircraft becoming very old and in desperate need of replacement. The ANG air defense fleet is currently outfitted with the F-15A/B and F-16A/B/C/D aircraft, with the age of its F-15 fleet averaging 26.1 years old.[50] This is eight years older than the average F-15C/D on active duty[51]; a model which is already having trouble meeting mission readiness rates. Though the layman would think the age of air defense aircraft is of little consequence due to the low occurrence of actual intercepts, one must remember that seven out of ten of the ANG air defense squadrons are scheduled for regular, four month AEF rotations.[52] This is the same deployment strain that is put on active duty fighter aircraft, resulting in ANG aircraft enduring through the same structural stress not only in combat missions, but during stateside training as well. These statistics are often overlooked when it comes to the acquisition of new fighter aircraft for the ANG fleet.

In light of these statistics, the Air Force should replace its aging F-15A/Bs with newer C/D models being retired from the active duty fleet, and continue to employ its F-16C/D models in the air defense mission. The F-16C/D does not have as powerful radar as the F-15C/D, but this does not deny its usefulness in overland air defense missions which do not involve cruise missile interception (not requiring the precision of the AESA system). Only a limited number of F-15s are needed to fill the air defense mission, and these F-15Cs could be outfitted with the new APG-63 V(2) AESA radar that has already been fitted on eighteen active duty F-15Cs.[53] The addition of the AESA system would greatly aid in the Eagles' ability to detect, track, and engage small, fast, low-flying objects such as SLCMs. While critics of such a proposition would claim that the outfitting of the "new" ANG F-15Cs with the APG-63 V(2) would be a costly endeavor, it should be noted that ACC has already slated 160 active duty

F-15C/Ds for the upgrade,[54] resulting in no additional costs to the ANG.

The alternative to the refitting of the F-15C fleet with the AESA is the employment of the F-22A Raptor as an air defense fighter. While its funding was still being debated in Congress, it was touted that the F-22 could be used in homeland defense by engaging incoming SLCMs with its AESA radar. However, the Air Force currently plans to buy only 183 of these advanced aircraft,[55] making it a highly sought-after weapon system by combatant commanders around the world. It is unrealistic to expect that the Air Force's newest and most advanced fighter would be relegated to an air defense role so early in its operational lifetime. In light of this fact, the AESA-equipped F-15C appears as the clear choice for the Air Force's contribution to coastal cruise missile defense. The F-16C/Ds assigned to the ANG air defense role should retain their current radar systems, as they would be assigned to the interior of the country and do not require specialized equipment to track cruise missiles.

The Cruise Missile Solution

The missile threat that is presented to the United States comes from the development of sea-launched cruise missile programs in numerous countries, to include hostile actors such as Iran and North Korea. Unlike ballistic missiles, the development of an SLCM is cheaper and simpler, making this technology much more accessible to developing countries. These weapons cannot only be delivered from submarines and surface combatant ships, but civilian merchant vessels as well. The SLCM requires relatively little space from which to be launched, needing only a tube housing and attachment assembly, which can be easily-concealed inside cargo containers aboard a disguised civilian vessel. Upon launching from the ship, the SLCM skims the waves at very low altitude and high speeds, navigating autonomously to its target using a varied route in order to confuse the enemy. The small size of the SLCM, combined with its high speed and use of ocean waves to conceal its radar signature, make it a very difficult target to track from an aircraft.

The SLCM threat is one which has never been specifically countered by the United States, and the mere fact that it is an airborne weapon system has placed the burden of responsibility upon the Air Force to defend against it. However, the best counter that the Air Force can pose to an incoming SLCM is the F-15 and its powerful radar and medium-range missiles. In order to better-equip the Air Force for the possibility of fending off an SLCM attack, the service must fit its F-15Cs with the new APG-63 V(2) radar. As mentioned before, this system uses the AESA design concept in its operations. This allows for better tracking ability of more targets than the first version of the radar. This heightened capability is the only realistic, near-term solution which the Air Force can bring to the SLCM dilemma.

Despite the advances in radar technology which could give Air Force F-15s a better chance at intercepting an incoming SLCM, the best way to counter the cruise missile threat is to not allow the situation to progress to the engagement stage. In light of this, greater steps must be taken to prevent SLCM launches, requiring greater cooperation with the US Coast Guard and Navy, with each service heightening its aerial and surface patrol presence in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. This logic seems to contradict the widely-held thought that sea patrols are a relic of World War II and the Cold War, but nothing could be further from the truth. Terrorist organizations make every effort to exploit the weaknesses of their larger enemies, and the United States' dismissal of seaborne threats is one of them.

The greatest threat posed to the United States comes from non-state actors such as terrorist groups, making the likelihood that a SLCM will originate from an enemy submarine or warship very small. Rather, commercial shipping provides the most effective means for a terrorist group to surreptitiously deliver such a weapon within range of the United States. The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with port authorities, must keep an accurate record of the ships coming into

the United States, their ports of origin, and a complete manifest of the cargo and crew aboard. If a vessel's whereabouts are questionable, the Navy must have small, fast ships available to intercept and board them before entering within launch range of the United States. While the Navy certainly does not have the resources to intercept every suspect ship, a vigilant presence at sea will send the message that any ship launching an SLCM will be considered a combatant and subsequently destroyed. Such practice will cause overseas shipping companies to carefully consider their decision to allow their ships to be used as terrorist weapons platforms. This method of deterrence may be the best means to fend off SLCM attacks against the United States, as aerial interception of these weapons remains difficult at best, even with AESA-equipped interceptor aircraft.

Manned Solutions to Unmanned Problems

The advent of the UAV in recent years has proven to be a revolutionary weapon system in the hands of its military users. While the UAV had been used for years in decoy, reconnaissance, and target drone roles, the USAF pioneered new uses for the platform in the GWOT. The service, along with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), armed its MQ-1 Predators with Hellfire air-to-ground missiles for use against targets of opportunity, which mainly consisted of leadership targets located in small buildings or traveling in light vehicles. Unfortunately, this offensive capability cannot be limited to only friendly actors, as seen by the Chinese conversion of fighter aircraft into armed UAVs.[56] Though the Chinese are only a potential example, hostile actors around the world could soon pose a great risk to the security of the United States with these aircraft, operating them from outside America's borders or even within the country as part of a terrorist act.

The recent emergence of UAVs for everyday use in the civilian world will make access to this technology commonplace in the near future. Such easy access makes the UAV a potential weapon for use by adversaries operating within America's borders. To combat such a threat, the production and sale of UAVs must be limited to government and commercial use, and restricted from private citizens. Furthermore, all UAVs must bear a standardized identification number similar to those used by manned civilian aircraft. Each UAV should also be outfitted with a transponder that is in continuous operation and cannot be deactivated by the user. Such measures would allow for the close regulation and monitoring of the civilian UAV presence within the US, helping prevent the use of these machines for harmful purposes against the United States. However, in order for these regulations to be effective, a governing body must be created that will enforce them. This should come in the form of a new branch of the FAA, created solely to the regulation and certification of America's UAVs.

From an Air Force standpoint, few changes need to be made to improve the defenses against the UAV threat. Perhaps the most valuable change that can come about is an increased awareness of the potential use of UAVs in acts of domestic terrorism against the American people, better-preparing air defense pilots for any future encounters with UAVs. In order to prepare them for such encounters, these pilots should practice intercepts on low-speed general aviation aircraft that simulate the flight characteristics of a UAV. Pilots should grow accustomed to holding formation with these low-speed aircraft, practicing weapons engagement procedures with the short-range missiles and cannon that will likely be used in an actual intercept. Additional considerations should be made for the inability of a UAV operator to see in his periphery, making it likely that the intercepting aircraft will not be detected. This will make interception easier for the fighter, but more hazardous, as the UAV could make unexpected movements into the flight path of the fighter. Air defense pilots must grow accustomed to such nuances that come with intercepting a UAV, and must make them part of their training regimen in order to safely execute future interceptions.

Such additions to the concepts of operations of USAF

air defense fighter units are essential in remaining relevant in today's world of changing threats. The emergence of hostile UAVs poses a growing danger to the internal security of the United States, and it is important that this threat is not taken lightly as USAF air defense forces look towards the future.

Improvements to North American Defense

Upon evaluation of the air defense capabilities of Canada and Mexico, it is clear that the burden of aerial defense for the North American continent has been yoked upon the USAF. This is not surprising, as both countries have only small air forces and are ill-equipped to provide effective air defense capabilities. Despite the small size of its military forces, Canada remains a highly effective partner with the United States in NORAD, providing aircraft and personnel to support the mission of monitoring American and Canadian airspace since 1958.[57] Canada's air defense aircraft appear to suffer from the same tendencies as the USAF, with its two squadrons of CF-18 Hornets based in a clustered orientation which is ineffective in projecting any sort of protective presence over the country.[58] Canada should be encouraged to separate these squadrons into smaller detachments of aircraft so that they may be spread across the territories in a better distribution of forces. However, the majority of this distribution should be focused in the southern half of the country, as much of northern Canada is very sparsely populated. Such basing would make the fighters more effective, as they would be closer to most of Canada's major cities and a limited number of large cities in the northern United States.

The air defense challenges faced by Mexico are much more difficult than those of Canada, since the country has little semblance of an air defense system in place. For many years, Mexico has existed as the peaceful neighbor on the southern border of the United States, having no major peer competitors to contend with. As a result, Mexico's military capabilities (particularly its air force) have been allowed to decay, having put little priority on modernization or development throughout the years. Mexico must be encouraged to modernize its small air force in order to meet the security demands of the new millennium. While terrorism is often seen as only an American problem, it has been proven to be a dilemma which the international community must confront together. The North American continent must be protected from such threats, and while it would be a fruitless venture to attempt to convince Mexico to join NORAD, an agreement of mutual air defense protection must be pursued between our countries. As a token of goodwill in starting such a partnership, perhaps the DOD should refurbish and donate a limited number of currently-retired F-16C/D aircraft to the Mexican Air Force to replace its aging F-5 fleet. These fighters are already in desperate need of replacement, and such a gesture may encourage the Mexican government to agree to cooperate in air defense matters.

Whatever the outcome of these recommendations, Canada and Mexico remain sovereign nations with political wills which are independent of the United States' desires. While better placement of Canadian air defense fighters and the modernization of the Mexican Air Force would be ideal outcomes in helping preserve the security of the United States' northern and southern borders, these nations must be convinced that such actions would be in their own self interest as well. Today's global security crisis makes international partnerships such as these a priceless commodity, and these relationships must continue to be developed in the years to come for the mutual protection of all parties involved.

CONCLUSIONS

Findings

After a thorough evaluation of the current conditions of USAF air defense forces, it is clear that there are problems within its force structure, equipment, and defense relationships. The first of these problems is the basing orientation of USAF air defense fighter squadrons, all twelve of which are currently aligned in a

manner which reflects the outwardly-defensive orientation of the Cold War. There remain no permanent USAF air defense units on the interior of the country, resulting in an unintentional neglect of the defense of America's large inland population centers, such as Chicago or Denver. Large cities such as these are likely candidates for a large terrorist attack in the near future, and are in need of more formidable aerial protection.

Limited not only to base orientations, problems in USAF air defense also lie in the aircraft used for this essential homeland defense mission. Equipped with F-15A/Bs for use against incoming aerial targets, the operational lifetime of the F-15A/B is quickly drawing to an end. The average age of these aircraft is over twenty-six years old, resulting in lowered mission-capable rates, higher maintenance costs, and fewer airframes available for use on a daily basis. Furthermore, the capabilities offered by the F-15A/B are lacking in terms of radar capability, as it is equipped with an older system that has a limited ability for tracking cruise missiles traveling at high speeds and low altitudes.

Aside from the current force structure issues within USAF air defense, there are many threats that have arisen in recent years which could pose great danger to America's aerial sovereignty. The first of these threats is the risk of SLCM attack against the United States. The use of these weapons is no longer limited to foreign military powers, as they are relatively inexpensive to build or acquire by any worldwide terrorist organization. Terrorists could possibly use commercial shipping vessels as launch platforms for these weapons, striking at targets within the United States from ships that are assumed to be civilian noncombatants. Such a threat has largely been ignored by the USAF because it lacks adequate capabilities to counter cruise missiles, with the F-15A/B as the only defense.

Another potential air defense threat which has been given little consideration is that of UAVs. These aircraft were originally designed for military purposes, but are slowly gaining popularity in civilian applications. There is a risk that a terrorist organization could utilize these aircraft in attacks within the United States, unbeknownst to military or civilian authorities, as they would likely blend in with the thousands of other slow-speed, general aviation aircraft that take to America's skies every day. USAF air defense forces are in need of new tactics in order to combat such a threat, as most pilots are accustomed to performing intercepts on faster military aircraft or civilian airliners, and are unfamiliar with the procedures used in a UAV intercept.

Beyond the scope of air defense within the American homeland, the United States must also pay closer attention to the air defense capabilities of its neighbors, Canada and Mexico. Both countries field relatively weak air defense forces, putting not only their respective countries at risk, but also the well-being of millions of Americans who might be affected as a result of an attack from within their borders. Though the NORAD partnership between the United States and Canada has remained strong for almost fifty years, America has contributed the majority of manpower and equipment to the mission of mutual air defense of the North American continent. Turning to America's southern neighbors, Mexican air defense forces remain nearly non-existent, as well as any defense cooperation between the two countries.

Recommendations

From the findings of the author's research, there are many fundamental changes and improvements which must be made to USAF air defense in order to remain relevant to tomorrow's threats. The first of these improvements is a reorganization of basing for air defense fighters. This would involve the splitting of today's twelve air defense squadrons into six-plane detachments, and their integration into each one of the FAA's Air Route Tracking Centers. Such integration would foster greater cooperation and exchange of information between military and civil authorities – essential elements in homeland defense.

Further improvements can be made in terms of the USAF air defense fleet, as its primary fighter aircraft, the F-15A/B, is aging and in need of immediate replacement. The most fea-

sible short-term solution is the installation of the APG-63V(2) radar on existing F-15C/Ds, and their subsequent transfer to the ANG for use in the air defense role. Such a solution would suffice for the next ten years, and perhaps future Air Force acquisitions of the F-22 will be high enough to warrant the Raptor's limited employment in the air defense role.

Along with the need for new aircraft, USAF air defense must remain vigilant for the next generation of aerial threats. Of these, the SLCM threat is one which the Air Force has little ability to counter. Though the F-15C/D has a greater chance of detecting and destroying a cruise missile than its older predecessor, such a task will still prove difficult to accomplish. For this reason, greater responsibility for defending against cruise missiles should be placed upon the US Coast Guard and Navy. These services should employ their ships and maritime patrol aircraft in efforts to prevent the launch of SLCMs, either by keeping a close watch on suspicious commercial shipping or approaching enemy maritime combatants. Such methods may seem reminiscent of those used in World War II, but are still applicable and necessary in the twenty-first century.

The other emerging threat to the American homeland is the UAV. In order to effectively combat these aircraft, a culture change must occur within the air defense community, recognizing these seemingly-harmless aircraft as viable threats. Along with this culture change must come new tactics and training standards in order to acclimate pilots to the engagement of these slow, pilotless aircraft. Such training should include practice intercepts at slow speeds and low altitudes, as well as growing accustomed to operating in close proximity to an aircraft without a pilot, remaining alert for abrupt changes in altitude, heading, or speed.

The final recommendations for USAF air defense lie in the establishment of greater cooperation among the Air Force and other military services, American and foreign alike. Like the relationship established with the US Coast Guard and Navy for coastal protection, the Air Force should make efforts to transfer some of the continental air defense mission to the ADA Corps of the US Army. The ADA is ideally suited for the protection of large American cities with its advanced radar systems and surface-to-air missiles. Such a shift in responsibility would give USAF air defense aircraft the tactical independence to actively pursue threats, rather than being defensively anchored to the confined airspace of their assigned city.

Aside from stronger bonds among the USAF and its sister services, greater air defense cooperation is needed beyond America's borders with Canada and Mexico. While Canada does offer assets to the air defense mission, it would be of great benefit to NORAD efforts if the Canadian Air Force would give a more equal distribution to its air defense fighters. Perhaps the same practice of splitting the fighters into detachments and assigning them to civilian air traffic control centers would be effective in Canada as well, with the USAF being used as an example for the implementation of such a system.

The condition of Mexican air defense forces remains more complicated than that of Canada, and the USAF must make efforts to establish closer military ties with its southern neighbor. This can be accomplished by holding of bi-national air defense exercises along the US-Mexico border, as well as the establishment of mutual air defense agreements between the two countries. The sale or donation of refurbished F-16C/D aircraft to the Mexican Air Force may serve as a catalyst for these improvements, and should be considered as a possible course of action for the DOD and USAF to undertake.

Implications of Findings

The implications of these findings serve to highlight the current shortfalls of the USAF in the air defense mission in respect to force basing, condition of equipment, preparedness for emerging threats, and the need for closer relationships among the branches of the American, Canadian, and Mexican militaries for the common defense of North America. Such findings are critical to the development of more effective air defense tactics, methods,

and relationships which are essential for the security and defense of the United States in the years to come.

Though the most immediate needs of the USAF air defense force have been addressed, there are still many areas of American continental defense can be improved by further investigation and study. It would be of great benefit to the Air Force and the security of the entire nation if research were conducted into the air defense practices of the Israeli Air Force. This elite service has developed a reputation for its ingenuity and deadly skill in the defense of its homeland, and many lessons can be learned from a nation which fights for its survival on a daily basis. Along with noting current tactics and trends in the air defense of other nations, the Air Force should also look to the future for potential developments in air defense aircraft and equipment. A long-term replacement for the F-15C/D must be found, whether its successor lies in the F-22, or the development of a new, unmanned fighter suited for the air defense role. Developing technologies will also play a part in the future of air defense, with research necessary for the application of space-based or lighter-than-air systems for nationwide radar coverage, possibly making ground-based radar obsolete.

It is hoped that the preceding recommendations will prompt changes in the USAF air defense force in order to maintain the fighting edge that the Air Force has held against America's adversaries for almost sixty years. It is the charge of the present and future Air Force leadership to ensure that the necessary changes are implemented, and that American skies will never again be used as a means for attacks against the citizens of the United States. In the words of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz: "To them we have a solemn obligation."

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"So Help Me God:"

The U.S. Military's Growing Recruitment and Retention Battle

C1C Walter J. (Trey) Darnell III

Introduction

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) is a conflict unlike any other fought in the Twentieth or Twenty-First centuries. It directly opposes the old belief that wars can always be won with better technology, as our enemies have forced the United States to fight with the lowest common denominator of combat: the individual solider. Unimpressed by the effects of smart weapons or nuclear missiles, the terrorist enemy operates in self-sustaining cells that span the globe and are expendable if destroyed. They have presented the United States with few centers of gravity at which to strike, forcing the American military to revert to the traditional method of using individual soldiers to eliminate theirs. This type of combat puts a much greater emphasis on the human element of war, and is taking its toll on the personnel within the branches of the US military. This war, while far from being an impossible undertaking, is one which will take a constant application of force for a sustained period of time in order to bring victory. However, the individuals applying this force must be able to endure as well.

In order to ensure the endurance of military personnel, a crucial balance must always be struck between operational involvement and management of human resources, an issue which has traditionally suffered inattention by the United States government. The military has been forced to "do more with less" for a number of years, under the guise of the creation of a "leaner, meaner force" that operates with greater efficiency than ever before. While this premise may apply in the need for fewer F/A-22s than current numbers of F-15s, it is irrelevant when human resources are concerned. Equipment and technology may improve over the years, but the thoughts and emotions of their human

operators can never be upgraded to better-suit the situation.

Thesis: In order to maintain the well-being of the current military personnel force, the senior leadership in the civilian government and Department of Defense (DOD) must decide either to scale-back its operational commitments or allocate the much-needed human and fiscal resources to the armed services. If the armed services are forced to follow their current path, they will find themselves with too-few personnel to accomplish their objectives due to widespread dissatisfaction with today's standard of living within the military.

The sources of this dissatisfaction are many, and their root causes lie in today's small number of military personnel. With so few people to perform the tasks assigned to them, the services have been forced to extend the deployment lengths of its members in order to compensate. These longer deployments have had great effects on the lives of service members, to include a rise in the divorce rate of military couples, a reduction in the numbers of new recruits each year, and a decline in the number of reenlistments by those already in uniform. The lucrative benefits of civilian life have often been enough to lure soldiers out of the military, enticed by higher salaries, safer working conditions, and a more stable home life.

Lengthy deployments

With the realization that US forces would have to maintain a long-term commitment in order to achieve victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, the services have steadily increased the length of deployments that their members must endure. In 2000, before the war on terror had begun, Army soldiers were limited to 179-day overseas deployments.[1] Five years later, it is now common practice for the same soldiers to be gone from nine months to a year at a time while deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan.[2] Operating under the newly-created Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) system, the Air Force wanted to make deployment times for predictable for its Airmen, creating a cycle of 90-day deployments every fifteen months.[3] This would allow them to better-plan their lives around their military service and be more prepared when the time came for an Airman to leave home for an extended period of time.[4] However, that has changed drastically since the beginning of combat operations in October, 2001. In the years that followed, the maximum amount of time an Airman can be deployed has changed from ninety to 120 days,[5] and up to 179 days for personnel in high-demand career fields.[6]

Heightened divorce rates

Many feel that divorce rates in military families are at higher levels than ever before as a result of these extended deployments. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2001, about 5600 Army members filed for divorce from their spouses. This number increased to over 7000 in FY02, almost 7500 in FY03, and was most recently measured at 10,477 in FY04.[7] This trend is astonishing, as the number of divorces has nearly doubled in the short span of four years, and can almost certainly be attributed to the heightened operations tempo that today's military forces have been forced to undertake. With such a dramatic increase in these statistics, it has been found that service members who are preoccupied with domestic affairs are more prone to disciplinary problems and less likely to reenlist.[8]

Guard and Reserves burdened

The heavy tasking of our active duty forces has forced the services to put a much greater reliance on their guard and reserve counterparts to help fill the gaps. The reserves were once thought of as a force to be used as a last resort if conventional forces required their support in a large-scale, conventional conflict (which the US had envisioned with the Soviets). Today, these soldiers who were once considered "weekend warriors" are now playing an integral part in the fight against the terrorist threat in Southwest Asia and other regions around the world. Members who signed up in the guard or reserves with plans to have their education paid for while making a small contribution to

their country's defense are sacrificing much more than they ever expected. These units are deployed just as much, if not more than active duty members.

The effects of these increased deployment rates extend far beyond an impact on a soldier's family or home life. Many reservists and guardsmen rely on full-time civilian jobs to provide the majority of their income, as reserve drill pay is certainly not enough to support a family. With their increased absence, many civilian companies are taking the jobs away from these reservists and giving them to people who are able to be at work every day. While some companies guarantee these reservists a job after returning from their military duties, it is often a position of lower standing within the organization, as the position they vacated was too important to be left unfilled.[9] This is a tremendous waste of experience, and is an improper way to repay a military member for their time in service to the nation.

The strong attraction of the civilian workforce has also become a major factor in military members' decisions to leave the military or never join in the first place. A job at a civilian corporation offers relatively regular hours to its workers and a fixed, rarely-changing schedule that can be relied upon. These factors alone are often attractive enough to draw military members into civilian companies, not to mention the higher pay that is usually offered for job skills for which they earned less money when in uniform. While the military does offer a steady source of income, many service members live and work in very hazardous conditions for extended periods of time, bringing feelings of uncertainty about the future and concern for the well-being of their families should they die in the dangerous environments of Iraq or Afghanistan. These emotionally-taxing attributes of military service in time of war also play a great role in the deterrence of prospective recruits and reduced retention of current military personnel.

Recruitment and Retention

From 1993 to 1999, the Rand Corporation conducted a study on the retention of military personnel, analyzing the numbers of service members who separated from the military in terms of service branch, wartime involvement, and promotion rates, along with many others. It was found that reenlistments in the Army increased when deployments were raised from one month to six months, while those in the Air Force, Navy, and Marines went down when the deployments were increased by the same number of months.[10] Additionally, the number of first-term reenlistments in the Army went up as the number of deployments into hostile regions increased from zero to one in a junior enlisted person's career.[11] However, the Air Force and Navy reenlistments went down as the number of hostile deployments increased from zero to one, and one to two.[12]

This study is somewhat dated, having been conducted during the 1990s, a time when the United States was faced with a multitude of small contingency operations, but no large scale conflict such as the current stability and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, brought about by the GWOT. Surprisingly, the numbers of personnel in the military services has been remarkably consistent and, in some cases, has risen since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

When comparing the military's success at meeting its recruiting goals, FY04 is used because it is the most recent fiscal year that has been documented (FY05 results have not been compiled from each of the services). During FY04, all active duty services achieved 101 percent of their recruiting goals, with the exception of the Marine Corps at 100 percent.[13] The reserve components of all four services met their recruiting goals of 100 percent or above, yet the Army and Air National Guards did not meet their recruiting standards. The Army National Guard attained an 87 percent recruiting rate in FY04 (up from 82 percent in FY03), and the Air National Guard scored a 94 percent.[14] Though FY05 has ended as of 30 September, little data has been

released concerning DOD recruitment rates, with the exception of the Army National Guard. This branch achieved only 80 percent of its recruiting goal,[15] a significant decrease from the previous fiscal year. It is interesting to note that the National Guard units (Army and Air Force) are the only organizations unable to meet their recruiting goals, which can perhaps be attributed to the over-tasking of these units in comparison to active duty and reserve units.

The statistics from the Department of Defense's retention rates almost mirror those of recruitment. In terms of active duty members remaining on active duty during FY04, all four services scored 100 percent or above in their retention goals, meaning that no more people decided to leave the service than was expected. The Marine Corps topped the list at 137 percent retention of its enlisted members who are in their second enlistment and beyond.[16] These figures are very encouraging, especially in a time of war when some might expect morale to be very low. In fact, it has been found that service members are more likely to reenlist in a time of crisis, under the presumption that their patriotism and duty concept drive them to continue serving.[17] The Army and Air National Guard were the only reserve units to come close to the attrition ceiling set forth by the DOD, with the Army National Guard losing 18.6 percent of its members (19.5 percent ceiling), and the Air National Guard losing 11.5 percent (12.0 percent ceiling) in FY04.[18]

Efforts to Improve Lives

Though the prospects may not look so grim for the active duty and reserve forces, it seems that the GWOT is taking its toll on Army and Air National Guard units. It is unknown why this is occurring, but could be attributed to the reduced pay and benefits of the Guard when compared to Regular service. Along with being paid less, these units deploy and fight with nearly the same frequency as their active duty counterparts.

In order to prevent further losses to the Army and Air National Guards and to prevent negative trends in the active or reserve forces, the services have implemented many measures to try and keep soldiers in uniform. For example, the DOD has won a slew of financial benefits for service members who are deployed to a combat zone. These include a Family Separation Allowance, Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay, and the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion.[19] The tax exclusion program was introduced in 1996 and is one reason why many junior enlisted members volunteer to be sent to Southwest Asia, as their pay will be tax-free for the entire duration of the tour.[20]

Aside from DOD-wide initiatives, there have been many service-specific programs aimed at preserving the numbers of one's branch. The Army has offered up to $150,000 in bonuses to special operations personnel with nineteen years of experience who are willing to devote five more years of service. Appealing to the younger generation, the Army is increasing its college scholarship offerings from $50,000 to $70,000 for those interested in making the Army a lifestyle, as well as advertising cash bonuses up to $20,000 dollars for those willing to fill undermanned career fields as enlisted members.[21] Though these monetary benefits are attractive and may be an effective short-term solution, committing the majority of one's adult life to the defense of the country requires a cewrtain amount of self-motivation, one that cannot be replaced by a large cash bonus. This is not enough likely to be to maintain a corps of career-minded soldiers that form the backbone of America's military forces.

To address such issues as divorce rates, the military is offering additional programs to aid its personnel. As part of service-wide efforts to curb the increasing rates of failed marriages, the Army has implemented internal programs to prevent marital problems in couples before the sponsor deploys and is unable to be home to resolve arguments. Called Building Strong and Ready Families (BSRF), this Army-wide initiative funds marriage retreats for hundreds of Army couples each year, allowing them to escape the confines of military life and discuss their marital

and personal issues in a more relaxed environment.[22] While this program is a step towards improvement, not all couples are able to attend these retreats. Additionally, this one-time program is insufficient to prepare couples for the rigors of separation, though this could be possible if subsequent programs continued throughout the soldier's career.

Conclusions

The findings above are not yet indicative of an end to the all-volunteer force concept in the near future. However, if current conditions are allowed to persist in which a relatively small number of personnel are forced to deploy countless times in support of the war on terror, trouble could be looming on the horizon. With the recent spike in military divorces, increase in deployment lengths, loss of civilian jobs by deployed Guard and Reserve members, and more attractive positions in the civilian workplace, it is only a matter of time before these factors have a significant negative affect on the numbers of active duty personnel choosing to join or remain in the military.

Though many may see these problems as timeless, unavoidable consequences of military life, this author believes that some of these problems can be prevented if pursued in the correct manner. However, in order to resolve these personnel issues, proactive steps must be taken on the part of the senior DOD leadership. If they are not, the United States' ability to project power on a global scale could be threatened by personnel problems which were once easily-preventable, but deemed too insignificant to address.

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MORALE AND UNIT COHESION: MULTIPLIERS OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

By
C1C Ilea Eskildsen

"Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely." Ardant du Picq's 1870 statement still holds true today. The sentiment in du Picq's statement is represented by a very effective multiplier of combat effectiveness: unit cohesion. James G. Pulley, a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army wrote, "For centuries, armies throughout the world have studied the art of fighting wars ... but certain principles consistently come to the front. One of these is that men who go into battle and fight as cohesive teams always produce better results" (Elton). Of near equal importance to unit cohesion is unit morale. If the soldier's morale is high, he will be more likely to attack effectively. As important as unit cohesion and morale have proven to be, current and past Army manning systems have worked against achieving these important factors. A greater level of combat effectiveness will be achieved if the Army abandons its current Individual Replacement System, which we be discussed later in the paper, in favor of a unit manning structure.

Combat effectiveness is a measure of a military force's ability to accomplish its goals. Morale is by one definition, how a soldier feels, and it can be influenced by several physical and physiological factors. The effect of morale on combat effectiveness is demonstrated by examining the success of Napoleon Bonaparte and his beliefs regarding morale. High morale can be the deciding factor in a battle between forces with a disparity in number. This may be important as United States forces are decreased and small special operations forces take on an increasing number of missions. Napoleon Bonaparte was able to conquer a vast amount of territory in Europe, and asserted that, "Morale makes up three quarters of the game; the relative balance of manpower accounts only for the remaining quarter." Combat effectiveness is influenced by several factors ranging from technology to leadership. Although the technical capabilities of the United States are a large factor in the success of its military endeavors, the true strength lies in the heart of its soldiers (Wong iii). Troop morale and unit cohesion are vital components to increasing combat effectiveness. Morale has been described as "the greatest single factor in war," and its importance is validated by the fact that military writers have been focusing on the subject since the fourth century B.C. (Richardson 1). Due to its intangible nature, the idea of morale has acquired more than one definition. It has been described as "the mental, emotional, and spiritual state of the individual", but more vividly as, "that instinctive feeling of strength and superiority; that which at the outset gives a feeling of confidence and an assurance of victory through…unconquerable ability" (Zentner 13).

The fulfillment of physical and psychological needs influence morale. Physical needs include adequate food, water, and rest (Zentner 16). The film "12 O'Clock High" depicts an example of diminished performance as a direct result of lack of rest. In this film, the 918th Group aircrews during World War II succumb to a barrage of flying sorties with no hope of respite. This lack of rest takes its toll on the officers and men, contributing to a high rate of casualties and failures. The group's commander, Colonel Davenport, realized the need for rest and became more concerned with his men's well being, rather than the accomplishment of the mission, eventually leading to his removal from command. When Colonel Davenport discussed crew readiness with the flight surgeon, he learned that there were twenty eight men requesting excusal from flying missions. This rate was three times normal. The physical needs of the 918th Group were not fulfilled, resulting in a lack of motivation. Also, the men's morale could have been influenced by the relative fulfillment of their psychological needs.

The degree to which a man has confidence in himself

and his equipment affects the morale and effectiveness of the soldier. In addition, it is necessary for soldiers to take a recess from the rigors of war and enjoy life (Zentner 16). The existence of morale, welfare, and recreation programs in the armed services demonstrates the need for a recess from the stresses of war. Confidence in one's equipment increases morale because it serves as point of pride which the unit can rally around. It has been noted that the 362nd Fighter Group, which performed well while supporting General George S. Patton's Third Army in WWII, had confidence in their P-47s as being the "best attack aircraft in the world" (Zentner 59). A unit must also have some degree of confidence that their mission will succeed. In regards to the lack of motivation in the 918th Air Group, Colonel Davenport stated, "they'll die for you, but they've got to have a chance and they know they haven't got one" (12 O'Clock High). Thus, a unit that enters a battle weary from war, and with little confidence, will be severely demoralized and ineffective.

Going hand-in-hand with morale is the important concept of unit cohesion. Primary group cohesion refers to the bonds between small groups of people. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary defines 'cohesion' as "the act or state of sticking together tightly," but cohesion among soldiers is much more than that. Primary group cohesion results in intense familial bonds. These bonds are so strong that a soldier's natural instinct of self-preservation is overcome by his need to support his comrades (Richardson 9). When asked what motivates them to keep going and give their all, the overwhelming response from soldiers who fought in Operation Iraqi Freedom was, "fighting for my buddies"(Wong 9). American soldiers are afraid of letting their comrades down. This primary unit cohesion contributes to combat effectiveness in many ways. It "places a burden of responsibility on each soldier to achieve group success and protect the unit from harm" (Wong 10). The cohesion also provides each soldier with the confidence that someone is watching their back and looking out for them. One soldier stated that, "You have got to trust them more than your father, your mother…or anybody. [Your fellow soldiers become] almost like your guardian angel" (Wong 11). This confidence empowers the soldier to do his job without worry.

Primary group cohesion, vital to combat effectiveness, is fostered through shared experiences and time spent together. The shared experience of training prior to combat is one of the most influential developers of unit cohesion. Bonds form as soldiers struggle and work together to train and accomplish goals (Wong 12). Familial bonds are also nurtured when the soldiers are not in training or combat. Spending nearly every waking moment with one another and partaking in the activities of daily life allows soldiers to become familiar with the quirks and characteristics of their comrades. Another soldier from Operation Iraqi Freedom stated, "We eat, drink, go to the bathroom—everything—together … I really consider these guys my own family, because we fight together, we have fun together … We are to the point where we even call the squad leader 'Dad'" (Wong 13). It has already been stated that this primary group cohesion contributes to combat effectiveness because it is what motivates soldiers to fight and empowers the soldier with a feeling of confidence that they will be protected by their comrades, thereby allowing each member of the group to do his or her job more effectively. Its impact on combat effectiveness can be further demonstrated by examining the attitudes of Iraqi prisoners of war captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

While American forces in Iraq had a high level of morale and unit cohesion, the Iraqi regular army conscripts had no desire to fight for their country or their comrades. When Iraqi prisoners of war were asked about their motivation, the most frequent response was "coercion". The soldiers reported that the reason they did not leave the army was because they were afraid of being killed by Ba'ath Party representatives if they deserted. There was little or no cohesion among squadrons, partly due to intense tribal and regional differences. This lack of cohesion

caused the fighting ability of Iraqi units to be diminished because soldiers showed very little concern about letting their comrades down (Wong 6-8). In order to avoid the plight of the Iraqi forces, the United States must examine its current manning system.

Since 1990, there has been a five hundred percent increase in primarily deployments, and a forty-five percent reduction in force (UMTF CSA Update 3). This disparity, along with the shortcomings of the Individual Replacement System (IRS), has caused a corresponding increase in personnel turbulence and a reduction in unit cohesion. One of the main tenants of increasing unit cohesion is that soldiers and leaders should be kept together as long as possible in both peace and war. The Army's current (IRS) is antithetical to this tenet and prevents the highest possible levels of unit cohesion. The IRS was established during World War I "in order to place large numbers of soldiers into combat quickly", and Army Secretary Thomas White believes that it is "disruptive and counter to unit cohesiveness and morale" (Burgess). Units under the IRS are unready for battle due to the process of constant rotation and the introduction of soldiers into unfamiliar units. According to White, "The IRS is constantly bringing in untrained people while the experienced soldiers are leaving just as they're figuring things out. These units never get fully trained" (Anderson). In his 2002 paper, "A Unit Manning System for the Objective Force", retired Lieutenant General John M. Elton wrote, "When high turnover and turbulence exists in units, then soldiers are not confident of the behavior of their fellow soldiers, and do not feel the strong sense of cohesion necessary to fight effectively in combat."

An example of the disabling quality of an individual replacement system is shown in the remarks of an American Civil War inspector, who said that, "Both officers and men bitterly object … strange officers command strange troops … old organizations feel that they have lost their identity and are without the chance of perpetuating the distinct and separate history of which they were once so proud" (Kellet 123). It is not only the unit receiving the replacements that is dissentious with the idea, but also the replacement soldiers themselves. A prevailing attitude among soldiers during WWII was the feeling that they were being "handled in bulk, without the benefit of permanent leaders who would show them a measure of personal interest" (Kellet 125). The ill-trained replacements brought into an unfamiliar unit detract from the combat readiness and effectiveness of the unit because training must be conducted to equalize the replacements with the unit. Combat effectiveness is diminished through this lack of training and also through the lack of integration and cohesion. When replacements are brought up into a new unit during a battle, or within a short time of deployment, the bonds of cohesion, which play a crucial role in the success of the group, have little or no chance to form. In 1999, two armored battalions were notified that they were to be deployed to Bosnia, it was discovered that 211 of their soldiers were non-deployable. The ensuing void was filled with soldiers from sister battalions, and the cohesion of the deploying unit suffered. Additionally, the units that were not deployed were left with the burden of assimilating the 211 soldiers and the task of rebuilding their cohesion (Unit Manning Task Force).

The Army has realized the downfalls of its replacement system and has made a dozen attempts in the last 90 years to create a more successful policy of manning its units (UMTF Briefing 3). In 1945, the Army made its first attempt at increasing unit cohesion by instituting "buddy packages" during WWII. Under this system, replacements were trained in platoon sized units and when deployed, were to be kept together in groups of at least four men. This system was instituted too late in WWII in order to be fully evaluated, but was attempted again during the Korean War when commanders became unhappy with the IRS. Although the soldiers were shipped in packages of at least four men, they were often broken up when assigned to a unit, thus nullifying the system (Elton). Three other programs,

GYROSCOPE, OVUREP, and ROTOPLAN, were all attempts at unit rotation. GYROSCOPE involved entire units serving thirty-three month tours with dependents; OVUREP involved one year solitary tours; and ROTOPLAN rotated units on a six-month solitary tour. These programs were unsuccessful for three main reasons: First, the programs focused on unit rotation rather than unit cohesion. Second, the difficulty of administrating the programs was too great. Finally, the failure of the attempted programs was due to a focus on "individual equity" and the six-month command tour. "Individual Equity" is the concept that in order to be "branch qualified", officers and non-commissioned officers must complete certain professional education programs. The requirement for leaders to receive schooling caused commanders to come and go quickly from a unit. The six month command tour was an attempt to give the most number of officers experience in command. The shuffling of leaders caused by this plan, as well as the concept of individual equity, broke up cohesion. This negatively affected vertical cohesion between officers and enlisted personnel, and disillusioned many non-commissioned leaders (Elton).

Another attempt at creating cohesive teams was the COHORT program, which emerged in the 1980's. The focus of the COHORT program was to keep soldiers and leaders together as long as possible. Although the COHORT program was somewhat successful, it resulted in the creation of a rift between COHORT and non-COHORT manned units; in other words, the haves and the have-nots. In order to man the COHORT units, the remaining units were being subjected to increased personnel turbulence. The Army was in effect destroying cohesion in other units in order to preserve it in the COHORT units. In the end, this program was also dissolved (Elton). Although none of the Army's previous attempts at unit manning were extremely successful, the Army has had a renewed focused on cohesion and is making another attempt at unit manning.

On 18 Oct 2002, the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, Brigadier General John M. Keane, chartered the Unit Manning Task Force with the emphasis that "it is one of my highest priority projects" (Keane). The premise of this task force is that in order to be ready for the unpredictable and complex threats facing the armed forces today, full-spectrum forces must be developed that result in highly cohesive teams. The shared experiences and intensive training of these teams will enable them to perform better in combat (UMTF). The mission of the UMTF is to "Develop unit manning recommendations to reduce turbulence in the operational force enabling unit commanders to build and sustain highly cohesive and well-trained teams" (UMTF). Under the Unit Manning Initiative, groups of people will arrive, train, and serve together through a standard thirty-six month tour (Burlas). This consistent structure will keep officers and enlisted personnel together to form the bonds that will lead to military success.

The newest policy developed is currently being tested. On 5 May 2003, the Army announced that the 172nd Infantry Brigade, based at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, will be the first to implement the new unit manning policies (Burlas). It is possible that this attempt at unit manning will be successful and produce more combat-ready and effective units.

The effect that morale and unit cohesion have as multipliers of combat effectiveness cannot be denied. A unit with high morale is more motivated to fight, and as Napoleon asserted, is capable of defeating a larger force with lower levels of morale. In order to attain high morale, physical and psychological needs must be met, the most important of these being rest and confidence. Unit cohesion is an even greater factor in combat effectiveness. It is the intense familial bonds between soldiers that will motivate them to withstand privation and resist fear, even when morale is degraded by environment and circumstance. In order to develop unit cohesion, leaders and subordinates must spend as much time as possible together and partake in shared experiences. The Army's IRS does not create cohesive units and must be replaced by a unit manning system. As the United States

faces an increasing number of threats, the Army must be ready to defend the United States and its interests. By focusing on morale and unit cohesion, the Army can create teams with high levels of combat effectiveness, ultimately leading to military success.

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A MIND OF THEIR OWN: IS THE UNITED STATES MILITARY DRIFTING TOO FAR FROM SOCIETY?

BY

C1C STEVE NELSON

Our attitude… should be that we have given our best professional advice on the subject and that no matter what decision is rendered, we stand ready.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower[1]

Over the last decade and a half, an increasing rift is developing between the United States military establishment and the elected civilian government the military is subservient to and sworn to protect. Most memorable perhaps is the debate and near defiance of General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, towards the newly elected President William J. Clinton – a dispute sparked over the acceptance of homosexuals in the military. Though isolated incidents occurred prior to the early 1990's – especially during the Vietnam War – the Powell/Clinton clash spurred what would seemingly become a trend towards outspoken criticism, if not outright noncompliance, from high ranked, respected, and influential active and retired officers. A debate emerged following the row, pitting those social scientists who view military dissent as dangerous to a democratic society against those who believe the military should uphold the ideals advocated by the founding fathers regardless of the trends society at large experiences.

Further complicating the situation is the perceived moral and lifestyle difference between the American public and military culture. The average citizen embraces an existence encouraging individuality and self-advancement. By and large, individuals strive for personal accomplishment, often at the expense of others. These values are in stark contrast to the culture of the military professional. Military members must aim for the advancement and success of the group; success of the group ultimately translating to success of the institution on the battlefield.[2] Even through this debate, though, the future has never looked brighter for American civil-military relations. In a democracy, dissent should be an acceptable and even healthy practice. An unquestioning military would most likely result in the decline of the U.S. on the world stage. As long as the military professional remembers -- as Eisenhower suggests -- we are ultimately subservient to our civilian leaders, opposition to certain policies proposed by civilian leaders and a certain degree of a unique, separate culture should be welcomed and applauded by the American public.

So how dangerous is the perceived "gap" to America? How far has the military splintered from the American public? A growing population believes the military holds a responsibility, even an obligation, to question civilian supervision when failing to do so might prove harmful to the United States. Those that err on the more traditional side, such as Gen. Eisenhower, maintain the military has no place in politics – even realizing that politicians may not have the military's best interest at heart. "We must never forget," declared Ike, "that every question is settled in Washington today based on getting votes next November."[3] Thus, these advocates claim, as military members we resign ourselves to the bidding of our civilian leadership.

Military figures immersing themselves in politics is nothing new to the American civil-military tradition. Former generals turned President include Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, Grant, Hays, Garfield, Eisenhower and of course the first President of the United States, George Washington – touted as "probably as professional a soldier as was possible to be in colonial America."[4] Other names, most recognizably Scott, MacArthur, and Clark, sought to win the presidency, but were unsuccessful. Others have held high positions as cabinet members, congressmen, and senators. Indeed, the American tradition holds military service in high regard when considering a candidate for office. Yet, for each military name known for success in politics there are thousands that never desire public service after distinguished

military careers. Those names mentioned earlier become, perhaps, the exception rather than the rule.

What then explains the shift of the military away from society and against civilian leadership? Noted scholar Samuel P. Huntington, in his landmark work *The Soldier and the State*, partly attributes this swing to the emergence of the military professional over the conscripted servant of the state. As the officer corps drifted from a group of political appointees and titles passed to heirs, officers stood to gain ground with innovative thinking in a profession where advancement was based on merit, skill, and "military genius" (a term coined by Carl von Clausewitz and examined by Huntington). Further, the development of the professional officer corps coincided with the "rise of nationalism and democracy." A professional soldier, claims Huntington, is intrinsically motivated to serving the nation rather than fulfilling a hieratical obligation or accepting a political favor.[5]

However, today's military does not mirror the force observed by Huntington. With the adoption of the all-volunteer force, the climate and culture of the military changed drastically. With the end of conscription, individuals chose whether to serve or let others serve. It should be no surprise then, that like-minded individuals now join the armed services. The military then is less representative of the American public than during past conflicts, where conscripted soldiers more accurately replicate a cross-section of society. Allowing for this acceptance of choice explains why a shift in political affiliation took place, presumably towards a more "conservative" military. Following a model of the free-market economy, soldiers gravitate towards the party they feel best represents them. Such behavior is not unexpected; in fact a civilian who supports a candidate that DID NOT look out for that person's needs would likely be sent for a mental evaluation. There should be no surprise then, with the emergence of a dominate political ideology being adopted by the majority of the military.

The political parties themselves contribute to this polarization as well. The military is viewed as any other grouped segment of the citizenry: a special interest population with votes to be won. To that end, both parties (and various third parties) attempt to tout themselves as the party of the military. In the recent 2004 election, both parties made a point of nominating candidates who served in the military. Further, each party endeavored to discredit or minimalize the opposing candidate's service in a concerted effort to win swing votes. Though the numbers are disturbingly dwindling, each party makes a point of publicizing prominent members of the party who formerly served in the armed forces. Finally, both Republicans and Democrats alike sponsor bills and initiatives that favor military interests.[6] Political parties stand to gain much from military support, and thus work hard to expand military support. Political scientist Michael Desch even goes as far as to propose politicians purposely attempt to engage the military in politics:

> In addition, civilian leaders now seem to be embracing subjective control of the military, moving to exert influence in a number of areas previously regarded as being within the military's exclusive purview. From the major effort to get the military to redefine the concept of "civil-military relations" to Clinton's use of the "campaign flags" during the 1992 election, the evidence suggests that civilians are trying to politicize the military.[7]

The ebb and flow of political activism in the military coincides with the popularity of the military in society at large. During times of high military confidence and esteem, such as during World War II and following the Gulf War and 9/11, military concerns and issues take center stage on the American political arena. Budgets are approved, recruiting is high, and military accomplishments are recognized. Conversely, when military service is considered *faux pas*, as during Vietnam or to a much lesser extent during the Korean War, military needs and problems are secondary considerations.

In fact, military politicization is largely a product of the resentment suffered from a military that felt abandoned in a time of need. With stagnating progress in Indochina and mounting

hostility on the home front, servicemen and women needed allies in Washington to legitimize their existence. Instead they found an administration bent on micromanaging the war to appease foreign governments and legislative officials pandering to the whims of the American public to ensure longevity in their positions. As prominent military historian Victor Davis Hanson points out in his landmark *Carnage and Culture*, "The irony was that in their misguided efforts to restrain the war according to murky and poorly thought-out parameters, the American administration ensured that the killing would go on for nearly a decade."[8] The debacle in Southeast Asia weakened military prominence in the public's eyes – and faith in the institution would take a decade and a half to rebuild.

This rejuvenation began first with the election of the pro-military Reagan administration in 1980, an administration that would focus an unprecedented portion of the national treasury on the defense budget. Though perhaps focused more towards an attrition war through bankruptcy against the former Soviet Union, Reagan's military buildup nonetheless delivered the military from a downward spiral of isolation and ineffectiveness.[9] In part due to world politics regarding Iran and Central Asia, and in part to refocusing on containment and destruction of the Soviet Union (though the two subjects are interrelated), the military found purpose again and regained goals to achieve.

Advancement in the military's political power achieved another victory with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Arguably the most important force realignment since the 1947 National Security Act, Goldwater-Nichols substantially increased the powers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); more specifically enhancing the powers and thus the influence of the Chairman. Additionally, the act created Combatant Commanders[10], a position which also rapidly gained political influence. With the new powers accorded to the Chairman of the JCS, military concerns could bypass the Secretary of Defense (and thus the politics that Secretary promotes) and be granted an audience with the President as his primary military advisor. Desch argues Goldwater-Nichols only partially explains the shift towards politicization of the military. "It is true that this reform played a part in the problems of civilian control, but it does not completely explain them… Even after the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, civilian control was seldom challenged." He continues, "During the Gulf War, as we saw, George Bush had little trouble bending the military to his will when it came to prewar and wartime strategy."[11] This is more likely due to both the fact that military goals were fundamentally in line with civilian objectives and that a strong, charismatic military leader had yet to be appointed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Colin Powell's ascension to this now coveted position would change the military-civilian dichotomy. Powell, an enigmatic, gifted, and engaging military personality, redefined the bounds in which a military leader interacts with his civilian superiors. Not since MacArthur blatantly undermined the authority of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and President Truman and was subsequently relieved of command in 1951[12] has a military figure so publicly clashed with a sitting President.[13] Though acquiescing to most of President George H.W. Bush's demands during the Gulf War, General Powell was quick to challenge incoming President Clinton's authority. Supported by top military officials, both from the Pentagon and from the services themselves, Powell challenged President Clinton's campaign promise to allow gays in the military. Within days of the Clinton inauguration, the Chairman successfully subverted Clinton's guaranteed openly-homosexual service principle to that of the compromising "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy that is still in effect today. Powell did not stop there, candidly expressing opposition through public speeches and written editorials to the Clinton administration's Bosnia policies until he retired as the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff on September 30, 1993.[14] After Powell's departure, military dissent became less overt, though is still present to this day. Incidents such as Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman's public resignation "over the Khobar Towers controversy"[15] and Army General Wesley Clark's open and active involvement in Kosovo despite objections from Defense Secretary William Cohen[16] highlight ongoing struggles between the military and civilian elite. Only with the emergence of another highly charismatic and forceful figure, this time on the civilian side in Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, has the balance seemed to return in favor of the elected civilian authority.

If military politicization as the rule rather than the exception is only a relatively new phenomenon, then it stands to reason that in the past military professionals shunned such behavior. While politicians view politics as "a game" and "the most noble and sublime of all professions", military tradition dictates politics as a wicked practice to be abhorred.[17] Political scientist and former Pakistani delegate to the United Nations, Dr. Talukder Maniruzzaman draws a striking conclusion from this tradition. "This is exactly the quality that soldiers usually lack. Almost all military rulers denounce politicians as an evil or, at best, a necessary evil."[18] This trait is seen throughout much of America's history – political activism noticeably becomes a tendency only during times of war. Between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, only a handful of officers transitioned to the highest level of American politics. Spearheaded by the example set by Army General William T. Sherman, military involvement again subsided until after World War II. Sherman loathed any military marriage to politics. Predicted by Sherman, his longtime friend and General turned President, Ulysses S. Grant would have his reputation dragged through the mud when he entered politics. Sherman would have none of it. As Huntington notes, "Sherman retained his military popularity because he would have nothing to do with politics."[19] The tradition of political neutrality survives, and is still widely followed in today's military.

Though most theorists view the political-military relationship as black and white, there is a third alternative that must at least briefly be mentioned. Though history provides countless examples of good statesmen, but poor generals -- vice versa -- there are personalities that excel both in politics and in the military arena. One of the most well known figures fitting this description comes from an unlikely source – Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is one of the few truly successful military leaders that fully embraced the transfer of power from the military to civilian control. First and foremost, Kemal believed in the principle of civilian control over the military; a necessary commitment from any military officer. Only when the civilian government proved incapable of defending themselves was Kemal compelled to take control of the nation. He believed so much in a separation of powers that he immediately resigned his commission to enter the Turkish political realm. The second ingredient to Ataturk's success was his exceptional rapport with his officers and enlisted men as well as his uncanny ability to rouse support from the Turkish citizenry.[20] Through these traits, Kemal provides a model, known as the Kemalist Model, of military ascension into politics and the subsequent disengagement of the two. Morris Janowitz would write forty years later, "The 'Ataturk' model emerges both as a political goal and a benchmark for comparative analysis."[21]

What conclusions can be drawn from all this? Should the American public be concerned over the notion of eighty percent of the senior officers in the military affiliating themselves with the Republican Party, as Ian Roxborough suggests?[22] Contrary to his implications, identification with a specific party does not inherently interfere with an officer's ability to complete his or her duties. While some officers go to the extreme of abstaining from voting all together, the average officer has strong political

opinions and votes according to them. The majority of these officers are able to do so without any hindrance to the job. When an officer publicly expresses his views and further forces those views on subordinates and peers, he has crossed the line and should be swiftly reprimanded. To deny a service member the intrinsic rights guaranteed to a U.S. citizen negates that member's service to the country entirely and breeds cynicism and discontent where there should be none. Contrary to Roxborough's claims, the very definition of a professional soldier is the ability to accept orders though one may personally disagree. An officer's affiliation with a certain political party is not an automatic denouncement of civilian control from the opposing party.[23] While citing "alarming" numbers of Republican affiliated officers, Roxborough fails to cite any performance issues correlating to political association.

Colonel Richard Hooker provides a more realistic view. "The commissioned officer corps, comprising perhaps ten percent of the force and only a tiny fraction of the electorate, is not in any sense politically active."[24] He supports this by noting that while many officers (he specifies senior officers) are self-admittedly associated with the Republican Party, they do not "proselytize among [their] subordinates, organize politically, contribute financially to campaigns to any significant degree or, apparently, vote in large numbers."[25] In short, military officers do not play a significant role in election outcomes, nor is there any evidence that they shape the American political landscape in any considerable manner. Hooker concludes (as was separately stated earlier) that American officers are just as much "consumers" of a party's policies.[26]

The military ultimately still exists to serve the American public. To some extent it is obligated to reflect the values and ideals of society at large. However, the values and ideals of its membership, American citizens who voluntarily sacrifice and serve, cannot simply be ignored. The American people should embrace a military that developed a unique culture; a culture that allows for efficient and effective job completion – winning America's wars. Until compelling evidence is presented that the military is adversely shaping American politics, political pundits should be less concerned with social engineering projects in the military and more concerned with real problems facing the nation today – issues such as terrorism and tax/welfare reform are far more pressing concerns than a military coup. This view does not advocate total withdrawal of the civilian government from military affairs. Rather, it suggests limited oversight and interdiction when necessary to prevent a serious departure of military behavior from the American ideals of civilian control. It also proposes, however, that the perceived gap between the civilian public and the military is a cyclical and identifiable trend that does not pose a threat to the subservient military tradition.

ENDNOTES

[1] Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., *American Generalship – Character is Everything: The Art of Command* (Presidio: Presidio Press, 2000) 62.

[2] Richard D. Hooker, Jr., "Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations," *Parameters* (Winter 2003): 6, 4-18.

[3] Puryear, 62.

[4] Hooker, 12.

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957) 32-35.

[6] It should be noted that a disturbing trend is arising in Washington; a policy of "supporting" the troops while opposing military action. Such policy, while successful in serving political goals and interests more often than not ultimately hinders military objectives and service members' fighting capabilities.

[7] Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 35.

[8] Victor Davis Hanson, *Carnage and Culture* (New York: Anchor Books, 2001), 410.

[9] During the late 70's, the military was marred with drug scandals and wandering policy – symptoms that increasingly separated the military from the public.

[10] Until recently known as CinC's, or Commander in Chief. This term was modified under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who felt that only one person, the President, could truly be called the CinC.

[11] Desch, 34.

[12] Richard Connaughton, *MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines* (New York: Overlook Press, 2001), 304.

[13] Such conflicts, though rare at this magnitude, are not unprecedented. The confrontation between Lincoln and McClellan during the Civil War was not much different than that of MacArthur/Truman or Powell/Clinton.

[14] Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, *The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 243-244.

[15] Feaver, 403.

[16] Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 258.

[17] Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), 92.

[18] Ibid, 92.

[19] Huntington, 230.

[20] Maniruzzaman, 90-91.

[21] Ibid, 90.

[22] Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira , eds., *Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation*, *America Confronts the New World Disorder*, by Ian Roxborough (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 360.

[23] Ibid, 360. Roxborough proposes, "most military officers … held to an ideology that they were not politically partisan in an overt manner, whatever their personal feelings might be. This belief enabled them to accept civilian direction even though this might run counter to the beliefs of the individual officers."

[24] Hooker, 8.

[25] Ibid, 8.

[26] Ibid, 9.

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STOPPING THE FLOW: THE USE OF MILITARY FORCES ON THE UNITED STATES BORDER

BY

C1C STEVE NELSON

We're learning to work with law enforcement agencies, and there's cultural difficulties in doing that and it's a cultural difficulty on our part.

Lieutenant General Thomas Kelley, Director of Operations for the JCS[1]

May 20, 1997 started as any other morning for 18 year old Redford, Texas native Esequiel Hernandez, Jr. He woke up, got dressed, and looked at his Marine Corps recruiting poster before joining his siblings for breakfast. Esequiel met his friends on the traditional yellow school bus and headed to class at Presidio High School. He returned home around 4 PM, studied his Texas driver's manual, and helped his father, Esequiel Hernandez, Sr., unload some hay from his pickup truck. Then it was time to take his family's goat herd down to the Rio Grande for an evening grazing and watering, one of Esequiel's daily chores since he was old enough to be trusted with such a responsibility. A few weeks earlier, he had lost a goat, presumably to wild dogs known to hunt in the desert area. Intent on protecting his flock, he grabbed his World War I era .22 caliber rifle, a prized possession from his grandfather, and headed down the cliffs. It was nearly six, and the sun painted the desert a dazzling array of reds and purples as it began its routine descent in the west. Twenty minutes later, Ezequiel Hernandez Jr. became the first American civilian to be killed by a U.S. Marine on American soil and the first citizen killed by the military since the anti-Vietnam inspired Kent State University shooting.[2]

In that moment Hernandez and the Marine, Corporal Clemente Manuel Banuelos, became trapped in the U.S.'s increasingly misguided policies allowing the American military to assist and conduct tasks known as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). From peacekeeping in the Balkans and humanitarian aid in Southwest Asia to drug interdiction in Latin America and anti-terrorism operations within our nations borders, American forces are more and more mired down in operations far removed from to their original design and purpose – the planning and application of violence as an extension of diplomatic means and an instrument of power to protect national interests. With bad feelings lingering from Vietnam, the Pentagon implemented the "Total Force" concept, designed at reducing Active Duty forces while integrating Guard and Reserve assets into the American war fighting package. In theory, "Total Force" limits the power the White House has in sending Americans abroad to fight; with such an emphasis on Guard and Reserve forces, the public would have to support a war for any prolonged period. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Pentagon and Congress agreed that further force reduction and "realignment" was necessary.

Top Department of Defense officials still maintain that the military is capable and ready to sustain two independent warfronts while placating and delaying a third until American forces can be shifted to that region. Such an outlook is foolishly optimistic at best; truthfully it is dangerously unrealistic. Amidst all this, many pundits from Capitol Hill are calling for yet another mission for the military: patrolling America's borders to curtail illegal immigration and further supplement the Wars on Drugs and Terror. As calls from both parties demand tighter control of the U.S. border, many are characteristically turning to the military to solve yet another inherently civilian problem. Claims that the military is the most capable in terms of resources and manpower overlook a very simple strategic question: while the armed forces can complete a variety of missions at the beckon call of the American public, should the military take on these missions so innately unlike their original purpose? Already overtaxed and nearing the point of mission failure, civilian leaders must find other avenues for solving America's border security concerns. The military is not institutionally designed to take on law enforce-

ment activities and better serves the public in its traditional role – fighting and winning America's wars.

One of the first issues we must examine when considering using the military as law-enforcers is the legality of option. At the forefront of this argument is Section 1385 of Title 18, United States Code – more commonly known as the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). It reads:

> Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.[3]

In short, this Act intends to prohibit the use of the armed services from direct participation in law enforcement activities. The PCA does not apply to the Coast Guard or to the National Guard; to this end, these organizations traditionally take on law enforcement related actions within U.S. borders. Where the military cannot partake in "interdicting vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit and seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement,"[4], the Coast Guard and National Guard units have made names for themselves in these mission areas. The Coast Guard regularly prevents illegal immigrants from reaching U.S. soil and partakes in hundreds of shipping interdictions to battle drug trafficking. The National Guard is habitually one of the first organizations to respond to natural disasters and often assists in crowd control when a civilian population becomes too much for civilian agencies to control. These organizations have thrived after the initiation of the PCA, and this trend will not likely end soon following the September 11th attacks. Providing airport security became a primary concern for National Guard units across the country for several months after the attacks. More recent debacles, such as Hurricane Katrina, further demonstrate the nation's dependence on military forces.

Posse Comitatus was designed to largely exclude the military from internal affairs, one of the principles the American founders firmly believed.[5] Since its inception, several amendments were added to loosen the constraints of the original law. These exceptions include the Insurrection Act (allowing the federal troops to enforce laws in times of rebellion), when nuclear materials or other weapons of mass destruction are involved, and most common and notably in counter-drug assistance under Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Such amendments to the law ended the career of Corporal Banuelos and the life of Esequiel Hernandez. These erosions, argues Major Craig Trebilcock of the Army's Judge Advocate General's Corps, renders the Posse Comitatus Act little more than "a procedural formality than an actual impediment to the use of U.S. military forces in homeland defense."[6]

Over the last two decades, the President and Congress have made significant legislative and statutory changes, repealing aspects of the PCA to further involve the military in customarily civilian roles – to include border control. "The use of the military in opposing drug smuggling and illegal immigration was a significant step away from the act's central tenet that there was no proper role for the military in the direct enforcement of laws."[7] Though the law presently precludes any active use of the military in border control, the legality of using the military should not be a major concern for those supporting such actions. Because of the nature of statutory law versus constitutional law, civilian lawmakers only need add another amendment to U.S. Code to legalize the active use of military assets for law enforcement related activities.

Since the legality of military use is not a major concern, we must then ask why the current system necessitates the use of the military in the first place. Currently, the U.S. Border Patrol is the lead agency in preventing unauthorized immigrants from entering America's borders and is considered the "nation's front line in the struggle to secure our borders."[8] As illegal immigration became a hot topic for the nations legislatures in the mid 90's, the

USBP devised and implemented its first National Strategic Plan (NSP) in 1994. The NSP focused on a strategy known as "Prevention Through Deterrence", an approach designed to dissuade illegal immigrants from coming to the U.S. by placing the majority of Border Patrol agents and resources directly on the border. This showed a dramatic change in policy from the previous focus of locating and detaining illegal aliens once they had already entered the country.[9]

Most of these resources were stationed along the U.S.-Mexico border – at less than 2000 miles, this border is half the length of the U.S.-Canada border but commands the majority of Border Patrol assets. This is due in part to the relative difficulty of patrolling the terrain of the Northern border, but more so because an astounding ninety-seven percent of apprehended illegal immigrants come from the Southwestern border.[10] Application of resources reflects the different concerns associated with each border – whereas personnel and equipment are high priorities for agents on the Mexican border, intelligence and coordination with Canadian officials constitute the primary means of border security on the Canadian side. To further add to the problem, these migrants are not solely from Mexico. Since immigration policy is so stringent in Canada, migrants from around the world view Mexico as the most reliable gateway to the United States. "More and more people from the so-called global south -- the nations of Africa, Central and Latin America, and most of Asia -- are abandoning their homelands to find better lives elsewhere…. Unable to go directly because of tight visa restrictions, they take what they see as the next best route --- through Mexico."[11] Known internationally as transmigrants, these peoples endure great hardships for even the opportunity of entering the United States.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. has largely ignored and deflected the problem, insisting that the Mexican government take a greater role in stopping immigration through their country. In response, Mexico built and maintains more than fifty migrant detention centers to combat the crisis. This only partly deals with the problem. Once detained, Mexico must eventually deport the transmigrants out of the country. Problems arise however, as many countries of origin cannot verify citizenship – and therefore do not claim the immigrants. Further, the countries from which the immigrants entered Mexico will not allow them back either. Ultimately, the transmigrants are simply released and eventually make it into the United States, often months after originally setting out.[12]

Though the government's stance on illegal immigration pushes tough rhetoric, the reality of the situation is that the United States thrives on services immigrants provide. As American citizens become more educated and pursue more skilled, higher paying jobs, illegal immigrants are filling the vacancy in blue collar jobs. From restaurant staffs to cleaning services and a multitude of jobs in between, immigrants provide the daily services American's have come to rely on, both for convenience and out of necessity. "The fact is, the United States needs illegal workers, and it needs them to remain illegal because they can continue to keep their wages low," declares Father Vladimiro Valdez, a Mexico City Jesuit Priest and critic of Mexican-U.S. immigration policy. While statements like this are certainly driven by a level of cynicism, there is unquestionably more than a degree of truth to it. The symbiosis between the immigrant working class, primarily unskilled labor, and the increasingly affluent American skilled labor pool is undeniably a relationship that cannot be ignored. A large proportion of Americans view the jobs immigrants fill as undesirable, perhaps even beneath them.[13] The immigrants on the other side, while low by American standards, still bring in more money than they would in their native countries. Argues journalist Michael Flynn, "If the United States didn't give so much work to undocumented immigrants, goes the argument, then Mexico wouldn't be flooded with migrants from across the globe."[14] The situation then, is really a self-created problem – and more impor-

tantly, a problem many Americans are not willing or prepared to fix.

Yet fixing it is on the agenda for many Washington political figures. The newest legislation, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), is currently making rounds between Congress and the White House. Introduced by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, the SBI focuses on five pillars to strengthen border security: increased staffing, expanded detention and removal capabilities, upgrading technology, enhancing interior enforcement of immigration laws, and renewed international cooperation to deter illegal aliens.[15] Increased staffing will primarily beef up the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement force, while also augmenting Border Control agents. This latest initiative adds an additional 1,000 agents, overall increasing the Border Patrol by nearly 3,000 agents since 9/11. The new legislation adds 250 new criminal investigators, 400 new Immigration Enforcement officers, and 100 new Deportation Officers.[16]

The SBI also adds 2,000 new beds to detention facilities and focuses on expedited removal, in some cases in as little as fourteen days after detention, under the detention and removal clauses. Further, the SBI looks to improve technology – including using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, other aerial assets and camera systems for surveillance, and a new integrated border security system – and enhance infrastructure, the physical barriers to curtail entry to the United States. Equipment such as GENEX Technologies intelligent surveillance systems, cameras that constantly scan for moving objects and autonomously process them as threats to relay back to guard stations,[17] are already being incorporated into the USBP's resource kits. The fourth stage for the Secure Border Initiative is increased interior enforcement, relying on employers to mandate self-compliance with immigration laws or risk heavy fines as well as actively seeking out criminal aliens and fugitives already inside U.S. borders. The final step is to intensify international collaboration in removing and preventing illegal aliens from entering the United States.[18]

Though not called for specifically by the Secure Border Initiative, lawmakers are increasingly calling for military intervention in these areas. Obviously at the front of these proposals is the explicit and active use of military personnel to patrol the border to detain and deport illegal immigrants. As discussed, such actions would currently be in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act – but quick amendments to the Act would be merely a speed bump in the military's new War on Illegal Aliens. Secondarily, but nearly just as visible, is the technological cooperation the military provides in such a scenario. From conducting both manned and unmanned over flight surveillance to operating cameras and motion sensors, the armed services are in a unique situation to provide technological advantages to the USBP. As is the case with other civilian agencies, technology originally designed for the battlefield easily adapts to use on the border. Footfall detectors and infrared body sensors, equipment used in world-wide military deployments, are already widely used along the U.S.-Mexican border. The Navy's electronic finger-printing system, IDENT, is utilized by the Border Patrol to track previously apprehended border jumpers.[19] "Think of this as one team, different roles, different uniforms, but with the same game plan – and that is to restore the rule of law to the border," boasts Doris Meissner, Commissioner of the INS.[20] The military already contributes to the enhancing infrastructure mission; building and maintaining roads and fences along the border is a mission already embraced by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy's Seabees.

Few people then will argue the military's capability, at least from a logistical standpoint, of conducting a border security mission. As has been proven, the military has already somewhat embraced at least a supporting role in curtailing illegal immigration. Nonetheless, two concerns are readily apparent when considering the subject. First, at what cost to mission readiness is acceptable in supporting border security; and on a less tan-

gible level, can the institutional mindset and culture adapt to a nonviolent attitude? The first question is the easier of the two to answer. Nearly every military analyst, both from within the military's ranks and outside observers, strenuously caution against such a blatant departure from the military's intended purpose as the force is already wearing perilously thin. Military assets must focus on military ventures, both to ensure effectiveness of the unit as well as to guarantee the success of the mission. Capabilities degrade when a system is not used for its intended purpose, and the armed forces are no exception to this rule. Further, if military capabilities are diverted to non-military purposes, there is less certainty in accomplishing the missions service personnel are already engaged in. More perplexing is the concern over the adjustment in military attitude. Out of necessity, soldiers must take on an approach that all antagonists are threats; thus military members focus on completing the mission with little regard to means of achieving that mission. This mind-set proved the undoing of Corporal Banuelos' Joint Task Force Six – Team 7. In stark contrast is the attitude of law enforcement personnel, who are first and foremost concerned with ensuring the law is upheld and due process. In battle, soldiers are not afforded this luxury – changing this fundamental belief sets a dangerous precedence for future warriors.

What then is the answer to America's immigration problem? The Secure Border Initiative is on the right track, especially in its aspiration to upgrade and reinforce the current staffing. However, lawmakers must ensure that this is done with civilian personnel and avoid using military members as border control agents. This does not completely preclude the military from participating in the border control mission. Support elements, particularly construction efforts, gainfully employ such units as the Army Corps of Engineers – as well as improves civil-military relations between agencies, a benefit that should be exploited anytime available. Further, military units should still be able to conduct aerial surveillance, both in manned and unmanned capacities. These sorties can serve dual-purposes; for the USBP, very necessary surveillance operations can continue, for the military, valuable training hours can be taken advantage of. Such missions do not deteriorate military effectiveness; in fact they serve quite the opposite purpose, providing aviators with real world experience that translates to useful skills in the battle space. Additionally, military and civilian agencies can safely find multiple purposes for traditional military technology. Why reinvent technology that already exists.

Other efforts must be made that are not addressed by the SBI to more fully rectify America's border security issues. Americans must embrace the fact that this country relies on immigrant work to serve as the backbone of basic societal functions, or alternately must be willing to take on those "undesirable" jobs themselves. Current economic practices prohibit any serious crackdown on illegal immigration. Realistically, measures must be taken to legalize work programs in the U.S. to solve illegal immigration. Finally, the government must provide more incentive for our allies, particularly Mexico, to engage in a concentrated effort to end illegal immigration. Presently, there is no serious motivation to end illegal immigration. Money sent back to Mexico from immigrant laborers comprises a substantial portion of the Mexican economy. Further, Mexico gains little by discouraging transmigrants from entering the U.S. via Mexico. Significant financial/economic aid must be brought to the table to entice Mexico to fully cooperate in this struggle. Illegal immigration is an important and pressing issue to the United States, however regardless of how fashionable it may be to turn to service personnel, the military is not the answer to America's immigration problem. An increase in civilian force structure and authority, coupled with increased international cooperation are the only effective solution to stopping the flow.

ENDNOTES

[1] Timothy J. Dunn, "Waging a War on Immigrants at the U.S.- Mexico Border," in *Militarizing the American Criminal*

Justice System, ed. Peter B. Kraska (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001), 66.

[2] Monte Paulsen, *Fatal Error: The Pentagon's War on Drugs Takes a Toll on the Innocent*, Austin Chronicle, December 25, 1998. http://www.dpft.org/hernandez/paulsen.htm

[3] Fact Sheet, U.S. Northern Command. http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.factsheets.

[4] Ibid.

[5] The founders did not write Posse Comitatus into the Constitution. The PCA did not make its way into U.S. law until after the Civil War, when Congress worried about the military becoming overly politicized in the wake of rebuilding the South.

[6] Major Craig T. Trebilcock, *The Myth of Posse Comitatus*, October 2000. http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Trebilcock.htm.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Blas Nunez-Neto, *Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol*. Congressional Research Service, Domestic Social Policy Division (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, May 10, 2005), 1.

[9] Ibid, 3.

[10] Ibid, 2. It is also suggested that the rate is so high because of such a disproportionate allocation of resources between the two borders. It is more likely that the argument is cyclical in nature, with resource management constituting both cause and effect.

[11] Michael Flynn, "Who's Trying to Cross Our Southern Border? Everyone" Washington Post (Washington, D.C.) 11 December 2005, B01.

[12] Ibid.

[13] In an interesting phenomenon, even many of America's poor would rather remain jobless than fill these unattractive jobs. Such is the state of the American psyche towards entitlement.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Secure Border Initiative*, Fact Sheet. http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/secure_border_initiative

[16] Ibid.

[17] Genex Technologies, *Border Control*. http://www.genextech.com/print.htm

[18] Secure Border Initiative Fact Sheet.

[19] Peter Andreas, *Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 91.

[20] Ibid.

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"TRAINING AND EDUCATING THE US AIR FORCE TO CONDUCT SECURITY, STABILITY, TRANSITION, AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS"

BY
C1C ROLAND WOOD OLMSTEAD

The United States has undertaken massive nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past five years with the Department of Defense (DOD) acting as the lead agent in these efforts and playing a crucial role in the success of these operations. This paper focuses specifically on the adequacy of the United States Air Force (USAF) to operate successfully in this nation-building environment. Is the USAF optimally shaped to support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations?

Background

The United States faces a different threat today than during the Coldwar. *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (NSS) says, "The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology."[1] The threat is no longer conventional; "We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few."[2] The embittered few are widely known as terrorists. The NSS recognizes that "poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks."[3] In response to 9/11, President Bush drew a line in the sand, stating, "America will hold nations accountable that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terroriststs, because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization."[4] *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (NSCT) makes the U.S. position clear; "Where states are unwilling, we will act decisively to counter the threat they pose and ultimately compel them to cease supporting terrorism."[5] Moreover, "states that continue to sponsor terrorist organizations will be held accountable for their actions."[6]

To combat terrorism and overthrow states that are unwilling to cease supporting terrorists, the United States has been forced to engage in SSTR. Unfortunately, the United States as a whole and the U.S. military in particular are woefully unprepared to conduct SSTR. While the DOD excels at defeating enemy forces and seizing territory, that is no longer enough. "For all its ability to wage war, the U.S. military is unprepared to mount major stability operations and secure a lasting peace. [Furthermore], U.S. civilian agencies lack the tools to take the job over from the military."[7] The inadequacies of US SSTR capabilities were apparent even before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).[8] (Simply put, the United States is incapable of finishing what it starts).

Limitations and Assumptions

This study addresses how to best structure, size, and train the USAF to conduct both major combat operations (MCOs) and SSTR while briefly discussing the nature of SSTR and appropriate USAF roles. There are two main limitations. First, it does not attempt to answer the questions: should the USAF support SSTR? Or, under what conditions should the USAF support SSTR? Second, this study focuses specifically on how to educate and train the USAF to effectively conduct SSTR, limiting discussion of the other services, the DOD, and other government agencies (OGAs) as they pertain to the USAF. The military itself plays a key yet limited role in SSTR, yet it is often called upon to assume extensive non-military responsibilities. "Until the U.S. government develops sufficient rapid civilian reaction capacity, the military will continue to be called on to accomplish "civilian tasks," greatly limiting the strategic choices of the U.S. government at home and abroad."[9] The development of such capabilities, and the decision of whether or not to do it, is well beyond the scope of this paper.

This paper is based upon five assumptions. First, the current threat from terrorism along with the corresponding need

and mandate for SSTR will continue in the future. Second, the U.S. should prepare itself for the worst case of SSTR, rather than the best case, to include a hostile and divisive population, no functioning government, an active insurgency, interference from neighboring countries, and limited coalition partners. If the U.S. can meet these worst case challenges, then it reasons that les complex situations would be manageable. Third, public support from the American people is sustained for the duration of the conflict. Winning the hearts and minds of our own people is the job of the President. Fourth, the military should do what it does best and what no one else can do, namely fight wars and provide security, minimizing its involvement in reconstruction. Fifth, the U.S. enjoys total conventional military superiority, especially air superiority, as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

This paper tests the claim that the education and training of the USAF needs to be adapted but change in size is necessary to successfully conduct both Major Combat Operations (MCOs) and SSTR operations. The groundwork is laid by determining objectives, identifying Centers of Gravity (COGs), and developing an SSTR strategy for the USAF. Education and training are examined in light of balancing the requirements for SSTR against those of MCOs.

Before making the case that the USAF should adapt its training to accommodate the SSTR mission while leaving its shape unchanged, the surrounding literature will be examined in four categories: (1) the nature and demands of the SSTR environment, (2) the traditional USAF mentality that must be overcome; (3) USAF core capabilities applied as SSTR roles; and the current and projected of the USAF.

The Nature and Demands of Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction

SSTR is the newest name for an old concept. The previous term "nation-building" is now out of favor. Likewise, "stability and reconstruction" (S&R) has been expanded to the more descriptive term SSTR. Regardless of its name, the characteristics of SSTR remain unchanged. Fundamentally it is long in duration, personnel intensive, politically driven, and requires a different set of principles than conventional war.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which is the DOD's vision for the future delivered to Congress every four years, acknowledges many of these realities of SSTR, especially the need for endurance as the US is engaged in a "long war."[24] Ironically, it quotes Al Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who makes the point that, "[v]ictory by the armies cannot be achieved unless the infantry occupies the territory,"[25] yet it fails to address the need for sustaining large quantities of occupying ground forces, instead considering SSTR a "surge" activity that will quickly reduce personnel back to a "steady state."[26] To its credit, the QDR establishes a new planning construct, "[g]iving greater emphasis to…military support for stabilization and reconstruction efforts"[27] and calls for greater dependence on other agencies to conduct SSTR.[28]

"Small wars are long wars,"[29] so say James Corum and Wray Johnson, experts in applying airpower to unconventional situations. The Marine Corps definition of small wars applies well to SSTR: "an extension of warfare by additional means, providing political leaders with a range of military options beyond just physical violence with which to further political objectives."[30] Such conflicts require perseverance and lack a decisive point; they are wars of attrition rather than annihilation. In the case of SSTR, this "range of military options beyond just physical violence," is directed at a specific political objective: to stabilize and reconstruct an occupied state. This breaks down into four key areas: security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.[31] Of these, only security belongs primarily to the military. The other three rightfully belong to the State Department, but are often tasked to the DOD.

SSTR is unlike war in many ways. First, it is fundamentally political in nature.[32] Military action is only important in the manner it relates to and affects the political situation. Second, "peace, unlike war, is a product of the will of the parties to a conflict."[33] Thus, influencing the will of the local population is the primary center of gravity in SSTR. Third, SSTR more closely resembles fighting an insurgency than a war in that, "when fighting an insurgency the political and economic aspects of the strategy are often as important if not more important to victory as the military contribution."[34] In fact, SSTR may be intertwined with counterinsurgency operations, as is the case today in Iraq. Consequently, military forces must exercise greater flexibility when conducting SSTR due to political constraints.[35]

SSTR falls into the phrase known as MOOTW, or "military operations other than war," although that term is now out of favor. Regardless, the six principles of MOOTW, objective, perseverance, unity of effort, restraint, and security, apply well to SSTR and differ greatly from the nine principles of war. The *Objective* in SSTR is settlement rather victory.[36] As previously discussed, successful SSTR takes a long time and thus demands *Perseverance*.[37] Since SSTR is primarily political in nature, the military must have *Unity of Effort*, not only between the services but with other government agencies, international organizations such as the United Nations and the Red Cross, as well as foreign governments. Unlike in the purely military environment, this often eclectic collection of bureaucracies must be led rather than commanded.[38] *Restraint* is necessary to SSTR, again because of its political nature, and means only applying military force that is appropriate to the situation.[39] The *Security* threat is lower in SSTR than in conventional war but is also harder to identify.[40] Lastly, crucial to SSTR is *Legitimacy*; the US must be seen as working towards international interests and not just its own.[41] These six principles of MOOTW are directly out of Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 *MOOTW*, which has since been retired with the claim that its content will be incorporated into all other USAF doctrine as appropriate.

SSTR is a long and challenging process. It is political in nature, personnel intensive, and operates under different principles than war. In short, SSTR contains all the difficulties and frustrations of small wars on a large scale.

The Traditional Air Force Mentality

The USAF has a long history of performing "contingency operations" to the point that "short notice deployments, airlifts, and other operational missions conducted in reaction to local crises…have come to dominate Air Force operations."[42] Despite such a tradition, contingency operations have not been the priority as reflected by spending and promotion. According to Corum and Johnson, the disinclination towards the missions that are most suitable to SSTR stems from the fact that, "regular armies and air forces generally dislike…a conflict against a nonstate entity [that] does not lend itself to a quick decisive victory…[and that] long wars are especially frustrating to airmen."[43] This same aversion is still a problem today.

The *Air Force Transformation Flight Plan* (AFTFP), published by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff, casts a vision of a future USAF that is severely lacking in SSTR capabilities. Although the AFTFP recognizes stability operations as one of the four Joint Operating Concepts (JOC's) that has been mandated for the US military in *The National Military Strategy*,[44] the USAF has failed to develop an SSTR Concept of Operations (CONOPS).[45] Such a failure demonstrates the USAF's continued emphasis on Major Combat Operations (MCOs) at the expense of SSTR. Stability operations are only briefly mentioned in the introduction, conclusion, and appendices of the AFTFP. The maximum attention it receives is a short paragraph, found in the conclusion, "Information superiority, non-lethal, loitering munitions, SOF, agile combat support, and

rapid global mobility capabilities will greatly enhance urban operations, peace operations, and stability operations."[46] While correctly identifying some USAF capabilities that can be applied to SSTR, such a list does not constitute a strategic plan for preparing a force to engage in what could quite possibly be the most important U.S. military operations in the 21st century.

Carl Builder and Theodore Karasik, researchers for RAND Corporation's Project Air Force, attribute the USAF's disinclination to conduct SSTR to the conventional threats of the Cold War which led to the situation that, "for more than 40 years…efforts to "organize, train, equip, and provide forces" ha[ve] been focused on "the effective prosecution of war," with operations short of war…on the margins of Air Force priorities."[47]

USAF Core Capabilities Applied to SSTR

The QDR recognizes the capabilities that the USAF brings to SSTR missions in its assessment and recommendations, specifically the rapid, global power project capabilities demonstrated in Afghanistan[48] and the need for more Joint Tactical Air Controllers, increased strike capability, and more Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).[49] Builder and Karasik, in their study of Crises and Lesser Conflicts (CALCs), state that unconventional operations (including SSTR) place heavy demands on airlift, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and ground-to-air threat suppression but little demand on the bulk of the mainstream USAF: fighters and bombers.[50] Furthermore, the USAF has some existing capabilities that are "tailor-made" for CALCs including airlift, air constabulary forces, command and control, USAF special operations, and RED HORSE (deployable civil engineering squadrons).[51]

The USAF role in future SSTR operations is fundamentally different than that of the U.S. Army or Marine Corps. Corum and Johnson correctly state that, in a guerrilla war, it is, "the support role of airpower (e.g., reconnaissance, transport, and so on) is usually the most important and effective mission."[52] This principle holds equally true for SSTR, which, as noted, is similar to a small or guerrilla war except that it is on a larger scale. The USAF role should not be devalued just because it is primarily in a support capacity. Likewise, "airpower does not take away the need for ground forces…but it certainly makes those forces much more effective."[53] Thus the USAF role should be designed to apply unique USAF capabilities to the challenges of the SSTR environment.

USAF doctrine states that core capabilities "are the basic expertise that the Air Force brings to any activity across the range of military operations."[54] USAF senior leadership has identified six core capabilities: air and space superiority, precision engagement, global attack, rapid global mobility, information superiority, and agile combat support.[55] In a previous work, I have applied these core capabilities to SSTR resulting in the following missions: airlift, ISR, counterland, presence, information operations, foreign internal defense, and a limited role in civil affairs.[56]

Current and Projected Structure of the USAF

There are several possible concepts for reorganizing the USAF to conduct both MCOs and SSTR. The QDR calls for, "[m]ultipurpose forces to train, equip, and advise indigenous forces; deploy and engage with partner nations; conduct irregular warfare; and support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations."[57] The other services have been reorganizing in different directions with the Army downsizing from divisions to brigades while the Marine Corps is adding specialized Foreign Internal Defense (FID) units.[58] The USAF is imitating the Army by restructuring into 86 combat wings,[59] up from the current level of 50, but will retain the Air Expeditionary Force construct which organizes deployments around steady state and surge capabilities.[60] Builder and Karasik offer a different solution: make the active duty into an unconventional contingency force and train the USAF Reserve and Guard for MCOs, only

activated for the less frequent conventional war.[61] To this end, they suggest decentralizing active duty units and making them smaller, more flexible, and deployable.[62] Which is very similar to the QDR's recommendation for more and smaller combat wings. Lastly, Builder and Karasik doubt that unconventional missions "should ever warrant their own specialized organizations" except perhaps air constabularies, by which they mean "providing ground security from the air."[63]

Thomas and coauthor Jason Cukierman agree that, "[t]here is no need of Air Force units specifically designed for peace support operations"[64] because there is a significant overlap between the skills required for conventional combat and the skills required for peace operations (to include SSTR).[65] They examine the arguments for and against specialized units and conclude that, "USAF forces typically perform the same duties in peacekeeping as they do in war,"[66] and that, "one tenet of aerospace power is versatility; commanders should use it. Many airframes can perform more than a single mission."[67]

Thomas Barnett, a civilian planner and author who claims to have a "big picture" perspective, is a principle advocate of dividing the military into two totally separate forces, "one to fight wars and one to wage peace."[68] He uses the labels Leviathan force and Systems Administrator (Sys Admin) force, specializing in MCOs and SSTR respectively. The Leviathan would be the force, "that specializes in high-tech, big-violence war," and would, "emphasize speed above all, preempting where possible and always staying on the offensive."[69] In sharp contrast, the Sys Admin force is the one, "that specializes in relatively low-tech security generation and routine crisis response."[70] In Barnett's view the Sys Admin force would, "serve as the hub to the many spokes involved in postconflict security generation, humanitarian relief, and national reconstruction," and act, "far more police-like," while being, "easily deployed for at-length duty."[71]

The proposed changes in USAF structure vary greatly although all grapple with the difficulty of trying to conduct MCOs and SSTR simultaneously. Builder and Karasik claim that changing the organization of the USAF would be the cheapest and most effective means of providing both MCO and SSTR capability, but would also be the most difficult to accomplish because of institutional resistance to change.[72]

Current and Projected Training of the USAF

On eight separate occasions, the QDR emphasizes the need for, "developing and maintaining appropriate language, cultural, and information technology skills."[73] Less emphatically, it also calls for more training to "helping others to help themselves,"[74] in military nomenclature Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and for more joint and interagency training.[75] Builder and Karasik claim that Criseses and Lesser Conflicts (CALCs) require more education, which tends to be one-time, rather than training, which must be practiced continuously.[76] They claim that there is significant overlap between training for CALCs and MRCs, especially in terms of flying, but that CALC specific training dulls conventional capabilities.[77] Thomas and Cukierman identify both positive and negative impacts on force readiness for the USAF to conduct peace operations,[78] but reach an entirely different conclusion that, "Far from reducing combat effectiveness, training for and participating in peace operations can be performed with little adverse impact on readiness, and in many cases may improve USAF members' readiness for combat."[79] They too separate and define education and training and make the claim that for training, "airmen see much commonality between skills used in peacekeeping and in war and thus should require minimal training for peacekeeping."[80] John Conway, a retired USAF colonel, lays out in detail the need for cultural education and foreign-language proficiency and, moreover, how to develop these within the USAF,[81] concurring with

all the previous authors on the critical need for this education and training if the USAF is to dominate the 21st century.

Current and Projected Size of the USAF

The QDR claims that fewer personnel are needed to accomplish a given mission today than in the past because of dramatically improved technology.[82] In the era of shrinking budgets and expanding missions, the capabilities that a service brings to the Global War on Terrorism (which includes SSTR) determines its size.[83] The QDR states that the current size of the DOD "is appropriate to meet current and projected operational demands"[84] but the USAF's end strength will be reduced by approximately 40,000 personnel.[85] The only proposed increase in the size of the USAF comes not to the USAF itself but to Air Force Special Operations Command, in the form of an additional specialized UAV squadron.[86]

As far back as 1995, Builder and Karasik noted that trying to conduct both Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) and CALCs (which today would be called MCOs and SSTR, respectively) was greatly stressing the USAF in terms of personnel, length of deployments, and readiness for conventional war.[87] Although the terminology has changed, the problems remain and the operations tempo has only continued to accelerate.

Before the USAF can determine the necessary education, training, and size to conduct both MCOs and SSTR, it must first determine the strategy that it intends to pursue, particularly for SSTR, since this is the weakest deficiency. The first two steps to develop a strategy are objective determination and COG identification. They will be covered succinctly, paving the way for determining the appropriate shape for the USAF as it faces the challenges of the 21st century.

SSTR is relevant today because "failed states matter."[88] Failed states create safe havens where terrorists, drug traffickers, and criminals can operate, thereby threatening US national interests and regional stability.[89] As discussed above, both the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* identify a connection between terrorism and failed states.

Unfortunately, what is true for MCOs is not true for rebuilding occupied states once the conventional fighting is over, again illustrated by Afghanistan and Iraq, where SSTR operations are currently four and three years running, respectively. The ultimate objective of these and future operations is lasting peace,[90] and the stepping stone to that goal is for the US to learn to conduct effective SSTR. For the USAF, the key concept is comparative advantage:[91] doing what the USAF does best and facilitating other government agencies, allies, and host nation personnel to apply their expertise to meet the complex demands of SSTR.

There are five centers of gravity that the USAF must consider as it develops an appropriate SSTR strategy. They are: persistence, legitimacy, distinction, interoperability, and sharing the burden. The first COG, persistence, is acknowledged by the QDR, which recognizes that the US is engaged in a long war.[92] Unlike MCOs, SSTR is slow and generally involves "tipping points" rather than decisive victories. A good analogy is the difference between American football and soccer, a theory set forth by Joel Cassman and David Lai. Their research sets forth the premise that American football closely mirrors the American way of war, in that both emphasize maneuver, concentration of power, specialization, strict rules of engagement, high scores, and seizure of territory.[93] In contrast, soccer and unconventional warfare, which includes SSTR, share the characteristics of surprise, dispersal of power, interchangeable forces, penalties against individuals rather than teams, low scores, and the irrelevance of holding territory.[94] In light of this, it is clear that the US will continue to suffer defeat if it persists in applying its "football" mindset to a "soccer" conflict. The USAF can help due to the flexibility and

versatility of airpower. The USAF can be persistent by deploying airmen on a fixed Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) cycle. The AEF keeps airmen proficient, trained, and available for deployment while creating predictability and stability, which is conducive to better family life, retention, and, ultimately, persistence. The USAF also enhances persistence by supporting the "boots on the ground," whether military or civilian, US or foreign. Airlift, collecting intelligence, close air support, and command and control are just a few of the support functions that the USAF brings to SSTR.

The second COG in SSTR operations is legitimacy, also commonly referred to as winning "hearts and minds." This breaks down two ways. First is the matter of whose "hearts and minds" are targeted, for which there are three broad categories: the host nation population, the U.S. and allied public, and the rest of the world. Second, is capability, actuality, and morality. The targeted "hearts and minds" must believe that the U.S. and its allies are capable and willing to act and will do so. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq graphically illustrated the damage that can be done to U.S. legitimacy in the minds of all three target populations by a breach of morality. The U.S. must demonstrate both its capacity and willingness to conduct SSTR while maintaining the moral high ground. The USAF can play a critical role in enhancing legitimacy. The rapid delivery of humanitarian aid to a disrupted country, which is often the case at the onset of SSTR operations, can go a long way to prove the goodwill and capability of the US to help reconstruct the country and frequently depends on USAF airlift capabilities. In the past, the USAF has enhanced legitimacy by flying in foreign troops as peacekeepers that were more acceptable to the local population than US troops.[95] To further develop legitimacy, the USAF needs to understand and interact with non-Americans, necessitating more cultural education and language training. Specifically, the USAF "should increase staffing for defense attaché positions and foreign-area officers."[96] Lastly, the USAF can enhance the legitimacy of SSTR operations by improving both the delivery and content of information operations.

The third COG of SSTR is distinction, separating the "good" and "bad" people. Failure to do so undermines U.S. legitimacy and creates a hostile population and increases the potential for future enemies. Distinction is closely related to legitimacy, because it is only by winning the hearts and minds of the host nation population that the U.S. will be able to collect adequate human intelligence to cull out the "bad" people and then kill them. Collecting that intelligence involves understanding the various cultural, ethnic, and tribal differences when dealing with occupied populations, their neighbors, and U.S. allies. Once the distinctions have been determined, precision guided munitions (PGMs) and the recently developed small-diameter bombs give the USAF the capability to disrupt and kill enemies while minimizing collateral damage.

The U.S. must also develop interoperability, the fourth COG to successful SSTR. While the US military has proven itself capable of conducting MCOs independently, the same is not true for SSTR –- the burden is too great and too complex. Kraus states, "Recent successes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other fronts in the war on terror have proven that the military instrument of power cannot succeed in the long term if used independently."[97] The QDR calls for moving "from the U.S. military performing tasks to a focus on building partner capabilities."[98] This includes OGAs, coalition partners, and NGOs. Kraus emphasizes, "Joint operations are the baseline; integrated operations with these new partners is the future."[99] To improve interoperability, the USAF needs to understand and train with other services, other government agencies, allies, and NGOs because SSTR is so complex and interconnected.[100] Builder and Karasik also identify the need for the USAF to, "forge more intimate and sustained ties with other organizations."[101] Increasing aviation Foreign Internal Defense (FID) capability would

improve ties with allied air forces while simultaneously equipping them to fight terrorism, decreasing the probability of a future US intervention in their country, and creating capable partners for future operations, whether MCOs or SSTR.

Related to interoperability is the fifth COG of SSTR, the idea of sharing the burden. This applies especially to the host nation population, who must own the reconstruction process.[102] Sharing the burden and interoperability can be applied preventatively by making, "significant improvements to paltry, ineffective foreign assistance programs," in order to win the support of people worldwide and, "provide them with the means to do something about it [terrorism] in their own countries."[103] This supports the goal of creating viable, self-sufficient states and the ultimate goal of lasting peace. The USAF can contribute to the development of minimally capable states and lasting peace by including host nation personnel as much as possible, giving them leadership roles and "seek[ing] out host country counterparts from day one."[104]

The result of these COGs is an effective SSTR strategy for the USAF. The question then is not if, but how should the USAF implement this SSTR strategy, recognizing that, "appropriate doctrine, organization, and training could dramatically improve the outcome,"[105] all the while maintaining MCO capability?

This paper claims of this paper is that transforming the current education and training of the USAF will allow it to successfully conduct both major combat operations and SSTR with no significant change in size. Education, training, and size will be examined in light of the SSTR strategy developed above and balanced against the need to maintain MCO capability.

An Old Problem

The problems of ensuring that USAF airmen are appropriately trained and educated to work with allies, develop relationships with other government agencies, and train host nation counterparts, are not new. Reflecting on his recent experiences in Vietnam, Colonel Richard Rosser wrote in 1968 that, "military men need a sophisticated understanding of potential enemies," and that "It is just as important that we understand our allies and their problems."[106] He goes on to claim that, "our approach had been to train individuals…in a crash program of area study after the crisis had developed. Unfortunately, it is impossible to create instant area experts."[107] Thirty-seven years later the problems are the same. Retired Colonel John Conway states, "To succeed, we must have the ability to communicate with our allies and understand our enemies."[108] He notes that during the past three decades the USAF has "just barely" met its language requirements through "the implementation of "just-in-time" language training, hiring scores of contract linguists, and…[the activation]…of reserve linguists."[109] The current demands for linguistic and culturally savvy personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and uncertain future demands in the ongoing Global War on Terror, necessitate that the USAF change. According to Conway, this transformation will be accomplished only by, "Institutionalizing the processes by which the Air Force recruits, trains, sustains, and manages its language professionals."[110] The current state of USAF education and training is insufficient for SSTR and this represents the area with the greatest potential for growth at the least cost, both in terms of resources and loss of readiness for MCOs. How will this kind of permanent, institutional change be accomplished? The next section will examine how to best transform USAF education and training and then the first-, second-, and third-order effects.

Institutionalizing Change

The first step to transformation is identifying the requirements. The answer to the question of who needs cultural education and language training is simple, all deployable airmen and all USAF decision makers. The answer to the question of "how much do they need?" is much more difficult. Conway calls

for identifying foreign language requirements, "by discipline (security forces, medical personnel, cryptolinguists, etc.), by major command (Air Combat Command, Pacific Air Forces, etc.), and by combatant commands to ensure completeness."[111] Once the requirements are identified and redundancies eliminated, the USAF should conduct a mandatory self-assessment to determine who already possesses language skills.[112] Efforts should then be made to retain personnel with critical language skills by increasing foreign language proficiency pay as well as actively recruiting native speakers to fill and overcome identified shortfalls.[113] Looking to the future, "cadets entering the Air Force Academy or ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] probably will be required to have two years of college-level foreign language classes before graduation and commissioning."[114] The USAF is also revamping its foreign area officer program to create international affairs specialists, giving mid-career officers one to three years of specialized language training and regional education, and follow-on assignments "in key international positions."[115]

While these are positive changes, many have yet to be implemented. Furthermore, fluency in a language, especially in a difficult and relevant language such as Arabic or Chinese, is not realistic or necessary for all airmen. What then can be done to improve cultural awareness and provide baseline language skills for all airmen? The USAF is taking steps in that direction, beginning with officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs). The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General T. Michael Moseley, "announced that in the near future, language training would become part of professional military education," at Air War College and senior NCO schools but that the emphasis would be on giving senior USAF leaders, "at least some familiarity with a language while greatly expanding their awareness and understanding of other cultures."[116] The goal is not to develop fluency but rather, according to Syed Karim, the chief of the Air Force Foreign Language and Culture Program Office, "to ensure that Air Force leaders are aware of the importance of cultural factors and their operational impacts in order that they make better-informed decisions."[117] The existence of such an office is a positive sign that, along with these developments in professional military education (PME) and the creation of international affairs specialists, the USAF is on the path to improving the cultural awareness and language abilities of all airmen. The USAF should continue along this path by incorporating language and culture at every level of PME, comprehensively identify its requirements and current capabilities, and adapt recruiting, training, and retention policy to overcome shortfalls.

Beyond baseline language training and cultural education, the USAF must also begin to better prepare for SSTR operations. Intensive pre-deployment training has proven its worth, according to Orr, who states, "the U.S. military and USAID have routinely provided intensive, scenario-specific training to their personnel prior to deploying them to an actual operation, with substantial positive impact on their performance."[118] While the USAF has incorporated training requirements as part of the AEF cycle, its purpose is limited to, "ensur[ing] that personnel complete their individual skills and mobility training."[119] Lieutenant Colonels Spacy and Trapp claim that herein lies a dangerous assumption, "that readiness of the pieces equates to readiness of the whole AEF."[120] They argue that the USAF should begin requiring geographically separated units in the same AEF that will deploy together to conduct training "designed to bring these separate units together," so that arriving at a deployed location will not be their first interaction.[121] They also advocate the certification of units, not just individuals, prior to deployment.[122] These two ideas, interactive pre-deployment training and certification, can be expanded upon to suit the SSTR environment. SSTR-specific scenarios and exercises could be created that require not only USAF units to cooperate and interact but also incorporate the other services, other government agencies,

international aid organizations, and U.S. allies. The USAF can look to any of the other services for models of pre-deployment certification, whether the Army's National Training Center, the Navy's Carrier Strike Groups, or Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable).[123] The bottom line for the USAF is to conduct large-scale training that places similar demands on logistics, force protection, flying operations, and interoperability as well as actual SSTR operations.[124]

At the highest level, USAF officers need to be assigned to the strategic and planning cells for SSTR.[125] Only a small number of USAF leaders need to become SSTR experts but the rest need their awareness raised about the differences between SSTR and MCOs and resources they can go to in the event they find themselves assigned to an SSTR operation. This can best be accomplished by incorporating SSTR education into every level of PME.[126] These lessons should be taught by those recently returned from SSTR operations and guest instructors from partner countries that have greater experience in SSTR-like operations.[127]

To further improve SSTR training and education, the USAF should implement a process for collecting "lessons learned" from personnel, both USAF and non-USAF. Presently, that means conducting mid and post-deployment debriefs of personnel assigned to Iraq and Afghanistan to determine what tactics, techniques, and procedures are effective and which are failing, having an immediate effect on the next AEF cycle to deploy. In the long term, these lessons learned can be collected and analyzed to determine broad principles for conducting SSTR operations. The synthesis of lessons learned, better known as doctrine, will mean that the USAF does not need to "reinvent the wheel" every time it begins a new SSTR operation.

The first order effect of making these institutional changes in the education and training of USAF personnel is better training for their HN counterparts and improving USAF support of other services, allies, and OGAs in the SSTR environment. The second order effect is keeping the USAF operating in areas where it enjoys a comparative advantage over other services, allies, and agencies by matching current USAF core capabilities to the demands of SSTR. They can support those other groups operating where they are most knowledgeable and capable, resulting in the third order effect on the size of the USAF required to conduct both SSTR and MCOs, which will be discussed below.

First Order Effects-Improving Skills

The first order effect of improving cultural education, language training, and SSTR-specific skills is greater U.S. legitimacy, FID, and interoperability which are all COGs for conducting SSTR operations. Learning the language and respecting the culture of the host nation people bolsters US credibility because it demonstrates America's concern for local customs and sensibilities and dispels a conqueror mentality that imposes "superior" American ways of doing things. Likewise, giving all deployed airmen an understanding of the people they are trying to train as well as improving their ability to communicate will make USAF personnel more approachable and allow them to develop deeper relationships with host nation counterparts, which will help speed the process of sharing the burden and eventually creating an independent, sustainable state. In terms of aviation FID, the demand from Iraq and Afghanistan greatly exceeds what the USAF currently can supply. The 6th Special Operations Squadron, which is currently tasked with all aviation FID, (or the group proposed by the AF Transformation Flight Plan), are insufficient to create and train an entire nation's air force from scratch. This is especially true while maintaining current FID commitments around the world. The solution is to make all airmen capable of conducting FID rather than relying on a single unit to facilitate sharing the burden of SSTR with host nation personnel. A further refinement of this training concept would be to focus on "training-the-trainers" and establishing indigenous institution,[128] such as

basic training, pilot training, mechanic training, and even a local USAF academy. Once these programs are established they must be sustained.[129] The USAF can gradually move from a mentor to a partner relationship, maintaining bonds through joint exercises and frequent exchange programs, in accordance with the expeditionary-to-permanent concept discussed above.

According to reconstruction expert Robert Orr, "U.S. personnel are greatly disadvantaged if they do not understand how organizations such as the United Nations, NGOs, regional organizations, and others operate."[130] Because of its unique supporting role in SSTR, the USAF especially must be able to work with a wide spectrum of agencies. A better understanding of the organization, goals, and culture of the other services, other government agencies, and allies is also important because these can be totally foreign to USAF personnel, whether it is the culture of the U.S. Army, the goals of the International Red Cross, or the structure of the Egyptian air force. Each of those organizations may have an important role to play in a given SSTR operation and the sooner that USAF personnel can understand, communicate, and train with them, the sooner they can bring their skill sets to the table, freeing the USAF to perform missions where it enjoys comparative advantage, the second order effect of transforming USAF education and training for effective SSTR.

Second Order Effects – Comparative Advantage vs. Army Missions

The combination of the USAF failing to understand and facilitate other services and other government agencies and a thinly stretched U.S. Army have resulted in "mission creep" with USAF personnel performing missions for which they do not enjoy a comparative advantage. In Afghanistan, USAF personnel have been tasked with, "a one-year deployment to Afghanistan with one of 12 provincial reconstruction teams."[131] While such missions certainly enhance legitimacy, and some of the airmen are volunteers, they are not applying USAF unique skills and capabilities but rather, "are learning both combat and humanitarian relief skills at Fort Bragg," fulfilling roles traditionally belonging to Army civil affairs units.[132] According to Peter Spiegel of the LA Times, "In Iraq, the Air Force has taken over supply convoys to ease the burden on the Army and Marine Corps, and specialized forces have been used in Army-like combat patrols, conducting raids and seizing suspected insurgents."[133] General Moseley has aggressively pushed for the USAF to pick up these traditionally Army and Marine Corps missions, going so far as to expand basic training by two weeks in order to incorporate a practice deployment focusing on ground combat skills and calling for the development of a school which, "would focus solely on teaching ground combat skills."[134] While more expeditionary training has potential benefits, the USAF should avoid having its personnel drafted, much less volunteering them, to fulfill traditional Army and Marine Corps ground missions. Turning airmen into ground troops and truck drivers is the wrong answer to the problem of an Army that is too small for its mission. This is especially the case if the USAF is seeking to make itself more relevant in what is today a ground dominated operation and to ensure its "fair share" of the DOD budget.[135] A better answer would be to address the Army's manpower shortfalls and create a civilian reconstruction force – but these proposals are beyond the scope of this paper. The bottom line is that the USAF should transform itself to apply the unique capabilities of airpower to SSTR and major combat operations, not become a "blue" army.

Transforming the USAF's education and training is vital to making it capable of conducting both SSTR and major combat operations. Emphasis should be placed both on creating international affairs specialists as well as providing all airmen with basic knowledge of culture, language, and SSTR operations. This will result in first, second, and third order effects. The first order effect is enhanced U.S. legitimacy, FID, and interoperability, all of which directly support the objective of creating a viable, self-sufficient state. The second order effect is keeping the USAF operat-

ing in areas of comparative advantage. It should vigorously resist taking on ground missions, especially on a permanent basis, and instead apply the unique capabilities of airpower to the SSTR environment. The third order effect, the result of effective education and training, is that the USAF may not need to increase its size to conduct both SSTR and MCOs.

Third Order Effects - Sizing the USAF

If appropriate changes are made to current USAF training and education, no significant change in the size of the force may be required. The USAF has a very limited and specific role in SSTR. To maintain its present size, or even absorb the projected cuts in personnel called for by the QDR, the USAF should stick to the tasks where it enjoys a comparative advantage. In essence, the USAF should be able to do more missions, both SSTR and major combat operations, with less personnel. This "more with less" philosophy applies to major combat operations because, "technological advances, including dramatic improvements in information management and precision weaponry, have allowed our military to generate considerably more combat capability with the same or in some cases, fewer numbers of weapons platforms and with lower levels of manning."[136] The QDR states the DOD now must do more than, "maintain their predominance in traditional warfare, they must also be improved to address the non-traditional, asymmetric challenges of this new century."[137] This approach is epitomized by small units of special operations forces calling in precise, devastating firepower from above in Afghanistan.

The problem is that the follow-on SSTR operations, especially those on the ground, are personnel intensive. But this objection does not apply to the USAF. Thomas and Cukierman argue that, for the USAF specifically, significant overlap exists between conventional and SSTR-like operations, with the latter sometimes even having a positive impact readiness for the former.[138] So long as it operates where it enjoys comparative advantage, that is, the peaceful and forceful application of airpower, the USAF can truly do more with less. The problem is that, as the Army struggles to man its requirements, the USAF is beginning to make up the difference by performing a variety of ground missions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. If the USAF persists in this effort, it loses its comparative advantage and it will not be able to meet its own personnel requirements. No amount of cultural education, language training, or SSTR preparation will enable the USAF to effectively conduct both SSTR and major combat operations if USAF leaders persist in taking on Army-like missions, at least not at current or projected force levels.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper was to test the claim that by transforming USAF education and training, current or even lower levels of personnel may be sufficient to conduct successful SSTR and major combat operations. The validity of the claim is possible given two necessary conditions. First, the USAF must become an enabler of the other services, other government agencies, allies, and host nation personnel in the SSTR environment. Second, USAF leadership must not persist in taking on ground missions traditionally performed by the Army and Marine Corps. The violation of either or both of these conditions seriously threatens the validity of the claim and would almost certainly require an increase rather than a decrease in USAF personnel.

Recommendations

This paper supports the idea that all airmen need more education and training to successfully perform both SSTR and major combat operations. The primary needs are for language training, cultural education, joint interagency pre-deployment exercises, the creation of specialists, and the synthesis of "lessons learned" into SSTR doctrine. The conduits for meeting these needs are, respectively, self-assessment and intentional recruiting and retention of language capable personnel, the incorporation of language, culture, and SSTR-specific classes at every level of

PME, conducting pre-deployment training that certifies unit and interoperability performance, further expansion of the international affairs specialist program, and mid and post-deployment debriefing of a wide range of personnel engaged in SSTR operations.

Implications

Unless the USAF transforms its training and education to infuse language, culture, and SSTR-specific skills in its personnel it will be unprepared to fulfill its mission: to defend the United States through the control and exploitation of air and space. The threat facing the United States today comes from terrorists operating out of hostile, weak, and failed states. Answering that threat means conducting SSTR to create self-sufficient states, thereby permanently denying terrorists their sanctuaries, and leading to lasting peace. The USAF can make a significant contribution to national security by adapting its training and education to better apply airpower in support of SSTR operations.

Future Research

There are many relevant and important topics related to SSTR and the future of the Air Force that this paper only covered or did not address at all. These include:

- Training, organization, and roles of the entire military in SSTR (not just the USAF)

- Development of an SSTR force, to include the role of reservists and contractors

- Creation of a joint interagency school of SSTR to include realistic pre-deployment training exercises

- The origins, present state, and future relevancy of the AEF as it applies to SSTR

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THE ROLE OF STRATGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

By

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The events of September 11th, 2001 did not change the world. At least, they did not change it substantively. After those four airliners were purposefully guided into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania, what did change was the way that the world's most powerful state viewed the threat of terrorism. In the five years since 9/11, the United States has launched military campaigns into Afghanistan and Iraq, the largest undertakings of their kind since the First Gulf War in 1991, in the hope that the terrorists using those states for shelter and support would either be killed, captured, or cut off and unable to function. We were indeed successful in ousting the Taliban government in Afghanistan, as well as the majority of al-Qaeda's operatives there. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime is a thing of the past while he has been is held accountable for the crimes he committed.

But despite our best efforts, terrorism continues to rear its ugly head, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in nations across the world, some of whom had never witnessed attacks by Islamist groups. We must therefore ask ourselves not only why our military efforts have failed, but also a much harder question: If eliminating the governments that support terrorism is not the answer, how we can defeat such an ill-defined foe? The complete answer to that question is still under debate in think tanks around the world, but part of it is clear. A fundamental misunderstanding of the culture that yields terrorists has led the United States and its allies to the wrong conclusion. The campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq focused on the governing regimes, and although those regimes were part of the problem, we have since discovered that the core of the problem involves the hearts and minds of the people.

One question that is often asked in the days since 9/11 is "Why do they hate us?" In an address to a joint session of Congress a week after the attacks, President Bush remarked, "They hate what we see right here in this chamber -- a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other."[1] For some, this may be true, but many others do not hate what America stands for so much as what America does, and it would be a grave mistake to assume that the war on terrorism will be won by sending the U.S. military *en masse* to destroy a state's current regime and replace it with one that suddenly presents its people with a local version of our Constitution. The Bush administration certainly recognizes that issue, but real efforts toward addressing the matter through non-military means such as strategic communication and public diplomacy have been half-hearted at best.

In addition to removing governments that use terrorism or support the use of terrorism to accomplish their objectives, whatever they may be, the real challenge will be to prevent individuals who profess such ideologies from ever rising to power. This has been the overarching goal of U.S. strategic communication for the past half-decade, but the magnitude of intensity with which it must be pursued has been grossly underestimated. Reflecting on our past policy, the 9/11 Commission reported, "The diplomatic efforts of the Department of State were largely ineffective. Al Qaeda and terrorism was just one more priority added to already-crowded agendas…."[2] The report also specifically listed a need to prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, which would require that we vigorously "engage the struggle of ideas," and recognized that "the United States has to help defeat an [extremist] ideology, not just a group of people" and that in order to do so the U.S. must "act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, [otherwise] the extremists will do the job for us."[3]

After September 11th, former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Charlotte Beers was tasked with accomplishing that objective, but sadly, the efforts by the bureau she directed were largely ineffectual due to what was deemed a "Madison Avenue approach" linked to her background as a New York advertising mogul.[4] Although the website of every U.S. embassy in the Middle East now has a portion dedicated to "Muslim Life in America," those websites focus mainly on the image of an America tolerant to Muslims while virtually every photograph of an adult Muslim woman shows her wearing a veil or head scarf. Executive Director of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dr. Robert Satloff, comments on the issue:

> Not only does that misrepresent American Muslim women but it also sends precisely the wrong message to Afghan women now free to choose whether to wear the burqa, to Iranian women fighting to throw off the chador and to Turkish women at the vanguard of building democracy in an overwhelmingly Muslim state.[5]

American women have enjoyed equal rights with American men for over three decades. It is counterproductive to give Muslim women a different impression of their status here.

Another failed effort is involves the 9/11 Commission's recommendation to "offer [Muslim] parents a vision that might give their children a better future." In late 2002, the "Shared Values" initiative sought to add America's piece to the conversation in the Arab and Muslim worlds by running a television advertising campaign that resembled a series of mini-documentaries in largely Muslim countries across the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Their purpose was similar to that of the embassy websites: to present America's acceptance of both Muslim religion and culture by showing Muslim Americans freely going about their daily lives in a tolerant society. The intended outcome was that the people of those countries would no longer believe that the United States was at war with Islam (one particular motivating factor for the campaign was a survey across nine Muslim and

Arab nations that found that only 12 percent agreed with the statement "Americans respect Arab/Islamic values.")[6] Dr. Satloff also commented on this issue:

> On closer inspection, this $15 million ad campaign is just the most high-profile example of a policy of "dumbing down" our outreach to Muslim peoples…. Instead of recognizing that millions of Muslims dislike America because of the alleged injustice of our policies on contentious issues such as terrorism, Iraq, and Israel, we have chosen to believe that if only Muslims knew us better – our society, values, and culture – they would hate us less.[7]

After the hijackers who carried out the attacks on September 11th were investigated, it was discovered that the first few had arrived here in mid-January 2000.[8] They were exposed to American society, values, and culture for over a year and a half while learning English and training to fly airliners, yet they had no qualms about executing their the mission when the "go" date arrived. Clearly, there is more to the problem of Islamist terrorism than correcting a cultural disconnect and thereby eliminating their motivation for violence.

With that in mind, it is probably useful at this point to investigate exactly what the terrorists' motivations are. The current stereotype believed by most of those who ask why Muslims "hate" us is precisely the one presented in President Bush's address to Congress cited above; i.e., that they blow themselves up out of anger at our open society and acceptance of others faiths, values, and opinions. That could possibly explain why the 9/11 hijackers were so determined, but such an answer is far too simplistic.

In his travels throughout Afghanistan, Iraq, and many other predominately Muslim countries, journalist Jason Burke of the London *Observer* uncovered many facts about the "terrorist threat" perceived by the U.S. Burke opens his latest book with what may come as a startling revelation:

> Ask even well-informed Westerners what they believe al-Qaeda to be and many will tell you that it describes a terrorist organization founded more than a decade ago by a hugely wealthy Saudi Arabian religious fanatic that has grown into a fantastically powerful network comprising thousands of trained and motivated men, watching and waiting in every city, in every country, on every continent, ready to carry out the orders of their leader, Osama bin Laden, and kill and maim for their cause. The good news is that this al-Qaeda does not exist. The bad news is that the threat now facing the world is far more dangerous….[9]

Burke's findings indicate the U.S. not only misunderstands the major cause of the Islamist problem, but for the most part the common enemy against which we have rallied is fundamentally different than the one we imagined. Although the overall scope of Burke's findings go far beyond the role of strategic communications, the implication still exists that the nature of the so-called "war on terrorism" is wholly different from that which the Bush administration anticipated. We are, as the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu would say, "ignorant of the enemy;" the United States is focused on the wrong fight.

Despite the variety of their motives, backgrounds, experience, and culture, Burke was able to break down the type of people who join Islamic militant movements into two broad groups. The first group, and the more sophisticated of the two, is one he describes as "intellectual activists." Remarkabley similar to almost every revolutionary group over the past few centuries, people such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden would be included here along with all those calling for change who have high aspirations and are then frustrated by apparent injustice when the political or social options approved by the state are ineffective.[10] Such a cycle of striving and disappointment is quite characteristic of the Middle East and the Islamic world, which is why the second-class status given to the region by the "Christian West" is so strongly resented. This combination is part of the greater reason why so many have resorted to such destructive methods.

The second group of militants Burke describes is far less sophisticated. Coming from the margins of society, "they are less educated, more violent and follow a more debased, popularized form of Islam," he says. "They are more unthinkingly radical,

bigoted and fanatical."[11] They are also the ones whom the United States is most likely to reach after an overhaul of its approach to public diplomacy.

The interview that Burke conducted with a young Iraqi named Didar reveals in part what the U.S. can to do prevent members of the second group, who have come to comprise a larger and larger portion of the Islamist militant force, from joining up.[12] Although Didar feels that his Kurdish upbringing was not necessarily a very religious one and that he was not very involved in politics, his limited education left him essentially unemployable. Therefore, when he left school in 1999 at the age of fourteen, he began frequenting the mosque due to a lack of any sort of employment or other means to keep him occupied. It was through the activities there that he was first introduced to Wahhabi books and pamphlets, published in part with subsidies from the Saudi Arabian government, and to works by Abdallah Azzam professing that every Muslim man had a duty to conduct jihad. Didar's opinion is indicative of the desperation that some Middle Eastern Muslims feel regarding their current situation:

> "We felt we could change things. We could make everything come right in our homeland. What Osama and my teacher [at the mosque] said was true. If everybody did what it said in the Qur'an then everything would be OK. It was only the atheists in the government who were stopping that and their supporters among the Jews and the Crusaders. We had to fight them all…."[13]

It is in cases such as Didar's that the United States has the ability to utilize its influence. There may not be any way to prevent individuals like Osama bin Laden from embracing extremism, for there will always be such individuals, but there are many ways that the U.S. can use its wealth and resources to prevent people like Didar from joining their ranks.

In a hearing before the Committee on International Relations in August 2004, one speaker quoted Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage as saying "We have got to stop exporting our fear and anger and export a message of hope and opportunity."[14] This point of view is also directly in line with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: "To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have a crucial advantage – we can offer these parents a vision that might give their children a better future."[15] It is fairly easy to argue that Osama bin Laden's master plan holds more appeal than the Commission's report surmises, otherwise he would attract no one besides extremist, suicidal maniacs, but the recommendation itself is, in essence, a good one.

One thing this recommendation lacks, however, is an accompanying plan of action. Instead, the general impression one derives from this section of the report, is that Muslims holding anti-American views will somehow ameliorate there views on their own. The largest failure of the "Shared Values" initiative was the assumption that once a series of short television spots had aired, at least in the countries that allowed them to run, a seed would be planted that would produce a new perception of Americans and their desire to alter the policy initiatives of radical governments and terrorist organizations. It failed to recognize the fact that the root cause of those organizations' actions was not rooted in a minor cultural misunderstanding, but rather in a desire to achieve equal status with the West that has gone unfulfilled for decades.

This realization has been incorporated into current public diplomacy initiatives by the Department of State. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen P. Hughes, the State Department has laid out three strategic objectives that are much more on the right track than the efforts of her predecessor, Charlotte Beers. The first is to "offer people throughout the world a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in America's belief in freedom, justice, opportunity and respect for all."[16] On its own, this goal would be exactly what Dr. Satloff emphasized that the U.S. should avoid in an article written for the *Weekly Standard* in 2004, on that piece, Satloff criticized the State Department's "feel-good outreach" to Arabs

and Muslims and advocated that "advancing U.S. policies must be the touchstone of all public diplomacy."[17] While argueing that some emphasis on values is important, Satloff argues that in order to promote our national interests, we must first realize that "a successful public diplomacy relies on three ingredients: a short-term focus on image, a long-term investment in future allies, and, most of all, a consistent emphasis on promoting U.S. interests."[18]

The method by which Ambassador Hughes plans to her objective is twofold, both parts of which agree with Dr. Satloff's recommendations. By increasing funding for programs that work, specifically foreign exchanges, and making them more effective as well as more strategic, the ambassador's plan is to spread a positive vision of hope while maintaining a "feel-good outreach." Accordingly, State Department requested an additional $70 million for exchanges in the 2006 federal budget and another $48 million on top of that for 2007.[19] To ensure that these exchanges are indeed strategic, Ambassador Hughes is going to focus them on the younger generation, people Didar's of age, as well as on groups who influence them: clerics, teachers, and journalists. The inclusion of journalists is a particularly important, since combating the anti-American propaganda that regularly passes for news in many Middle Eastern countries is a primary means for spreading the teachings of radical Islamic clerics.

Second on Ambassador Hughes list of strategic objectives is probably her most important goal, specifically to "isolate and marginalize the violent extremists and confront their ideology of tyranny and hate."[20] Accomplishing this goal will not only ensure that al-Qaeda and its operatives are rendered powerless and their methods de-legitimized, but it will also initiate a trend in Muslim and Middle Eastern thinking that will discourage their reemergence in the future. Granted, the effort must be accompanied by governmental reform at the highest level, otherwise the current regimes in countries like Iran, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia will simply suppress indigenous reformersadding to the frustration of the progressive elements. As events in Iraq have made clear, however, revamping a state's government, even drastically so, will not be sufficient on its own. These two actions must run concurrently in order to have long-term effect.

Ambassador Hughes indicates that she has been "meeting with interfaith leaders and challenging them to try to launch a similar movement across all faiths and continents, to clearly state that no grievance, no complaint, no matter how justified, can ever justify the targeting and killing of innocent civilians," She offers an analogy that seems very pertinent:

> We need to do for terror what was done to slavery. Slavery went from being an international accepted norm to becoming an international pariah. And the antislavery movement actually sprang from religious convictions about the worth and value of every person, convictions very similar to America's belief in the dignity of every human being.[21]

The ambassador's third strategic imperative is the broadest: "to foster a sense of common interests and common values between Americans and people of different countries and cultures across our world."[22] It is evident that Ambassador Hughes would like to maintain a public diplomacy initiative that is a little more congenial than Dr. Satloff's suggested approach to constantly maintain focus on U.S. interests with little consideration for the interests of other nations, save for an occasional check to make sure that we are not hurting ourselves in the process. To support her initiative, Hughes is holding other U.S. ambassadors accountable for making ample use of public diplomacy in their host nations. They are now "expected to speak out [in media interviews] and don't need pre-clearance from Washington."[23] Such guidance is precisely what Dr. Satloff recommended in one of his contributions to a series of articles for the Washington Institute. Satloff entended that, previously, it was better for ambassadors to keep their heads down rather than risk a slip-up under the previous "anodyne" State Department guidance. In short, ambassadors had virtually no incentive to focus their efforts on media

outreach.[24] Ambassador Hughes now expects U.S. ambassadors to make it a focus. In fact, effective media relations have become one of the criteria on which all Foreign Service officers are rated in their performance evaluations.

Nor has Hughes lost focus on the policy side of the issue, which is another one of the "key areas" she has decided to focus upon to make the Bureau for Public Diplomacy work more efficiently. In his memo to Hughes upon her nomination, Dr. Satloff specifically cautioned her against being deceived about the nature of her job. Since its mission is to engage foreign governments, State Department activities can actually inihibit public diplomacy, the purpose of which is to influence foreign peoples. That is why it is imperative for Ambassador Hughes to remember that she might have to occasionally do battle with the bureaucracy within her own building and butt heads with people who work on the floor above her.[25] She has taken Satloff's advice to heart, since taking office, it appears Hughes not was ensured that her bureau is involved in the department's policy-making process from the earliest stages, but also has developed a Rapid Response Unit that browses and analyzes news sources across the world to determine important issues on a daily basis, rather than waiting for a week to discover taht some event received unfavorable comment in an editorial column. That information gets passed to the heads of each federal department and to other branches of government in Washington, D.C., as well as to the U.S. military commands across the world. This broad dissemination of foreign news ensures that decision-makers have access to the pertinent information of the day, and that the importance of Hughes' bureau is recognized by all who base major decisions on the information she provides.[26]

Another "key area" for Ambassador Hughes is marketing American higher education to students all over the world.[27] By convening a University Presidents Summit to discuss with educational leaders the ways in which America can attract even more graduate students, she has encouraged collaboration in the one arena that is not likely to be looked at with suspicion, since our educational system is at least partially removed from government influence. This effort helps promote mutual understanding between American students and those from participating countries, and perhaps even lasting relationships since some of those who learn together may end up working together, possibly in the international arena.

On the other hand, Ambassador Hughes also has a few wrong notions, one of which involves the realm of technology. She herself admits that the government usually lags behind in technological trends, but the direction in which she is planning to go will promote her strategic objectives only marginally, if at all. By advocating that the Bureau of International Information Programs use popular technology like MP3 players and cellular phone text messaging to enhance the reach of U.S. public diplomacy, the ambassador would be focusing on the wrong demographic entirely.[28] The people that the United States needs to try hardest to reach are impowerished people like Didar, or those disposed to resort to other, more violent means of satisfaction precisely because they do not have the financial ability to do otherwise. Again, we are ignorant of the enemy.

Dr. Satloff makes an important observation in that "the decision to sacrifice printed materials to push internet-based programming [like the embassy websites] was a mistake, given that the Middle-East is one of the least-linked parts of the world."[29] The most important technological outreach programs, if any are implemented, will be those that employ the medium of satellite television, for which the Bush administration is currently searching for funding to get the Middle East Television Network off the ground. Although METN would require considerably more capability to communicate in Arabic than is currently possessed by Foreign Service Officers and would never be able achieve the sensationalism of al-Jazeera as a government-subsidized network, it is still a noble idea. Dr. Mustapha Masmoudi, General Man-

ager of Institut Massmedia in Tunis and Associate Professor at Tunisia's École Nationale d'Administration, offers the following observation:

> Thanks to satellite connections, television has given people of the Arab world access to richer information, increased their social awareness and allowed them to develop finer critical abilities. By developing social communication, television has allowed the citizen to communicate better with society, to be more active, and to change his behavior voluntarily for the sake of adherence to community values.[30]

If the United States could perhaps improve the Arabic language skills of even 10 percent of Middle East FSOs to a 4.0 or higher instead of allowing such skills to stagnate at the current required 3.0 level, perhaps we could obtain air time for some of our more prominent officials on Arabic-based networks or on privately created networks whose content we can control.[31] Efforts such as Radio Sawa were well intentioned, but unless a unique message is provided, it will quickly be lost in the "noise" as other local stations provide more successful programming styles. The real challenge will be ensuring that the gap between the haves and the have-nots does not continue to widen. As South Africa's president, Thabo Mbeki, stated, "Less developed countries must not be left out of the new Information Society, and we must ensure that the information highways do not develop in a way that will enhance the differences between those who can communicate and those who cannot."[32]

Beyond society's current fascination with world-shrinking technology is the best way to influence the lives of people like Didar. That will require even more focus on education, both English language education and general education at the elementary school level. Having educated his children for the most part at American schools abroad, Dr. Satloff recognizes the profound impact that they have on students and their parents:

> What makes American schools a strategic asset is the fact that non-Americans flock to them. Of the nearly 100,000 students enrolled in such schools around the world, more than 70 percent are not American, fairly evenly divided between local and third-country students….
>
> Students at these schools learn how to ask questions, be curious, solve problems, and accept differences…. Every student leaves with a facility in English and an appreciation for critical thinking and cultural diversity that represent American education at its best. While these schools may only benefit relatively few children, their impact is profound. In Morocco, for example, local parents make a weighty political cultural statement by enrolling their children in these schools.[33]

The challenge now is to increase the benefit that these schools can offer by breaking the barrier that currently limits attendance by local students: the tuition. It is not as difficult as it might first appear, for the current annual assistance the U.S. provides to American schools abroad is a meager $8 million. To provide half-tuition scholarships to almost forty students at each of the fifty or so accredited American schools in countries with sizable Arab or Muslim populations would amount to just an additional $13.5 million each year.[34]

These suggestions, goals, and strategic imperatives are all well and good, but it is also obvious that their success requires a well-defined, responsible bureaucracy within the federal government. The jumble of offices, committees, bureaus, and organizations that have been tasked with overseeing and coordinating public policy since September 11th have been nothing but a hindrance, and have failed to produce any clear guidelines beyond amendments to the recommendations made by Ambassador Hughes. One study by the Heritage Foundation recommends simply proceeding with the current structure intact, using only the Public Diplomacy Advisory Commission from the White House to supplement the bureaus within the State Department.[35] It appears that Ambassador Hughes has a good enough grasp of the situation to continue with the organization available to her, although she would probably appreciate any additional personnel or funding available. Thankfully, we seem to be fulfilling Sun Tzu's admonition that, at the very least, we should know ourselves, otherwise we would certainly be in peril.

On the other hand, the Government Accounting Office

views the situation differently and states as much in an in-depth report released in April 2005, two years after the aforementioned Heritage Foundation's report . Before the short-lived Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee (Septembber 2002--Mardh 2003), was disbanded (before it could ever release a policy strategy), the Office of Global Communication was created within the White House and took on new meaning once the SCPCC was gone.[36] In the absence of a national communications strategy from that quarter, the White House subsequently established the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee in July 2004, and the State Department stood up the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources a month later, but the effectiveness of both of these organizations has yet to be determined.

The study by the GAO also acknowledges the larger roles that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are beginning to assume in the never-ending struggle to establish the nation's public diplomacy objectives. USAID's contribution to public diplomacy could be assigned to the hierarchy of the Bureau for Public Policy in the State Department, but the role of the DoD is somewhat more difficult to describe. That is partially due to the fact that "the DoD has been reluctant to define any of its activities in public diplomacy terms," even though its employment in that regard has been undeniable in recent years, especially considering its involvement in maintaining peace in Iraq and its mobilization of 13,000 troops to provide relief for victims of the recent tsunami.[37] In general, the DOD is not a major player in the formulation of public diplomacy except for rare instances in which it must declare its inability to effectively carry out a desired mission. The DoD has, however, begun to acknowledge its role in the arena by developing a "defense support for public diplomacy strategy." Its first step in that regard was to designate the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as the head of the department's public diplomacy activities, as well as overseer and focal point of strategic communications.[38]

Unfortunately for the U.S., the only organization that might be able to relieve some of the burden in addressing the al-Qaeda narrative and act as a neutral authority when dealing with peaceful acts of public diplomacy or the employment of military force is the United Nations, which is viewed as biased or corrupt in a large portion of the Arab world. Even though the United States has a generally strong track record regarding its efforts to protect Muslims, particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina, Osama bin Laden remains capable of convincing Muslims that those events were "hair-raising and revolting massacres… committed before the eyes of the entire world clearly in accordance with a conspiracy by the United States and its allies who banned arms for the oppressed there under cover of the unfair United Nations."[39]

It might appear that the United States is alone in this fight, but we do have our allies. They include sympathetic nations like Great Britain which now realizes it faces the same threat we do, and non-fundamentalist Muslims who are not convinced that al-Qaeda or similar organizations offer a better alternative. It may take many more months before the U.S. finally solidifies its approach to public diplomacy or its message, to the Muslim world. In the meantime, we must remember that in the battle for hearts and minds that defines this global war on terror, the fundamental principle must always be respect: respect for culture, respect for Islam, respect for Muslims as our fellow human beings. If we continue with that principle constantly in mind, we cannot fail in our struggle to triumph over the fear and hatred professed by the likes of Osama bin Laden. If we ignore it, we cannot succeed.

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THE HANDYMAN COMETH: USE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

BY

C1C CHRISTOPHER VALLIERE

One would typically not associate the USNS *Comfort* and *Mercy* and Air Force C-130s as the recognizable "superstars" of the military. However, in recent years, this has become the case on the local and international stages. It does not seem to make sense that hospital ships and medium transports would be poster-children for the military services. However, in the wake of several disasters around the world, this has become the case, for it is these pieces of equipment, not main battle tanks and fighter jets, which take the lead in military disaster relief.

Military response to disaster relief has become an increasing trend since the dawn of the 21st century. Even in the past two years, two major disasters—the 2004 Pacific tsunami and the American hurricane season of 2005—have led to massive military responses. The response has included airlift and maritime support, to ground forces used to uphold the law and distribute aid. Even before these disasters, it was recognized that on average the military conducts more than 200 humanitarian operations every year.[1]

Many people recognized that, as it stands now, the military is the United States government's best responder to large-scale disaster relief operations. The military possesses the manpower, logistical, and command and control capabilities that are necessary to execute a some have notedsuccessful relief operation. However, it has also been noticed that the military, already over-stretched with two wars, cannot and should not have such a huge role in disaster relief operations. When used properly, the military can be a great asset in relief efforts; however, the military should not be the lead agency in any disaster effort, unless policy makers are willing to accept the diplomatic ramifications and decreased combat effectiveness that could result from this.

Foreign Relief: The Tsunami

Monetarily the United States is criticized for its initial response to the tsunami that struck the Pacific Ocean. However, the military response was quick and plentiful. The three services that led the way in this operation were the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The Navy provided a sea-basing capability by positioning several ships, including the *Mercy* and the *Abraham Lincoln* battle group, off the shores of Sri Lanka and Indonesia. The Air Force sent in transport planes, eleven alone dedicated to flying into Sri Lanka[2], from its regional bases to the affected areas. Finally, the Marines went ashore to unload and distribute these aid packages. Other agencies were involved, such as USAID[3], but again it was the military that provided the majority of the assistance. With Marines unloading one ship, the USS *Duluth*, carried earthmoving equipment for use in Sri Lanka.[4] Without a doubt, the military was the "saving grace" for the United States in terms of providing a massive response to the disaster.

One of the main reasons that the military is called upon to do international relief is its ability to reach anywhere on the globe, by air or sea. If it cannot be shipped in, it can likely be flown in by Air Force transports. This capability is more than that possessed by any other American agency.

In this case, it would seem to make perfect sense that the military should be the first response to foreign disaster. However, there is one danger that must be considered before a military enters a foreign country. For example, in Indonesia, where a prolonged struggle between the government and the Tamil Tigers was still going on at the time of the tsunami, the Indonesian government was wary of allowing armed troops to come ashore for fear that this might incite the Tamil Tigers. American Marines and Australian soldiers who went ashore were then left vulnerable to rebel attacks, protected only by Indonesian security. This situation could have turned deadly in early 2004 when rebels attacked officials near the United Nations relief headquarters in the Banda Aceh province. After the attack the American and Australian governments still attested that the situation was safe for their troops.[5] It is this sort of situation that could create a public relations nightmare should a Marine die because he did not have the means to defend himself. It is understandable that the government was trying to accommodate the Indonesians' wishes, but this should not be done at the expense of our troops.

The Effort At Home: Hurricane Katrina and Arguments Against Military Relief Efforts

Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, breaking the levees and flooding the city, leaving thousands stranded and homeless. Several factors prevented a quick response, taking in excess of four days to get the first relief convoys into the area.

Again, the military was the lead agent in the relief effort after the implosion of FEMA. The services' helicopters performed search and rescue, the U.S. Navy ship USS *Comfort* arrived on scene along with five other ships. The National Guard was deployed and the Air Force's transports shuttled supplies and people into and out of the region.[6]

It is the scale and "close to home-ness" of Katrina that started a serious call for the military to become the lead agent in disaster relief. On 15 September 2006, President Bush made his stance clear when he said "It's now clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader role for our armed forces—the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment's notice."[7] It is no secret that military leaders are opposed to this idea, citing several reasons.

Perhaps the biggest argument against this change is that the military is designed as a force to fight wars, not keep the peace and feed the hungry. An officer from the 82nd Airbone Division, one of the lead responders to the Katrina effort, was quoted as saying "The 82nd Airborne are trained to kill. They are

not trained to be police or rescue." [8]

This feeling is reflected elsewhere in the military, but the job is still accepted. "I tell my young troopers, you are the 911 force for America," says Major General William Caldwell, the 82nd Airbone's Commander.[9] The military is sworn to do the job that the civilian leaders tell them to, but that does not mean that the civilian leaders understand the bounds of the military's responsibilities. Marine General Charles Wilhelm says that disasters should "pass the threshold of catastrophic[10]" before the military is called in.

Another argument against the use of the military is the violation of Posse Comitatus, an 1870's era law which prohibits federal (not National Guard) troops from being used in domestic law enforcement roles. Military leaders see Posse Comitatus as a guiding principle for use of the military, saying that it restricts—for good reason—use of the military to a warfighting purpose. Military leaders also assert that the active duty is more than capable of providing its current level of relief without violating Posse Comitatus, leaving the National Guard, who are state troops and do not fall under the law, to provide law enforcement capabilities if necessary.[11] Even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld agrees on this point, having said that "…the Guard, as opposed to the active force, tends to have a higher proportion of people who do things that are appropriate in a domestic setting."[12]

The third argument the military presents is, with the recent scaling down of forces, it does not have the manpower to perform a humanitarian mission and fight two wars. Perhaps one of the best examples of this was during the confusion that followed Katrina. There were rumors of the governor of Louisiana wanting to recall her National Guardsmen from Iraq to help in New Orleans. The ramifications of this would have gone well beyond a simple swap of troops. With the military stretched thin, the recall of the Louisiana troops would have meant a massive transfer of manpower and logistical support, more than was warranted for the size of the Guard unit. Randall Larsen, director of the Institute for Homeland Security said "They [the military] are overstressed now. If you give them this mission, they will have to organize, train and equip for national disasters.[13]" Adding this new responsibility to the military's already expanding plate of responsibilities would not be fair, nor intelligent for the government to do.

Another potential reason that the military should not be allowed to perform these missions is the effect that it may have on foreign relations. It has already been established that the military is having a difficult time managing two wars and its other worldwide commitments in addition to supporting Katrina efforts. It is obvious that the military devoted a vast number of assets to the New Orleans cleanup. If this were to become a primary mission and another international disaster were to occur and the United States could not support a large military effort there, then no matter what the reason, it would look bad in the eyes of the world. The United States would be made to look selfish and not concerned with international problems. However, if the military is not tasked with this job full time, then it will not be expected by foreign governments.

Other Considerations

With the military strained as it is, humanitarian efforts take away from their capabilities to perform the warfighting mission. The United States is the best overall military in the world, and the humanitarian mission will begin to take away from that. It will come down to a matter of the humanitarian mission expanding, further taking away from training time. The ultimate worst case scenario is one depicted in Charles Dunlap's "Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," where the military has been so tied up in other operations that it faces off against a fairly weak yet experienced Iraqi Army and is handily defeated.[14] The military must be careful to avoid heading down this road. If it accepts a humanitarian mission, it must devise a way to ensure that the mission of war is still maintained as the priority.

The military must avoid falling into the "handyman trap." The trap is a theory that the military is quickly becoming the American Government's solution to every problem. The issue arises when one considers that the military's interests are divided among such a diverse range of operations that there is not enough time to train for excellence in any of them. Therefore, the military becomes good at everything, but great at nothing, especially its primary mission, to win America's wars.

A question that must be asked is why other federal agencies are not capable of shouldering the loads themselves. For example, FEMA was supposed to be the lead federal agency in the hurricane effort, but the public implosion of their leadership left them nearly unable to do anything. Also, why are not other agencies, such as the Peace Corps, leading the way in foreign efforts?

The answer is quite simple. Those other agencies tasked to do relief missions simply do not have resources in the sheer magnitude that the military does. This includes manpower, money, equipment, transport capabilities, and command and control structures. The military is an incredibly self-sufficient force that has all the organic assets needed for these types of relief missions while other agencies which fall under the auspices of the State Department or Department of Homeland Security, must negotiate the federal bureaucracy to coordinate their response. If this is to change, these organizations must be allowed to develop their own self-sufficiency so that the dependency on military assets can be lessened.

Potential Solutions

The unfortunate truth is that, despite its wishes, the military is going to continue to be involved with humanitarian efforts. Therefore, in order to prevent a degradation in combat capabilities and to maintain a sufficient humanitarian response ability, there are several options available.

The most military-centric answer is to create units of the National Guard specifically designed to perform humanitarian missions. These units, which would be deployable in the event of a foreign disaster requiring American involvement, would be specially trained in the myriad of missions that might present themselves in a relief contingency. This option presents several advantages. The first is that with these special units, the rest of the active/guard/reserve force would be freed to perform its traditional combat roles. Another advantage would be that, because this is a guard unit, more specialists could be brought in, such as policemen, construction workers, and other specialties needed in relief missions. They would be able to work full-time in their civilian jobs on that which they may be asked to perform in a military role, which would negate the necessity for some training to do their jobs. Further, because it is a guard unit and controlled by the state, it would be easy for a governor to activate this unit in order to respond to a domestic disaster. Certain supporting efforts would need to be coordinated, such as transportation to and from a site, but one merely needs to task a transport wing on a training cycle to do this.

An effort that should be undertaken before the Humanitarian units of the Guard option is considered is the enhancement of those federal agencies designed to perform humanitarian missions. As it stands, there are several agencies tasked with this, to include FEMA, the Peace Corps, USAID, and other State and Homeland Security departments. The initial fix to enhance these agencies is to give them more money, equipment, and manpower so they can adequately perform their missions. An increase in these agencies' size would allow them to truly be the lead agencies, while using less of the military in a smaller, supporting role. This would take the strain off the military that it is currently experiencing.

As time passes, it is conceivable that all these agencies could be combined into one, under the conceptual name of Office of Humanitarian Relief. This idea has several benefits. One of these would be a simplified command and control structure. This would allow the agency to not have to wade through multiple

bureaucracies in order to coordinate an effort. Also, one combined agency would allow all the assets and personnel to be used without having to ask other agencies for their assistance. If managed properly, this agency could quickly alleviate any responsibility of the military beyond transport in relief operations.

There are three issues that could prevent any of the above solutions from taking place. The first is money. It is conceivable that the United States would be unwilling or unable to put the necessary funds where they needed to go in order to stand up these organizations. It would almost definitely require a shift of funds away from another major project of the government, something that lawmakers may not be willing to accept.

Another issue, mainly for the National Guard concept, is manpower. Creating these units would be dependent on people volunteering to join them. Perhaps a way to solve this problem is to set these units up like the Public Health Service's Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs). DMATs are a type of Medical National Guard, consisting of volunteer doctors, nurses and emergency medical technicians. They are called up when large numbers of medical personnel are needed around the country. Each state maintains at least one DMAT, these medics are called up when the need arises. If the National Guard units were set up in a similar fashion, they would be more attractive to those professionals who would be involved in relief operations.

The final problem, one that would give more backing to the DMAT answer, is that it would be hard to rationalize standing up a large federal agency with great resources that was only used in rare cases when disasters occur. This would be attacked by lawmakers as a waste of money that could be spent elsewhere. They could very well be correct. A federal relief agency without a full-time mission would probably be assigned to do other things beyond its scope, and eventually fall in to the same trap that the military is in danger of falling into.

Conclusion

The United States military is going to be involved in humanitarian relief missions in some form for the foreseeable future. There is no escaping this fact. There is simply no other agency with the assets, abilities and manpower to conduct a large scale relief operation. However, the military should not continue to be as involved in these operations as they currently are. A legitimate effort must be made by the U.S. government to strengthen other government agencies that are supposed to be performing humanitarian missions so as to not ask too much of an already stretched military.

The answers are fairly simple. Abroad, we must allow governmental and non-governmental agencies designed to support relief operations to take the lead role, which will involve better funding and equipping, while keeping the military in a support role. If forces must go to the country, the government must create a balance where those troops can protect themselves while not seeming to impose American will on the host nation.

At home, the answer is much the same. With the implement of the DMAT/National Guard force, a military presence in humanitarian operations could be maintained, while allowing the active combat force to stay in combat roles, and give federal agencies the lead role in relief operations.

Each of these answers will require money and efforts beyond what the military or any other agency has at this point for foreign operations. It will require a determined effort on the part of the American government to ensure that the country is ready to respond to any disaster quickly and efficiently without running into the issues that have arisen in the last few major disaster operations.

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LEADING THE WAY: AMERICA'S ROLE IN GULF SECURITY

By

C2C Hunter Grunden

Achieving stability in the Persian Gulf region is not a new goal for Washington or the Gulf States. For thirty years the US has made its presence known throughout the Gulf. During the Cold War years, the US sought to form strong allegiances with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Throughout the Iran-Iraq war the US subsidized the Iraqi army while trying to keep the Gulf powers balanced. Friendly overtures towards Saddam's Iraq were quickly withdrawn when Iraq invaded Kuwait leading to the first Gulf War. After 9/11, a second Gulf War, and amidst perilous relations with Iran, one can hardly say that US-Gulf affairs are a thing of beauty.

This article will consider why securing the Gulf region is of vital interest to the US and what major security threats currently exist. Then, with the ambitious goal of learning from ones mistakes, the article will examine current and past solutions that have met little success. Following the critique of past and present solutions will be a discussion of the common interests that the Gulf region shares with the US. These common interests provide the framework for open dialogue and compromise on both sides in order to arrive at a place where the values and interest of all the actors are balanced.

"It's the oil stupid."[1] Few say it more bluntly than Kenneth Pollack who served as Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council from 1995 to 1996 and from 1999 to 2001.[2] The fact of the matter is that human rights violations, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and even fighting terrorism all take a back seat to the number one US security objective in the Middle East: safeguarding the flow of oil from the region to the rest of the world. Even if the US finds alternate oil suppliers, the Persian Gulf supplies 25 percent of the

world's oil with 15 percent coming from Saudi Arabia alone.[3] The global economy is dependent upon a plentiful supply of inexpensive petroleum. It is impossible to differentiate between the global economy and the US economy. Therefore ensuring the security and stability in the Gulf must remain a top priority for Washington.

Although oil is the primary motivator for seeking security in the Gulf, maintaining a presence in such a geostrategically critical location is also a concern for strategic planners in Washington. From the Persian Gulf, US military forces can address conflicts that may arise in the Middle East, Central Asia, eastern Africa, and South Asia without maintaining expensive supply lines that stretch back to America. Furthermore, after the events of 9/11, stamping out terrorist groups has and will remain a strategic interest of the US. However, the US's pursuits of "strategic interest" in the region are responsible for many Gulf States', and even more Gulf citizens,' mistrust, resentment, and fear of the US. [4]

Currently there are three major threats to security in the Gulf. These include Iraq's unstable government and social unrest, Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, and unrest amongst the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates." The difficulty with Iraq is that an Iraq that is strong enough to balance and contain Iran will pose a threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.[5] However, to leave Iraq in its current state of affairs would guarantee one of two things: civil war amongst the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds or the takeover by one or more of Iraq's neighboring countries. Because of Iraq's track record, acquiring WMD's to deter Iran will not be an option. Just as postwar Germany and Japan were forced to rely upon the international community for security, so Iraq will need considerable support from the US and other countries for many years into the future. Iraq, like many other nations in the Gulf, needs the security guarantee that a US presence in the region provides, while unfortunately, at the same time results in resentment of US hegemony.

The second major threat to Gulf security makes the news every day: Iran. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the US has been at odds with Iran. Under the presidency of Mohammed Khatami, it appeared that Iranian reformists were making strides to promote cooperation with Western countries. However, all hopes quickly faded in 2005 when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected as Iran's new president. As an Islamic fundamentalist and puppet of the religious clerics, President Ahmadinejad has insisted upon portraying the West, especially America, as a threat to the sovereignty of Iran. To solidify Iran's defiance of the US, Iran has placed its nuclear program in overdrive. In February of 2005 Iran signed a deal with Russia to acquire a nuclear reactor and the fuel necessary to employ it.[6] Intelligence suggests that at its current pace, Iran will have the capability to produce one or more nuclear weapons in less than a decade.

Preemptive intervention was feasible in Iraq. However, Iran has a population three times the size of Iraq, a landmass four times the size, terrain that would pose considerable difficulties for any conventional army, and a population that historically rallies around the government when threatened by outsiders.[7] Furthermore, President Ahmadinejad is waging a largely successful propaganda campaign making nuclear power a source of national pride amongst the Iranian people. Further threats from the US and its allies serve only to legitimize Iran's desire to ensure its security by attaining WMD's. In essence, President Ahmadinejad is utilizing pressure from the US and other countries to bolster the morale of his people. Clausewitz classified courage and patriotic spirit (morale) as two of the three principal moral elements for any army.[8] Especially after witnessing the invasion of Iraq, each threat from the US arouses stronger courage and nationalistic pride amongst Iranians.

Several factors contribute to Iran's desire to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter an attack from the US. First,

Iraq has witnessed firsthand the invasion of its neighbors Iran and Afghanistan. Being placed on the "axis of evil" list by President Bush in 2004 caused many Iranians to assume that they would fall victim to the US's next preemptive strike. Second, Iran has noted the preferential treatment that North Korea received because of its nuclear capabilities even though it also was placed on the "axis of evil" list.[9] One cannot blame Iranians for believing that acquiring nuclear weapons will serve as a deterrent for US military operations.

The third formidable threat to security in the Persian Gulf comes from unrest within the Gulf States that comprise the GCC. The fact of the matter is that the Gulf Cooperation Council is fictitious. Qataris want US military bases in their country in order to provide a shield against their daunting neighbor, Saudi Arabia. Bahrain wants to attain missile technology in order to defend against hostile actions from Qatar.[10] Saudi Arabia wants to ensure control of oil prices throughout the region. Border disputes exist between Qatar-Bahrain and Qatar-Saudi Arabia.[11] To summarize, political, economic, and social stagnation is rampant amongst these Arab states. The threat of civil war and now the growing threat from a would be nuclear capable Iran makes these states vulnerable to becoming the next Gulf catastrophe.

The current threats to Gulf security are not new. As mentioned before, the US has sought to stabilize the Persian Gulf region for over thirty years. However, US "solutions" have only exacerbated the security concerns of the Gulf region. Beginning in the Cold War era, the US's strategy in the Gulf was characterized by ensuring victory via strong alliances, US hegemony, and maintaining a balance of powers within the region. Washington poured out support for the Shah of Iran but this strategy backfired with the Iranian Revolution in 1979. After the revolution, Iranian sentiments quickly changed to anti-American and the previous economic and military aid fell into the hands of the Ayatollah.[12]

Similar to Iran, the US was also an ardent supporter of the Al-Saud family in Saudi Arabia. Turning a blind eye to human rights violations, the US did everything it could to maintain regional stability by ensuring the succession of Al-Saud monarchs in Saudi Arabia. Again this strategy failed when many of the 9/11 terrorists were proven to be Saudi citizens.[13] Even though these terrorists were most likely operating independently from Saudi government officials, the American people at large were left with a general disdain for positive US-Saudi relations.

Iraq also fell victim to US "support." By the time the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980, the US no longer supported Iran but instead had begun providing Iraq with military and financial aid in hopes that Iraq would counterbalance the strength of Iran within the Gulf region. However, instead of maintaining a balance between the region's strongest states, the war that lasted nine years crippled both of the countries economies and left both states exhausted and hollow.[14] As a result, Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait --in order to capture Kuwaiti oil--two years after the Iran-Iraq war ended in a desperate attempt to rebuild Iraq's failing economy. Again the US was forced to switch sides as the first Gulf War began and US forces attacked Iraq in response to the invasion of Kuwait. Given the recent history of Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, it is no wonder that the Persian Gulf region has become increasingly leery of American involvement.

As discussed earlier, US attempts at hegemony are playing into the hands of Iranian officials. Beyond Iran, the claims of the region's terrorists have been legitimized by the United States' prolonged military presence. Even though Washington's attempts may be noble, it is difficult if not impossible to convince Arabs that the US's motives are pure. The inconsistencies of the US have left the US mistrusted, misperceived and feared.[15] Attempts to balance powers within the region have resulted in frequent vacillations from friend to foe and back again. At this point, it is questionable as to whether it is safer to be an ally or enemy of the

United States.

It is easy to play "arm chair quarterback" with regards to the strategic failures in Gulf security. Truth be told, the "silver" bullet solution will probably never be found. However, that should not keep one from seeking to learn from the past, adapt, and plan for the future. One of the most promising aspects of Gulf security is the broad range of interest that the US shares with Gulf States. First and foremost, security and stability in the Gulf means that the global economy is not upset but it also ensures the survival of individual economies within the Persian Gulf. Nearly every state, from Iran to Oman is in need of foreign investment in order to build or rebuild weak infrastructure. As incredulous as it may seem, Iran shares two of the same goals that rank high on the Bush administration's agenda: curbing regional drug trade and stemming the flow of arms and extremists across borders from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Many believe that the global war on terror is strictly a "Bushism." However, terrorism is a threat to the governments of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and all of the GCC States. Contrary to popular belief, terrorist organizations operating in the Gulf are working to disrupt stability amongst any states that do not prescribe to a hard-line fundamentalist version of Islam. Iran is the only state in the region that comes close to this form of government, but even within Iran there is a significant realist majority that falls victim to terrorist attacks. Every other state in the region allows and supports a more liberal form of Islam. Therefore, Islamic extremists are feared by the governments of *all* Gulf States.[16] Although terrorism is a threat to Gulf security, it is also a rallying point for cooperation between the Gulf and the US.

Managing conflict between the Gulf States will support liberalization within the states.[17] Considering the common interests that are shared between the Gulf and the US, two entities that many would consider to be at odds with one another (if not all out enemies), policy makers should consider the Helsinki Process that Europeans embraced to bring about a free Europe as the Communist Empire came to a close.[18] This process confronted sensitive issues such as conventional arms balances and human rights violations that plagued Western and Eastern blocs. Significant to the Helsinki Process is the fact that progress was made even before the Cold War came to an end. The key to this process, according to Michael Kraig who serves as the Director of Policy Analysis and Dialogue for the Stanley Foundation, is that "it crossed ideological and territorial divisions and was truly integrative in its overall approach, both in terms of participants and in terms of issues visited in the talks."[19] Because the Helsinki Process resulted in successful diplomacy amongst countries that were technically enemies, there is promise that the same approach could be utilized in the Gulf region.

Central to the Helsinki Process was the ideal that mutually beneficial international agreements could have a "trickle down" effect on domestic problems within authoritarian states.[20] Current policy coming out of Washington reflects the belief that political change only moves from domestic to international and that is impossible to compromise upon authoritarian regimes' domestic practices in order to achieve a broader international endeavor. Such a rigid stance by Washington is meeting little success in the Gulf and often serves to handcuff the leaders of authoritarian regimes. Instead of insisting that domestic reform take place prior to international negotiations, the US must realize that better domestic governance will result from international agreements along the lines of foreign financial aid, trade incentives, security agreements, punitive sanctions, or military cooperation.

In essence, the US needs to focus on positive-sum negotiations instead of holding to an uncompromising insistence that domestic problems must be solved prior to international collaboration. This is not to say that gross human rights violations should be ignored. Instead, it is a suggestion that internal moral problems are dealt with from the top down. Iraq has proven that forcing a regime change requires extensive military operations.

Furthermore, implementing a new government sympathetic to liberal democracy is an extremely difficult, if not impossible task. Therefore, the most viable means of bringing about domestic liberalization will involve tremendous patience working through authoritarian regimes that are already in place. China is another excellent example of how multilateral international efforts have slowly brought about the liberalization of domestic issues. Mutual dependence and international trust coincide with domestic reforms. It is impossible to achieve one without the other.[21]

In order to facilitate positive-sum negotiations, a new security order needs to be created within the Gulf. The Gulf Cooperation Council can serve as a base layer, but needs to be expanded to include more multilateral involvement and enhanced integration of military forces. Currently, Gulf military assets are not being used to their maximum potential because of mistrust between the states and because of the difficulties they confront in joint operations with the American and British forces.[22] Before the US can diminish its military "footprint" in the region, a security coalition must be fully institutionalized. Such a coalition must be strong enough to deter the aggression of any rogue state in the region. As mentioned before, withdrawing US forces from the region would decrease resentment for other US-led initiatives. However, the Gulf States cannot afford to dismiss US military forces until they can guarantee their own security. Once a strong security coalition is established, the US can withdraw to an "over-the-horizon posture" in order to maintain support for the Gulf States while decreasing the legitimacy of those who claim the US seeks to be an imperial power in the Persian Gulf. Dr. Brent Talbot, a professor of Military Strategic Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy summarized what such a security coalition would involve:

> A cooperative order might emerge in the Gulf around a bargain: the states cooperate to enhance Gulf security, and, in turn, the United States provides a security guarantee. At the same time—and this is a key part of this agreement—the United States limits its exercise of power in the region. (Talbot 2000, 90[23])

Although the formation of a security coalition is an essential step in achieving stability in the Gulf, such a coalition must be coupled with a security organization that is even broader and more multilateral than a coalition of military forces. States with vested interests in the Gulf must be included and an environment based on dialogue should be foundational to the organization. Initially, the organization should focus upon transnational threats and common interests such as: shipping safety, oil cleanup, earthquake hazard mitigation, avoidance of incidents at sea, nuclear fissile materials safety and security, and counter drug trafficking.[24] The organization should seek to establish a code of conduct and a charter for security cooperation. Eventually, endeavors should be made to incorporate joint military operations and information sharing. Each state in the Gulf region has pronounced security concerns. The ultimate goal of the security organization should be to create an environment where each state feels that its security interests and national developing goals are respected by all other actors in the Gulf region.

One cannot effectively address the opportunities and threats facing the Persian Gulf region without also addressing wider Middle East issues. Specifically, the ongoing war between Palestinians and Israelis is central to every Arab. With the advent of independent media outlets such as the Al-Jazeera satellite network, Arabs are pained by daily images of violence from the West Bank. Arabs are disgruntled by the selective nature of the US's enforcement of nuclear proliferation policies. Nothing is ever mentioned about the International Atomic Energy Agency performing inspections within Israel and many Arabs believe that Israel's nuclear program is completely unsafeguarded. Needless to say, the US's denouncement of Iran's nuclear ambitions smacks of hypocrisy when Israel is given free reign to develop not only a nuclear program but nuclear weapons as well.

The status of Jerusalem, an Islamic holy Site, reso-

nates amongst all Arab states. Arabs perceive the US as the only country powerful enough to effectively mediate peace between Palestinians and Israelis. The degree to which the US considers the plight of Palestinians and works to achieve lasting peace serves as a litmus test for US respect for all Arabs.[25] Furthermore, Levant subregional security is closely intertwined with enduring Iranian threats to Israel. Iran is known to support anti-Zionist terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah. It is unlikely that positive Gulf-US relations will come to fruition so long as the Israel-Palestine conflict remains unresolved.

The US should also seek to promote a WMD free zone amongst all Middle Eastern Countries. This should include Northern Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf. Instead of using piecemeal arguments against individual states (Iran), multilateral initiatives to rid the entire region of nuclear weapons should be pursued. If the US applied equal pressure on Israel, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Pakistan, to abandon their pursuit of WMD's, any one country that refused to participate would face isolation from the entire region instead of just the US. Interestingly enough, all Middle Eastern states, enemies of the US included, have expressed a willingness to pursue disarmament.[26] Again, the enduring crisis between Israel and Palestine has caused Israel to exercise caution in giving up its nuclear option. However, the willingness to cooperate expressed by all of the Middle Eastern states is reason enough to pursue preconditions necessary to eliminate WMD's.

In parallel with pursuing a WMD free zone, the international community should bolster support for the IAEA. Iran insists that its nuclear ambitious are peaceful in nature.[27] Even if this were true it does not alleviate the environmental concerns of Iran's neighbors. Fearing what has become know as the Chernobyl effect, many Gulf States fear that a Russian built reactor operated by Iranians is an accident waiting to happen. Russian nuclear technology is notorious for cheap manufacturing techniques and Iran's quality control procedures are minimal if existent at all. Furthermore, Bushrer, the location of Iran's newly acquired reactor is located on top of an active earthquake fault line. A repeat of the environmental catastrophe of Chernobyl within Iran would cause widespread dispersion of radioactive particles throughout the entire Gulf region. Such a catastrophe could shut down oil shipments out of the Gulf resulting in a domino effect of economic, political, and military debacles. For the time being, the IAEA is the only institution that may successfully ensure the safe operations of Iranian nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is paramount that the US, *in addition* to other nations, advocates and supports the IAEA's mission in Iran and other countries. In order to maintain the legitimacy of the IAEA, the US must fight vehemently to disprove any perceptions or realities that the IAEA is a puppet actor for US demands.

This article has covered a myriad of issues that the US and the Gulf must address in order to establish security in the Persian Gulf. The likelihood of finding a "quick-fix" solution is not only implausible but dangerous to pursue. To attain real success in the Gulf, each of the central issues listed below must be addressed multilaterally.

- Iraq's security dilemma
- Iran's pursuit of WMD's
- Political, economic, and social stagnation amongst GCC states
- Ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict

The difficulties listed above are not unique to any one particular state in the Gulf or to the US for that matter. Resolution of these problems and in turn the establishment of a stable Persian Gulf will require each of the actors with vested interests in the region to reach out to friends and enemies alike. An environment of dialogue must be maintained even when one or more states feel that their interests are not receiving adequate attention. By placing the emphasis on multilateral cooperation, countries such as Iran will be met with sanctions and reprimands from the entire Gulf region

as opposed to unilateral reprimands from the US that have failed to achieve their intended results.[28]

Domestic liberalization remains a core US foreign policy goal. However, the US must abandon its uncompromising stance on refusing to cooperate on an international level when authoritative regimes are fraught with domestic issues of which the US disapproves. European and Asian countries serve as prime examples for the "trickle down" effect. Progress at the international level will in turn lead to liberalization within the country. Progress in Gulf security will not be achieved by focusing strictly on piecemeal, case-by-case internal development. Instead, as stated by Michael Kraig, "*International trust and mutual interdependence between nations must increase alongside domestic reforms and vice versa*."[italics added][29] Positive-sum initiatives must overtake the US's uncompromising stance on domestic reforms.

The US is the world's sole superpower. The Gulf States and the rest of the world are well aware of the power that the US wields both militarily and economically. As such a world power, the Gulf needs the US to demonstrate *leadership*. Up to this point, what Washington terms "leadership" in the Middle East is considered hegemony by Arabs. True leaders are willing to make personal sacrifices to ensure the success of those being led. In regards to Gulf security, such compromises must include a shift in focus from strategic positioning and dominance of US values to promotion of multilateral cooperation. Instead of seeking to balance powers in the Gulf, the US should work to encourage mutual respect for each state's security and developmental concerns. The Gulf wants US leadership; leadership that promotes the strength of the Gulf as a whole as opposed to leadership that humiliates Arabs and prolongs their reliance upon Western powers. As the Arab proverb goes, "*It is better to be part of a herd led by a lion than to be the leader of a flock of sheep."* [30]

Finally, the US must exercise patience while striving to lead the Gulf in establishing multilateral organizations and coalition forces. It took two decades to work out the details of post World War II reconstruction. It has taken at least as much time for the Eastern and Western blocs to reach a point of peaceful coexistence. The US must resist the temptation to sacrifice long-term goals for short-term tactical gains. Such attempts have failed consistently in dealings with Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Failure to "stay the course" has hurt the US's reputation amongst Arabs and it will take time to rebuild this trust.

It is only fitting to conclude this discussion with a Clausewitzian principle. Few people take the time to study Clausewitz but many are familiar with his assertion that "war is politics by other means." From this grounding principle, he went on to say that "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."[31] Reflecting on the US's failures to establish security in the Middle East reveals the fact that US policy has failed to follow Clausewitz's age old maxim. Instead of utilizing military force to achieve political objectives, US political strategy has vacillated depending on the success or failure of military operations. For example, instead of defining clear political objectives for Gulf security the US has fluctuated from supporting Iran, to Iraq, to Saudi Arabia depending on the outcome of military operations. To attain lasting success in the region, the US must define its political expectation and then use military force to guarantee the security of those nations who buy into the political objectives clearly defined by the US.

ENDNOTES

[1] Kenneth Pollack, "Securing the Gulf," *Foreign Affairs,* (July/August 2003): 3.
[2] Ibid, 10.
[3] Ibid, 3.
[4] Michael Kraig, "Forging a New Security Order for the Persian Gulf," *Middle East Policy*, (March 2006): 86.
[5] Pollack, 3.
[6] "Political Overview," *Iran Country Review,* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 23.

[7] Pollack, 5.
[8] Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 138, 186.
[9] Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh, "Taking on Tehran," *Foreign Affairs,* March/April (2005).
[10] Pollack, *Securing*, 5.
[11] Brent Talbot, and Jeffrey Hicks, "Led by a Lion," *Aerospace Power Journal,* Fall (2000): 85.
[12] Kraig, 86.
[13] Ibid, 85.
[14] Ibid, 87
[15] Ibid, 90
[16] Ibid, 89.
[17] Ibid, 92.
[18] Ibid, 90.
[19] Ibid, 90.
[20] Ibid, 91.
[21] Ibid, 92.
[22] Talbot and Hicks, 90-91.
[23] Ibid, 90.
[24] Kraig, 94.
[25] Ibid, 96.
[26] Ibid, 94.
[27] "Political Overview, 14.
[28] Pollack and Takeyh, *Tehran*.
[29] Kraig, 94.
[30] Talbot and Hicks, 89.
[31] Clausewitz, 87.

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IRAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

By

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In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush recognized the threat of three nations, Iraq, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Iran. He categorized these countries as the "axis of evil," all seeking weapons of mass destruction and posing a significant threat to the United States.[1] In the last four years, these three countries have been on very distinct courses. Iraq claimed that it was not developing nuclear weapons and, not believing its claims, the Bush Administration decided to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. In the end no nuclear weapons were found. The DPRK, on the other hand, openly asserted its intentions to acquire nuclear technology, and despite opposition from the United States was successful in this task. Now that the DPRK possesses nuclear deterrents, the United States has shifted some of its attention away from it, and has become less aggressive in its dialogue.

Finally, Iran has steered more of a middle ground. It has recently become more aggressive in the development of nuclear technology, although Iran insist it is only seeking peaceful technology; "Iran has so far refused to give up uranium enrichment, which the United States and some of its allies suspect is meant to produce weapons. Tehran insists its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes."[2] This is a rational course considering what has happened to its two counterparts in Bush's "Axis of Evil." If Iran acts rationally, it is clearly in its best interest to follow the lead of the DPRK rather than Iraq, and advance its nuclear program. This action by Iran, nevertheless, could greatly affect the national security of the United States.

Recent History of the Iran and the IAEA

After the discovery in 2003 of an Iranian nuclear program, the international community shifted focus of proliferation to Iran, as well as the DPRK. Increased attention by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations (UN) steadily increased tensions surrounding weapons development and reached a new level in November of 2005. With the election of a new president and increased investigation by the IAEA, Iran became less cooperative about inspections, increasing suspicions regarding Iranian intentions to develop nuclear weapons. Iran adamantly asserted its right to develop energy technology; however, its continued efforts to IAEA reduce cooperation has alarmed many states and forced this situation into an ever-changing cycle of reports and recommendations on how to deal with Iran.

The IAEA recently released a report regarding the state of nuclear affairs in Iran, citing concerns with the state of development due to the secret nature of Iran's previous nuclear activities. The international community, though, should not focus on Iranian desires to acquire nuclear energy. Two major areas of questions arise from Iran's nuclear policy; the stipulations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the effects of a nuclear-armed Iran. The NPT clearly allowed signatories to pursue peaceful nuclear technology and for the withdrawal from the treaty given proper notification and reasoning; however, questions remain about recent programs in Iran. If Iran withdraws from the NPT and pursues nuclear weapons, the precedent and the proliferation prospects would be more devastating than the weapons themselves, due to the chain reaction it might set off as wall as the diluted legitimacy of the document. For these reasons, the UN and UN Security Council must assist Iran in developing peaceful technologies, rather than implementing restrictions.

History of Iranian Nuclear Technology

The nuclear history of Iran began during the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi when Kermit Roosevelt and the Central Intelligence Agency aided in a coup to overthrow the democratically elected Prime Minister, Muhammad Mossadeq.

Iran began to investigate nuclear technology during the 1950's and 1960's, but encountered little success. After signing the NPT in 1968 and ratifying it in 1970, the Shah focused on peaceful development of nuclear technology. In 1973, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was established and, although nuclear energy was the focus, the Shah provided minimal oversight for the program.[3]

On 13 December 1974, Iran signed the Safeguard Agreement (INFCIRC/214) in accordance with the NPT for voluntary inspections by the IAEA. Iranian officials planned for the building of twenty nuclear power reactors.[4] After the Islamic Revolution and during the Iran-Iraq War, scientists and engineers made little progress on the reactors and in research and development. Many of the contracts to build the reactors disappeared because of shifting of alliances, and Iran had no operational reactors. In the late 1980's and the early 1990's, nations such as Pakistan, China, Russia and the DPRK provided nuclear assistance and expertise to Iran. Iran acquired dual-use equipment—weapons and energy—from these nations, later raising questions about the legality of the program. In 2003, a French group exposed the acquisition of this dual-use equipment and experiments conducted to enrich uranium and produce heavy water. [5] The IAEA has not specifically charged Iran with violating the NPT; still, it released a statement in the 19 June 2003 report stating, "Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement."[6] After the IAEA report, Iran signed the Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards on 18 December 2003.

Over the past two years, the international community shifted more attention to the matter of Iran's nuclear program. In 2004, the IAEA inspection teams sought to punish Iran for not providing earlier access to information concerning nuclear programs, despite Iran's openness in the inspection process.[7] On 15 November 2004, Iran and several European powers (Great Britain, France and Germany) agreed in Paris to begin negotiations on Iranian nuclear options while protecting Iran's sovereign rights under the NPT; Iran voluntarily agreed to continue to refrain from uranium enrichment.[8] Following this agreement, the confidence of the international community began to fall as Iran passed several government resolutions in May, protecting its right to enrich uranium.[9] In a letter to the IAEA on 2 February 2006, H.E. Dr. Larijani, the Secretary of the Supreme Security Council of Islamic Republic of Iran, announced Iranian intentions to pursue peaceful nuclear power and resume research and development in accordance with the NPT, hoping for a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the situation.[10] On the following day, Iran notified the IAEA of its intentions to resume "those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which had been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension."[11] By 11 February 2006, Iran successfully completed several uranium enrichment and conversion tests.[12] The IAEA released a report on 27 February 2006 and shortly after recommended the UN Security Council review the situation. The UN Security Council began doing so on 17 March 2006.

Precedent and the NPT

The important issue under review involves the responsibilities Iran holds to the NPT and subsequent Safeguard agreements it signed. Because Iran signed onto these legal agreements, it remains responsible for upholding them, regardless of restrictions in the agreements. The NPT came into effect in 1970. Every nuclear power signed the treaty and became the only five legitimate nuclear powers in the world. Since the ratification, India and Pakistan developed and tested nuclear weapons; nevertheless, because neither signed the NPT, they suffered no repercussions. In 2003, the DPRK withdrew from the treaty abruptly. Article X of the NPT stipulates that any nation may withdraw with three months notice if the nation "decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its county."[13] The

DPRK renounced the NPT, but Iran has not. The IAEA did not explicitly accuse Iran on violating the NPT, although some of the equipment Iran acquired in the 1990's could violate Article III because of the capability to convert peaceful nuclear material into weapons material.[14] Currently, Iran claims that all nuclear research will produce peaceful technology, a feat encouraged by Article IV of the NPT that specifically stipulates that every non-nuclear state is encouraged to develop peaceful nuclear technology. Also, it is the responsibility of the nuclear nations to help non-nuclear nations with peaceful technology.[15] On 1 February 2006, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated "Iran has fully complied with the provisions of the NPT, has voluntarily implemented the Additional Protocol and accepted inspections, and has taken measures beyond cooperation, transparency, and building confidence."[16] With regard to the NPT, this statement is factually accurate. The only argument the United States or the IAEA could make regards stipulations of the Safeguard Agreements.

Iran voluntarily submitted to two Safeguard Agreements, suspending several nuclear activities not explicitly forbidden in the NPT. These voluntary agreements suggest a willingness of Iran to cooperate, but the recent violation, as mentioned above, suggests a change in policy to independently seek nuclear technology. The rhetoric by the Minister of Foreign Affairs suggests frustration with the United States, as he stated that the tone of the IAEA report "demonstrates that a closed club of few members from the powerful countries manage the affairs of our world against the desire and the will of nations, governments and the international community."[17] This attitude towards the United States and other members of the permanent five (P5) of the UN Security Council could cause Iran to move away from negotiations, as demonstrated by the reluctance to follow the 2004 agreement. Iran's relationship with China and Russia does differ from the other members, and recent talks indicate Iran's willingness to cooperate more with China and Russia than other nations. These relationships could be crucial for the peaceful resolution to the problems, as well as resolutions originating from the UN Security Council.

If Iran decides to withdraw, a dangerous precedent could be set for other nations thinking of pursuing a nuclear program. The NPT stipulates that nations may withdraw. Although President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated, "if we find out they are going to take advantage of these regulations to destroy the rights of the Iranian people, you should know that the Iranian nation will reconsider its policy," he suggested that Iran will not make a sudden withdrawal like the DPRK.[18] Unfortunately, if Iran withdraws, some nations may want to seek punishment even though Iran would violate no international law. Withdrawal from the NPT might cause sanctions against Iran, provoke other nations to withdraw or increase the cleavages already present in international institutions.

International Response

The United States and other P5 nations, particularly China and Russia, should encourage Iran not to withdraw or violate the NPT. Rather than threaten sanctions, these nations should work economically to integrate Iran and provide needed resources to the region. Sanctions will only act to further alienate the Iranian public from the international community and provide more legitimacy for the government. Iran continues to show its place as a rational actor in the international community by making rational decisions with regards to its own future, and signing several agreements voluntarily restricting its nuclear program. As a signatory to the NPT, Iran deserves the support of the nuclear powers in its pursuits of nuclear energy as promised by the NPT. The nuclear powers do not have the luxury of discrimination over which signatories they support and which they suppress. As a signatory, Iran holds the same rights as other nations despite fears of weapons production. If an international actor finds Iran to be in violation of the NPT, the situation

changes dramatically.

The reason why sanctions are often advocated revolves around Iran's possible pursuit of nuclear weapons and the danger a nuclear-armed Iran could have on the world. Iran continues to show its desire to remain a rational actor in the international community, despite irrational comments made by its current President. As a rational actor, Iran understands the implications of using nuclear weapons against a nuclear or nuclear allied state. Thus Iran seemingly gains no advantage to use nuclear weapons, but a major benefit is the deterrent value against invasion. Iran, like several Islamic nations, has made hostile remarks towards Israel; nonetheless, with Israel's known capability, the government of Iran would be acting irrationally if it launched a nuclear attack. The primary danger associated with Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons would be the proliferation to non-state actors.

UN Security Council member should seek multilateral negotiations about positive outcomes, rather than unilateral threats. Thomas Schelling, a well-respected political strategist, suggests in his book *The Strategy of Conflict,* bargaining between two nations in a zero or positive sum game means these nations can reach the best outcome by communicating. However, an important aspect of this theory suggests that if one side does not participate in the communication, action is forced onto the other nation.[19] In the US actions towards Iran, bargaining could not be effective because the United States is removing options from Iran by making a general threat about enriching uranium. The international community should expand options, rather than push Iran in a direction it is currently unwilling to go. This forced negotiation could back Iran into a corner and force a negative outcome for all parties.

Recently, there has been increased dialogue regarding the possibility of military intervention in Iran. On April 18th, 2006 President "Bush was asked if his administration was planning for the possibility of a nuclear strike against Iranian nuclear facilities," and he responded by saying, "All options are on the table,"[20] Taking Military actions against Iran would be a mistake because the development of nuclear technology does not pose an imminent threat to the United States. Although all militaries and governments develop contingency plans for invasions, for the United States to invade Iran in the near future, would drive a schism into the Middle East for many years to come. Currently, many cultural and religious cleavages separate the different regions of the Middle East. By executing another preemptive or preventive war, the nations of the Middle East would unite in opposition to the intruding United States, perhaps utilizing terrorist groups to strike against US interests in the area.[21] The reason for the attack would also reflect badly on the United States. Regardless of public statements suggesting reasons for war, "the 'war' would not be an invasion of Iran but subversion leading, it would be hoped, to regime-change and an air attack if necessary."[22] The people of Iran would lose trust in western powers to support positive change. Crucial infrastructure would collapse under a military attack, and civilians would begin to die for their country. This outcome would be increasingly devastating to the relationships between the United States and Middle East states than the alternative of no military action. Additionally, because a regime change in Iran is not currently a viable option, from a strategic standpoint, an attack on Iran would represent a poor understanding of the Iranian nuclear situation. The primary motivation that Iran has to develop nuclear weapons is to protect it from the United States. If the United States attacked Iran, and did not also bring about a regime change, this fear would be substantiated, and Iran's desire to acquire nuclear weapons would be catalyzed.

Besides the direct effects of a military attack, indirect pressure on other states in the Middle East and elsewhere could cause them to hesitate to develop peaceful technology as the NPT clearly states it is allowed to conduct nuclear research for peaceful purposes. The international community needs to support the research and development of peaceful nuclear technology

for everyone's benefit, and nuclear powers should not utilize its nuclear advantage to abandon the NPT. As responsible members of the international community, nuclear nations must recognize the rights of non-nuclear states for conventional weapons and peaceful technology. The Iranian representative to the IAEA stated publicly "the world should not worry because any county has its own self-defense oriented military activities."[23] Although some international agreements do exist to limit types of weapons (nuclear weapons, land mines, exploding ammunition, etc), international law allows nations the right to defend themselves, which is the argument that Iran is making for the development of its conventional arsenal.

Iran supports several non-state actors overtly and possibly several others covertly. Iran admitted to past support of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. The covert proliferation of nuclear technology to these groups could be devastating to the world, not just the region. Non-state actors lack the accountability and territorial security that states must acknowledge, enabling certain non-state actors to act irrationally and without regard for many international norms. If Iran chooses to withdraw from the NPT and develop nuclear weapons, the international community must provide support and security to prevent proliferation to non-state actors. By supporting the peaceful research and development of nuclear technology, along with economic development in Iran, the international community could substantially reduce the tension and hostility in the region. By providing parts of the current security to the Iranian government, nuclear nations can reduce the probability of nuclear technology falling into the wrong hands. These two steps will help to resolve the situation peacefully.

Besides these external measures that could be taken to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors, there is also an important internal hindrance that nation-states will likely consider. As John J. Mearsheimer (a political scientist at the University of Chicago) argues, allowing non-state actors to gain access to nuclear weapons is almost certain to lead to there use; thus, 'Iran is highly unlikely to give nuclear weapons to terrorists, in large part because they would be putting weapons into the hands of people who they ultimately did not control, and there's a reasonably good chance that they would get Iran incinerated.'"[24] Mearsheimer adds that because a country could easily trace the weapons used back to the state actor who provided them, "'[a]ny country that gave [nuclear weapons] to terrorists who would use them against the US […] would disappear from the face of the earth.'"[25] Although some may argue that it would be difficult to trace which state actor provided the nuclear weapons, this is not a legitimate argument considering that there are only nine nations in the world who currently posses nuclear weapons, and that the uranium used in nuclear weapons can be traced back to their extraction sites.

As stated in the NPT, the nuclear powers of the world hold a higher responsibility for nuclear weapons than those without them. This responsibility should not be absolved if nations are not a party to the NPT. Recently, the United States offered nuclear energy support to India, a nuclear power and non-signatory to the NPT though it remains an undeclared nuclear power. The relationship between India and the United States angered Pakistan, the Islamic counterpart of India, because the United States failed to offer it the same assistance. Israel, another extremely close ally of the United States, also developed nuclear weapons and never signed the NPT. The preferential treatment towards these democratic allies encourages questions about the consistency of the Untied States. The security threats provided by India and Israel do not concern the United States because of the importance of the relationship, "and Iran, at least for the Americans, falls into a very different category."[26] Consistent policies quell international skeptics, and a more consistent policy from the United States would remove an element of distrust in the current situation.

The Proper Course of Action

The United States and other nuclear states should offer nuclear security technology to those nations with nuclear capabilities. Responsible nations have the right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy, and those not party to the NPT have the right to pursue any nuclear technology. The proliferation of nuclear technology to rational states poses little security risk to the world because of the effectiveness of deterrence. Although this may seem improbable initially, this is justified by the argument of Kenneth. N Waltz. State actors understand the consequences of launching a nuclear attack, even if the nation is not a nuclear power. However, the proliferation of nuclear technology to non-state actors will shift international relations away from rational decision making toward paranoid security states. When non-state actors with few limitations or identifying characteristics obtain nuclear weapons, states with ideological differences face catastrophic acts of terrorism.

If the Iranian government wants nuclear weapons, it is simply a matter of time—regardless of what the United States does to prevent this inevitable occurrence. The knowledge and technology exists and is somewhat available, making control nearly impossible. By taking action to inhibit the Iranian nuclear program, the United States likely will be able to delay the program. However, this action to delay the program may catalyze the destruction of the already fragile relationship between the United States and Iran. With such a volatile relationship, the Iranian acquisition of nuclear technology could have dire consequences because of the response it will illicit from the United States and other nations. Current plans by the UN Security Council and the United States recommend a range from written reprimands to economic sanctions to approval of military efforts to control Iran's nuclear capabilities. However, these plans should focus on a violation of the NPT and the Safeguard Agreement, the international agreement in volition. A preemptive war, as stated above, will serve no positive purpose and have dire effects for relations in the region.

It is likely that without a regime change the acquisition of nuclear technology by Iran or other controversial state actors is inevitable; "In a world where nuclear weapons are the ultimate protection, many countries feel an urgent need to acquire them, and some are bound to succeed."[27] Nonetheless, the dire consequences that may result from its acquisition of nuclear weapons may not be inevitable. The most renowned scholarly advocate supporting this point of view is the structural realist Waltz, who co-authored with Scott Sagan in 1995 *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate,* and in 2002 *The Spread of Nuclear weapons: A Debate Renewed*. In his book, Waltz argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons to state actors may actually be a stabilizing force in the world. The reason that Waltz believes that nuclear weapons are a stabilizing force is because, "'The only thing a country can do with nuclear weapons is use them for a deterrent, [….] [a]nd that makes for internal stability, that makes for peace, and that makes for cautious behavior.'"[28] Additionally, Waltz argues that the possession on nuclear weapons will also reduce minor skirmishes, because "'If states can score only small gains because large ones risk retaliation," Waltz writes, 'they have little incentive to fight.'"[29] The core of Waltz's argument is that, "'Countries that have nuclear weapons co-exist peacefully,' says Waltz, 'because each knows the other can do horrendous damage to it.'"[30] To support this argument empirically Walt's sites not only the situation of the Cold War, but also the current India and Pakistan environment. Waltz argues that "[d]uring the 1999 fighting between the two nations, […] "the presence of nuclear weapons prevented escalation from major skirmish to full-scale war." The same logic held in 2002 when the two sides made a public display of preparing for war over Kashmir."[31] Both countries acted cautiously in these situations, because they were aware that a massive strike by either side could warrant a nuclear response, and both India and Pakistan made it clear that they

would use nuclear force only if absolutely necessary.

Although most scholars do not believe that the world will become a safer place as more countries acquire nuclear weapons, they do recognize that countries will be more hesitant to act with nuclear weapons, because of the huge consequences of there use. One scholar who fits this mold is "Graham Allison, a dean and professor at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and one of the country's most visible nonproliferation crusaders, [who] concedes some of Waltz's argument." Although Allison is staunchly against nuclear proliferation, he recognizes that "'With a nuclear war, probably most of the people living in the capital are going to be killed, including the leader and his family, so it brings it home. You have a positive effect, and you can certainly see that in the India-Pakistan relationship' since both countries acquired its nuclear arsenals."[32] No matter how irrational a leader is, it is difficult to fathom that he would risk his own life and the life of all of his friends and family by launching a nuclear attack.

With the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, the most prominent issue is Israel. If and when Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it is highly unlikely that these weapons will have the capability to reach American soil. Nevertheless, it is likely that they could reach Iran's publicly declared most hated enemy, Israel. The likelihood that Iran would attack Israel once it acquired nuclear weapons, though, is highly overestimated. First, the reason that Iran and other Middle Eastern Islamic countries possess so much disdain for Israel is due to its occupation of Islamic holy land. From an Islamic perspective it would not be logical to launch a nuclear attack and devastate holy sites like Jerusalem, because then the land that the Muslims desire gravely would be uninhabitable by all.

Additionally, many people argue that the value of a nuclear deterrent is being able to sustain a nuclear attack and retaliate;

> The key to deterrence is a second-strike capacity — the ability to absorb an attack on one's nuclear arsenal and still mount a nuclear response. If a country does not have that ability, its adversary may be moved to launch a pre-emptive strike. When both sides have a second-strike capacity, neither can hope to gain from going first, which fosters caution and stability.[33]

Because of the small size of Israel, it may be possible for Iran to launch a nuclear attack, and completely obliterate the entire nation. In this scenario Iran might not have to fear an Israeli retaliation. However; this argument is flawed, Israel could choose to retaliate upon launch warning: and Israel likely posses a sea-based retaliatory capability that can not be attacked via a first strike. Moreover, Iran must also consider the capability of the United States. The reason for this is that the United States has the largest Jewish population in the world[34], even greater than that of Israel, and the largest lobbying group in Washington is the AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee).[35] Because of its significant influence in the United States it is highly likely that an attack on Israel would warrant a response by the United States. Iran is aware of this.

A more important question regarding Israel would be if the United States and the world community would be able to prevent Israel's preemptive a strike on Iran, if launched as a result of Iran's development of nuclear weapons. There are two reasons why this deterrence would be possible. First, Israel likely does not posses the quantitative means necessary to take out the Iranian Nuclear program. According to Mr. David Gompert, Senior director for Europe and Eurasia on the National Security Council staff, Iran "may be out of [Israel's] weight class." Unlike the United States, Israel does not have the ability to launch a conventional or tactical nuclear strike on all of the Iranian Nuclear facilities, the later of which is possibly the only way to stop the Iranian Nuclear Program. This means, even if Israel wanted to stop the Iranian Nuclear Program on its own, it probably would be unable to do so. The second deterrence for Israel launching

an attack on Iran, against the wishes of the United States, is that Israel possesses virtually no allies in the Middle East, and it does not have many powerful allies in the world other than the United States. If Israel attacked Iran, against the wishes of the Untied States, they would likely be compromising its ability to exist. Finally, Israel did not fight in the first two Gulf wars, so it would be unprecedented for it to take unilateral military action against a country such as Iran.

Although the possibility of Iran attacking Israel is not that likely, it will still be a factor in deciding the United States policy towards Iran. AIPAC lobbying power[36] has a huge impact on US policy in the Middle East. According to Stephen Walt, the dean at Harvard's JFK school of government, and John Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, "the United States' 'unwavering support' for Israel — including the $3 billion a year we give in direct assistance, as well as the decades of unequivocal military and diplomatic support we've provided — is justified by neither strategic nor moral imperatives."[37]

If the United States assists Iran in the development of nuclear technology, especially peaceful technology, the relationship between Iran and the United States could improve immensely. As a result, when Iran acquires nuclear technology, even weapons, its desire to proliferate these weapons to non-state actors would be inhibited. UN options with Iran, though, will be seriously limited once it acquires nuclear technology. It would be very risky to attack Iran conventionally once the gain nuclear weapons, because it is a possibility that they would retaliate. Additionally, according to Gompert, "Once they get nuclear weapons regime change is off the table."[38] Once Iran leaders feel its regime is threatened, it is likely that they would respond with a nuclear attack. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, however, "we can wait them out,"[39] because the theocratic government is highly unstable, and it is likely that it will not survive in its current extreme anti-western form for a prolonged period time.

One of the most important steps that the United States should take, anticipating the possibility of Iran becoming a Nuclear Power, is to rapidly develop alternative fuel sources. Currently, the United States and the rest of the western world are heavily dependent on oil from countries in the Middle East, including Iran. Recently, because of a turbulent environment between Iran and the US, oil prices have reached record highs, having an adverse affect on the US economy. With a nuclear capable Iran, this dependence on oil by the United States could become compromising to the national security of the nation. Although President Bush addressed the issue of alternative fuel sources in his 2006 state of the Union Address,[40] greater progress to reduce US dependence on Middle Eastern oil is crucial to future dealings with Gulf states. The less dependent the United States is on Middle Eastern oil, the less leverage Middle Eastern nuclear countries will be able to exercise in the future.

The United States should not try to cut all economic ties with the Middle East, because globalization is clearly a stabilizing factor in the world. Even though the United States should aim to be less dependent on the resources of the Middle East, at the same time it should establish strong ties through technology exchange and economic integration. If the United States does so, Iranian officials would see more harm in proliferating weapons to non-state actors than in the distraction of an enemy such as Israel. The best course of action to prevent nuclear weapons from reaching non-state actors is to enhance Iran's economic development, while discouraging nuclear weapons development. The exchange of oil and consumer goods will pull together not only the governments, but also the cultures of the two nations. Although the religious tendencies of the two nations differ significantly, the youth of the two nations have striking similarities. Focusing on the similarities and incorporating Iran into the elite nations of the world will make political leaders rethink any decisions that might be harmful to relationships.

Utilizing referent power, the United States, Russia and China should use their prominent positions in the world to encourage Iran to abstain from developing nuclear weapons. When nations begin to threaten, coerce or use military means to persuade Iran to refrain from developing such weapons, the hearts and minds of the people begin to unite behind radical elements to feel more secure from persecution. By addressing Iran as a nation of educated individuals seeking the best lives for themselves, the UN Security Council could seek more positive initiatives rater than strict sanctions or authorizing military intervention.

The reason that that the UN must refrain from implementing strict sanctions or threatening military intervention with countries such as Iran, is because "[w]e don't want countries to feel that the only way they can protect themselves from [the United States] is to acquire nuclear weapons."[41] In the current environment of the world, it has become evident that the best way to get the United States to negotiate and aid your country is to work on your nuclear program. This has been apparent in the situation of Pakistan and the DPRK. Once these countries acquired nuclear technology, the United States was visibly more hesitant in its actions. This is clearly not the situation the United States wants to deal with vis-à-vis Iran. Therefore, the United States needs to work with countries such as Iran, who claim it is not developing Nuclear weapons, so that such countries do not feel the need to develop nuclear weapons in order to justify respect and consideration.

The most significant argument that supports the drastic need to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is that it is a highly irrational rogue actor. On the surface this may appear the case, with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claiming the holocaust is a myth, and aggressively pursuing peaceful nuclear technology against the wishes of the United States and the United Nations. When analyzed more deeply, however, these actions can be viewed as completely rational. By claiming the Holocaust is a myth, Ahmadinejad is able to unite the populace, because a hatred for Israel is something that almost all Middle Eastern share. It may be argued that this action contributes to his international deligitimization, but Ahmadinejad has made it clear that he does not hold great regard for the international communities' opinion of him.

By pursuing nuclear technology, Ahmadinejad is also acting rationally, because it has become evident that possessing a nuclear deterrent is the best way to protect it from outside aggression. In a February 7th *Washington Post* article, Mel Levine supports this argument by saying,

> One of the most dangerous assumptions about Iran is that it is acting irrationally or is led by people who do not calculate the potential costs and benefits of their actions. But in fact, while one can challenge the logic that leads the Iranian leadership to seek nuclear weapons in the first place, the Iranians have acted with complete rationality in seeking to achieve their objectives."[42]

Levine supports this assertion by arguing that Iran has acted intelligently in its pursuit for nuclear technology; "For example, Iran has been careful to escalate this crisis slowly over the past two years, engaging in protracted talks with the "E.U. Three." Recently, as the likelihood of Iran's being referred to the U.N. Security Council has increased, the Iranians have patiently probed for fissures among the Western allies," and "The Iranian leadership has meticulously cultivated allies in India and China by signing lucrative oil deals with both countries, and it has reached out to Syria, another isolated Middle Eastern state."[43] Additionally, Iran waited to escalate its recent nuclear activities until Israel was faced with a crisis; "Even in its choice of timing for the most recent escalation Iran chose a moment when Israel, a key regional adversary, appeared headed for political disarray. None of these has been the steps of an irrational actor."[44]

The core of Levine's argument is that considering the current cost benefit analysis, from the Iranian perspective it is very logical for it to pursue nuclear weapons, and thus it does not make sense to classify it as an irrational actor.

Even if one believes Iran to be an irrational, rogue actor, this does not mean that Iran will attack the United States or Israel with nuclear weapons. Waltz argues that rogue leaders are not likely to use nuclear weapons, because it will spell their own doom, and these leaders have a knack for surviving; "'The characteristics of these people you can't overlook is that they survive. They're ugly; they're nasty; but when it comes to the preservation of their regimes, they are not reckless.' And so, they will not provoke disastrous attacks on themselves."[45]

Additionally, Waltz argues that history has shown that even leaders who have been considered extreme have not used nuclear weapons. Leaders such as Stalin or Mao were "determined expansionists,"[46] like leaders of the Islamic world, but they never used nuclear weapons for anything other than deterrence.

It is clear that under the current environment it is likely that Iran will continue to pursue nuclear technology, and the United States needs to take carefully calculated steps to shift this environment. The way to shift this environment, is not by continuing to threaten Iran, because the reason that Iran desires nuclear technology is to protect it from the United States, and threats of military action from the United States only solidifies this belief. Rather, The United Nations and United States must seek peace and stability, not hostile intervention. Repercussions for a future violation of the NPT must be considered carefully and be targeted at those responsible but not the entire nation. By helping Iran establish its stated goal of developing peaceful nuclear technology, the United States and other members of the UN Security Council will reduce tensions, establish an interactive economic relationship and be in position to assist Iran in the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.

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NEW SPACE THEORY

By
C3C Genelle Martinez

The United States currently enjoys significant advantages in space, including advanced surveillance, communication, and navigation capabilities. These capabilities not only provide the U.S. with a considerable edge in military operations, but economic and political benefits as well. The current American space policy focuses on deterring, warning, and defending against enemies through the use of space-based assets. American leaders must focus on protecting these space-based assets. This needs to be done without actually placing any weapons in space. As a policy, the United States should develop methods to protect its space-based assets while improving its ability to deny an adversary's space capabilities. The United States must accomplish all of this while deterring the weaponization of space.

The United States is well on its way to becoming an Aerospace Nation (Hays 286). Space has replaced air as the new battle frontier. National security is directly dependent upon America's ability to develop and protect its space assets (Hays 287). This is due to the fact that a huge majority of our communication, precision navigation, missile early warning systems, intelligence, and weather observation rely heavily on satellites (Hays 285). The U.S. has launched over 2,600 satellites since 1957, two-thirds of which have been used for military surveillance (Papp 53). This is clearly evident in America's success in the Middle East throughout OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Space has become a critical means of support for ground troops. In the early 21st century, the United States Air Force will continue to evolve towards becoming an integrated aerospace force (Hays 286).

The United States has invested billions of dollars towards research and development in both space control and weapons that could be deployed in space. If any other country engaged in a space arms race with the United States, America

would most definitely have a great advantage due to its economic strength and the amount of its previous investment in space programs. In order to drive costs down, space weapons systems would be designed to fill numerous roles (Yanarella 219). American researchers would attempt to program every answer to all threats automatically into the weapon systems. However, American scientists could easily be distracted by the prospect of eliminating all possible risks (Yanarella 237). This would only cause the state of international stability to weaken, and a strategic arms race would be unavoidable.

The U.S. is years ahead in research and technology, definitely having the upper hand when it comes to an arms race. Nonetheless, this is not to say that the U.S. is unrivaled in attempts to develop weapons against space assets. As an example, China has made great advances with cube satellites and lasers that can target U.S. satellites (Muradian). Thus, they possess the technology to shoot down American space assets from the ground. If this technology were to be taken a step further, and weapons were actually put into orbit, it would ignite an unprecedented arms race which could ultimately lead to nuclear weapons orbiting the earth. These nuclear weapons would provide for their host country the full capability of deploying nuclear weapons at any time against any target in the world. Another problem that should be taken into consideration if weapons were to be put into orbit is the fact that they would be easy to track. The predictability of the locations of various weapons would put these assets at risk.

Space assets are becoming so critical to global powers that their defense has become crucial. The importance of these assets, combined with the amazing advantages of placing weapons in space, assures that an arms race would be inevitable. All it would take would be for any one country to put weapons into orbit, then other nations would feel the need to follow suit in order to be safe. The deployment of space-based weapons would also lead to more space-based assets that could be targeted. Consequently, this would defeat the purpose of putting the weapons into space in the first place. The key purpose of these weapons would be to protect valuable space assets, and by putting weapons into orbit, more assets would be put at risk (Spacy 105).

The United States should continue to develop ground-based weapons that could be capable of disabling enemy satellites, as well as develop measures to protect U.S. space assets. Once weapons are put into orbit, other countries are bound to follow the example of the U.S. Thus, the benefit of space-based weapons fails to outweigh their potential political and military costs (Spacy 105).

Many countries have already voiced their concerns dealing with the weaponization of space. They fear the destabilizing implications for global relations. One possible implication of the United States employing space as an arena for combat is the idea of other nations coming together to form opposing alliances against the U.S. This alienation of potential allies would put the U.S. in a poor position internationally. One relatively cheap and feasible remedy for these opposing alliances could be to use space mines against America's satellites. Clearly, America has more at risk if it were to advance unilaterally towards weaponizing space. This could propel the world towards an arms race in which America would be the most at risk considering how heavily it relies on its space-based assets (Spacy 99).

Countries that would follow the U.S. example would profit at the cost of the U.S. This is because America would already have conducted a good bulk of the research and development for various weapons systems. European powers, along with China, have already begun working on Galileo, their counterpart to American GPS systems (Wirbel 147). Therefore, they would be capable of the same global reach as the U.S. without having invested the resources that our country has (Spacy 6).

Space should be kept as a peaceful sanctuary, free from any type of weapons, whether they are offensive or defensive. It is almost impossible to distinguish between the two; therefore the global acceptance of defensive weapons in space is very vague and

can potentially cause many disputes over the definition of "peaceful purposes." If weapons were put into orbit, the U.S. would have to comply with numerous standing treaties. These would include the United Nations Charter (1945), Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (1963), Treaty on the Principles of the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972), Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977), and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979) (Spacy 95). Taken together, these various treaties strictly prohibit the use of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in space. In addition, military installations in space are not allowed. Space is seen only as a peaceful sanctuary for all citizens of earth.

The definition for "peaceful purposes" is extremely vague. It can be easily misconstrued as nations seek self preservation. The right to self defense is commonly seen as a peaceful purpose. Although defensive weapons systems are more globally acceptable, many nations feel that no weapons are to be tolerated. Another important thing that should be taken into consideration when determining whether or not defensive or offensive weapons should be allowed is the fact that many of these weapons possess dual capabilities (Spacy 96). In today's world, the United States more than ever would benefit from a space sanctuary strategy considering the vulnerability of its space assets (Spacy 101).

The United States is inarguably the world's foremost space power. American intelligence, communication, and navigation capabilities rely heavily on satellites and other space-based assets. These assets have come to be of key benefit to ground forces. They enable the United States to take full advantage of its strengths, thus strengthening our military forces considerably. The protection and maintenance of these space assets, along with American space dominance, is critical to U.S. national interests (Spacy 105). Presently, the threat to our space assets is not great enough to support the development of space-based weapons. Also, America's denial of enemy access to space is best dealt with excluding the use of space weapons. The best means of defense is the development of ground-based, launch-on-demand weapons, which could disable or even destroy an enemy's space-based assets. A second answer to this problem is the idea of conventional weapons as the primary means of protection. For example, stealth bombers and cruise missiles are perfectly capable of destroying nearly all of the targets on which space assets would focus, thus negating the need for offensive space-based weapons. In addition to conventional weapons, suborbital weapons (such as expendable missiles) can also produce the same results without being as vulnerable or nearly as controversial as fully orbiting systems.

Most nations regard America's space capabilities as benign to their existence and security. However, as nations who are not on friendly terms with the United States gain the technology to compete with American dominance, this could lead to serious repercussions as far as a space race is concerned. If America were to move forward unilaterally and deploy weapons into space, our allies would question American motivations. This is because this move would be seen as an offensive shift from previously peaceful purposes. Other countries would be more inclined to follow the American example and pursue a space-based weapons system despite cost and political implications.

Ultimately, the United States needs to advocate a new treaty for banning space-based weapons before an uncontrollable space arms race is created. Weapons in space are highly probable, and most might argue, inevitable. Nonetheless, a good treaty could potentially deter the use of these weapons for decades. The United States is currently the foremost power in space. The U.S. presently employs a space policy focused on deterring, warning, and defending assets against enemies whenever necessary. America must protect its space-based assets without actually placing

any weapons in space. As a policy, the United States should continue to increase methods to protect its space assets while ensuring their ability to deny space capabilities to an opponent. This must be achieved while preventing the weaponization of space.

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LEAVING THE DOOR OPEN: THE POROUS BORDERS OF THE UNITED STATES

By

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Since that warm September morning over four years ago, our nation has been at war; not with a nation, but with an ideology. The US and its Coalition allies have been at war with terrorism to stop the threat of Al Queda and ensure that a terrorist attack as grave as that which occurred on September 11, 2001, never reoccurs. Less than a month after the attacks of September 11th the United States military, along with allies of numerous nations around the world, deployed into Afghanistan to remove the repressive, extremist Taliban government that openly harbored Al Queda. Two years later the Global War on Terrorism expanded to the sadistic dictatorship of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein and end his domestic terrorism against his own people as well as his threat of weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors. Two wars, two fronts, one common enemy: terrorism. But what about our home front? If we are sending tens of thousands of our troops to fight the terrorists on *their* soil are we vulnerable at home on *American* soil? Has our military, as the main defensive arm of our nation, been over-extended to the point where we can no longer adequately defend ourselves via our own domestic borders?

There is no debate that the United States' borders are incredibly busy. According to Anthony T. Bryan and Stephen E. Flynn of the University of Miami's Dante B. Fascell North-South Center, 489 million people, 127 million cars, 11.6 million maritime containers, and 829,000 planes passed through American borders in the year 2000, which makes it clear why these borders are among the busiest in the world. However, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in the year 1994, further increased the busyness along the world's longest non-militarized border (northern border with Canada) and the world's second largest non-militarized border (southern border with

Mexico) (Taylor). While the number of items crossing the border has increased, the number of inspection officials has remained the same since pre-NAFTA levels (Bryan and Flynn). Having what is known around the world as the two largest non-militarized borders sends a message to the rest of the world: that we are weak on our home front. American forces may travel around the world to hunt down terrorists (as well as governments harboring terrorists) but we as a nation have left ourselves vulnerable, giving them the backdoor into our country via our weak borders. Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations, Stephen E. Flynn, addressed our national security in an article featured in Foreign Affairs. Flynn commented that "[the United States] cannot strike the right balance as long as it persists with treating homeland security as wholly separated from national security. Nor can muscular efforts to combat terrorism at its source be a substitute… to confront the threat of catastrophic acts of terror at home" (Flynn). The author explains that security from terrorism at home is equally important, if not more important, as stopping terrorists on their own land. In addition, there is also the issue of what Americans often care deeply about: their pocketbooks. Fighting this war on terrorism will cost money, money that many Americans may not be willing to part with. Congressman J.D. Hayworth, a Representative from the 5th District in Arizona, stressed the importance of border security in his book, writing that "Al Qaeda is looking to ship a nuke across our Southern border and we're supposed to be wringing our bands over the price of lettuce? Not this congressman" (Hayworth). Representative Hayworth sees the gravidity associated with our borders, and he knows that the issue is of the utmost importance.

With our presently porous borders, there have *already* been incidents of known terrorists crossing into the America through Canada and Mexico. In July of 2004, a Chechen terrorist group that illegally entered the United States from Mexico was apprehended and later investigated. According to Bill Getz, a writer for the Washington Times, the Chechen terrorists, were "suspected of having links to Islamic terrorists seeking to separate the southern enclave of Chechnya from Russia" (Gertz). Here is the scary part: just one month earlier, Muslim terrorists sympathetic to Chechnya raided a school in Russia, killing more than 300 people. Also, in Iraq, a computer disk was found that contained building layouts to six different school districts in the United States. There was ultimately no found link between the disk and the Chechens (Gertz). While there was no found link, America must perceive this as a potential terrorist attack. However, these terrorists leaked through the porous borders of the United States and compromised our national security, something which is of the utmost importance to the American people.

The border control issue has also caught the attention of Congress. Jim Malone, an author for the online news site newsvoa.com, reported on a Congressional committee hearing where Senate subcommittee member John Kyl commented, "Many of these aliens, incidentally, are not from Mexico, but they come from countries all over the world… we do not know whether they intend to simply find work or whether they plan to engage in acts of terror in the United States or are here to commit crimes" (Malone). This, however, only makes sense. Since the terrorist attacks in 2001, America's airports have been under much higher security and such security would (hopefully) deter any terrorist from simply flying onto American soil unquestioned. Thus, they must enter through other means, such as the border with Mexico. Senator Kyl and Texas Senator John Cornyn have proposed a bill, aptly named the Cornyn-Kyl bill that would authorize 10,000 new Border Patrol agents, increasing the total number of agents to 11,000 (Malone). The approval of such a bill would be a step in the right direction for national security.

While there are accounts of terrorists leaking through Mexico's borders into the United States, Mexican President Vicente Fox assures the United States that there have not been terrorist activity along his border. President Fox said to the press a week before President Bush visited the Mexican leader last

March, "In the case of terrorism, we don't have any evidence or any indication either that terrorists from al-Qaida or any other part of the world are coming into Mexico and going into the United States" (Blears). President Fox is partly correct, but what is a terrorist? Does one have to commit an act of terrorism in the United States in order to be considered a "terrorist"? Defining what a terrorist exactly is and determining if a person is actually a terrorist can be a very subjective, difficult task. However, for the sake of national security, we cannot wait until this "possible" terrorist attacks the nation. Instead we must challenge them before they ever enter the United States.

While some representatives in Congress are adamant about increasing border security, some citizens are taking matters into their own hands. While these groups main purpose may not be to stop terrorists, they are a very formidable force in the cause for more border control. These groups go by a variety of names and organizations, but the largest and most well-known go by "Minutemen", the same title that members of the militia during the revolution took who were ready to fight the British in a minute's notice. On only its second day of operations, the Arizona Minutemen claimed to have caught 141 illegal aliens passing over the border from Mexico… and other states have taken note. Minutemen have now been organized in New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas (World Net Daily). Texas' Minutemen operation started on October 1, 2005, and included more than 500 volunteers (Seper). While some people may see these people as patriots and courageous, others may view them as vigilantes. President Bush has spoken out against the Minutemen, while President Fox has threatened prosecution. However, the media has given the citizen border patrollers positive attention, showcasing their "composure, discipline, and orderliness" (World Net Daily). In any case, the cause has raised awareness of the leaky border between Mexico. As of now the Minutemen are mainly seizing Mexicans crossing into the United States. However, if an ill-equipped Mexican citizen can cross the border, what will stop a trained terrorist? As Peter Andreas of Brown University put it, "if the existing border enforcement apparatus has proven unable to stop multi-ton shipments of drugs and hundreds of thousands of crossings by unauthorized migrants every year, the chances of deterring a few bombs or a terrorist is far more remote" (Andreas 5).

While the borders between Mexico and United States have been given the most spotlight, our northern border with Canada is just as, if not more, vulnerable. According to Andreas, there are only 334 agents assigned to the Canadian border, compared to the now 9,000 agents protecting the border with Mexico. In addition, on September 11, 2001, there were just as many agents in Brownsville, Texas, as there were defending the entire Canadian border (Andreas 6). Why so little protection? There could be a variety of reasons. Canada has a much better reputation combating terrorism compared to Mexico. Also, we have much stronger economic ties with our neighbor to the north, trading back and forth each day over our borders. Extensive searches and increased security at the border could deter Canada from trading with us, and thus, weaken our economy. Finally, there are currently very few problems of illegal immigrants from Canada crossing into the United States over our borders as there is a problem with illegal immigrants with Mexico. While the Canadian border is rarely talked about, it too needs to be considered a possible location for terrorist entry into the United States. After all, being described as a "border with many gates but no fences" can only compromise a country's security (Andreas 7).

In light of the media attention from the Minutemen and other advocates of national security, the United States has made changes to its view of border control. According to the BBC, President Bush announced that technology has been implemented to help border control (Watson). Also, in December of 2005, it was announced that the US Border Patrol would gain 1,700 agents, a much awaited "reinforcement" to the nation's borders and national security (KRISTV). The US government has also sent money directly to Mexico to help with the guarding

of the border, including $50 million dollars this year. While this money is used to train and equip the Mexican military and police, there are some who strongly oppose the gesture, saying that such money can wind up in the wrong hands (Seper). However, this can also be said about government entities in the United States. According to journalist JoAnn Wypijewski, "pork" is a major problem in post-9/11 national security, with pork being "free stuff" for the bill creators' home congressional districts. Handing out money to fight national security does not mean that the city of Newark can buy $250,000 air-conditioned garbage trucks, nor should Dayton, Ohio, buy $7,000 bullet proof vests… for their police canines (Wypijewski). However, there are still some individuals who oppose the increase of border patrol. According to Peter Andreas of Brown University, "high-profile border enforcement campaigns [do] more to redirect rather than reduce the flow of unauthorized migrants" (Andreas 3).

The United States needs to make a decision: is stopping terrorists "at the source" enough or does the US need to secure the home front first? Without a doubt, the borders of the United States with Mexico and Canada are vulnerable. Possible terrorists have *already* leaked through our borders while the border patrol is having a tough enough job stopping drug trafficking. Such permeable borders compromise our national security, putting our nation at risk for another 9/11. We, the United States, can longer be so naïve to think that the terrorists are not entering through our own borders. We, the United States, cannot assume that the almighty fortress known as America is invulnerable to another terrorist attack. We, the United States, must take more serious measures to stop terror from ever entering America and that means strengthening our borders.

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PATTERNS FOR PEACE

By
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There are several similarities and differences between the conflict that has been taking place in Ireland for centuries and the conflict within Iraq between the United States and the insurgents who seek to keep Iraq from becoming a democratic government. By making an analysis of the conflict in Northern Ireland and how the disagreement has been dealt with in both positive and negative ways, one may be able to derive guidelines from which the United States should or should not navigate the path to a democratic government in Iraq. In order to effectively analyze and compare these two social, religious, and political situations we must first understand the background of the conflict, the actors within it, and the positive and negative actions taken towards peace and resolution. Much is known by the American public concerning the steps toward democracy in Iraq that have been taken by the United States armed forces and diplomats, such as the isolation and removal of key leaders within terrorist sects and rooting out of insurgent combatants. However, it is essential to examine the disputes of Northern Ireland in depth in order to surgically extract methods and tactics that have been effective in the region that may be of use to U.S. forces, and gather education and information on tactics that have been largely unsuccessful to avoid the same failures.

The conflict in Northern Ireland is largely misunderstood in regard to what the core of the dispute involves. One could say that even the parties involved are, at times, not aware of the specific reasons for their political argument. The conflict as a whole lies essentially between two segregated groups. The Unionists currently represent about sixty percent of the population in Northern Ireland and seek to have Northern Ireland become part of the union of the United Kingdom. It is also interesting to note that the majority of this group associates themselves with the Protestant faith. On the opposite side of the conflict lie the

Nationalists who are largely of the Catholic Faith. This group associates themselves with the Irish Free State, which is basically the territory outside of Northern Ireland, and wish to have the entire country of Ireland separated from the rule of the United Kingdom so that they may govern themselves as a sovereign nation. A fair representation and synopsis of the separation of the two parties can be found in this statement by Paul Dixon. He states "Northern Ireland can be seen as a place where the British and Irish nations overlap and their co-nationals, British Unionists and Irish Nationalists, aspire to be part of two different states." (Dixon 2)

These two groups of people lie on opposite sides of a conflict that is fundamentally derived from an argument over who may legally claim the territory that is present day Northern Ireland. The large majority of Nationalists take the stance that their ancestors, the Celts, were the undisputed and original settlers of the region. Unionists, for the most part, stubbornly disregard this claim and adamantly lay claim to the land, stating that they are descendants of the Cruthin who were inhabitants of the region even earlier than the Celtic settlers. If this were the basis of the entire conflict between Unionists and Nationalists, it seems that the conflict would not have perpetuated itself over the past several centuries. However, this fundamental debate is simply used as an arguing point for both sides to support a much larger argument and elaborate on their multi-faceted claims to the territory.

Regardless of which ancestors inhabited the region first, it seems that the furious conflict between the two sides over the decades is rooted in the imperialism of the United Kingdom. From the invasion of Ireland, known as the Anglo-Norman invasion, by Scottish settlers in 1169, to the atrocities committed by the Protestant reformist Oliver Cromwell that involved the massacre of countless Irish, there has been a dominant presence of British influence for centuries that has left the Irish Nationalists feeling as though their independence and fundamental right to freedom has been unjustly stolen. Time and the persistent presence of the United Kingdom has only aggravated the animosity, and as it stands today, the region is in a vicious cycle of peaceful treaties that degenerate into armed conflict.

By 1916, the violence and hostility between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland was in full swing. A group of Irish Republicans, who were the political predecessors of modern day Nationalists, entered a post office in the heart of Dublin, a political and military center for conflict, and declared Ireland to be a republic in an effort to spark rebellion and lasting change. It was not long before revolt was building momentum and the rebellion eventually evolved into what was known as the "Easter Rising." Although this massive uprising was repressed by the British, it helped Irish Nationalists gain the momentum they needed, and promoted the support of Republicans all across the region. The increasing support on the side of these freedom fighters gave way to the War of Independence which was fought by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and was once again subdued by the British army. After suppressing the Irish in their battle for independence, the United Kingdom further asserted their power and elected a partitioning of Ireland into Northern Ireland and what was known as the Irish Free State. The forced segregation of Ireland into these two separate regions along with the political negotiations of Sinn Fein, a political organization with the goal of uniting Ireland politically with the United Kingdom, who sought to involve Nationalists in boundary commissions, have shaped the political cycle which Ireland finds itself in today. The influence of Sinn Fein, though well intentioned, only served to further complicate the struggle between Irish freedom and British control.

As the hostilities of World War II gave cause for concern in Britain, the British hoped that Ireland would unite itself against a common enemy and provide support for the allies. There was no reason to believe otherwise since this had been the case during the First World War. This was not the case, however, and Britain found themselves alone against German forces, and

decided to offer the proposition of unity to Ireland in exchange for their military support. In a bold move against the perceived oppressive forces of the United Kingdom, the Irish Free State flatly declined Britain's offer. They did this mainly because, at the time, Britain was not favored to win the war, and the Nationalists feared that their unity would be lost right along with suspected defeat of the British army because of their history of indecisive action and inconsistency in Northern Ireland. Following the atrocities of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Ireland was given the offer once again, which they declined in order to remain neutral. Immediately following the war, which left Britain in great favor with the allies and the Irish Free State in an unfavorable light, the Republicans took the initiative and began the anti-partition movement, declaring themselves a republic once again by leaving the commonwealth of Northern Ireland. In the wake of the war and this movement by the Nationalists, Northern Ireland was quickly becoming less of an autonomous state and much more of a burden on the British government. This was primarily due to the growing issue of economic depression and unemployment that was putting a significant strain on the United Kingdom. These issues would ultimately end the period of passive rule of Northern Ireland by Britain and would cause conflict with the Irish Free State to resurface due to increased British influence in Northern Ireland politics.

It seems unimaginable, but the conflict in this region has essentially remained unchanged over the past century. To this day the peace process, which has lasted decades, is essentially entirely broken . This seems to be primarily due to a serious lack in consistency both militarily and politically. The Sinn Fein organization, that fundamentally represents the Irish Free State politically, is in perpetual struggle with the British government and continues to squabble over pieces of influence in the Northern Ireland government, rather than making a definitive argument for independence for Ireland. The actions of the British government are equally contradictory. As the main representative for Unionists, they have made countless vows to take a firm stance on the decommissioning of IRA weapons and surrender of all weapons but have not done so. In addition, they lackadaisically accepted the IRA's empty promise of a permanent cease fire in Northern Ireland even though both sides were well aware that, should negotiations go poorly, the IRA would be likely to revert back to violence in an effort to gain independence for the Irish Free State.

Though there are many differences in the two conflicts, one can easily discern the similarity of the conflict in Northern Ireland and the effort to liberate Iraq. Both conflicts most certainly involve the entrance of a foreign force or party into a land with its own set of unique values, norms, and culture. In both cases this leaves the potential for intense conflict due to each nation's fundamental commitment to their nationalist values. Much of the source of argument by insurgent forces in Iraq is that they do not favor any foreign occupation of their land, and they certainly do not welcome American influence on their oppressive government which enslaves many to serve a few. The enemy force within Iraq is a subset of a larger organization with goals to dominate a large portion of the Arabian Peninsula and a massive portion of the worlds oil supply along with it. Once Saddam Hussein was subdued from taking over the country of Kuwait, the conflict appeared to be in the process of resolution. However, following the attacks on the United States on September 11th the United States quickly realized that the violence would not cease until the root of the problem was exposed and exterminated. This brought on the initiative by President George W. Bush to combat terrorism itself and establish a democratic and self sufficient government in Iraq which would foster peace and growth within the country. The initiative was also largely sparked by foreign intelligence that led the United States to believe there were weapons of mass destruction involved that posed a serious threat to security.

There are many lessons that our government could gain from analysis of these two conflicts. In comparison with North-

ern Ireland it can be ascertained that consistency in pursuing objectives is absolutely essential to maintaining a certain level of control in a conflict, such as the one in Iraq. The British government squandered many opportunities to establish effective peace agreements by being indecisive in their interaction with Irish Nationalists. Essentially they promised unification to Ireland while ensuring Unionists that Ireland would soon become part of the United Kingdom. This left both sides with the perception that the government was largely inconsistent and could not be trusted. This caused both sides to act radically and ultimately escalated the violence in the region. It is vital to the American initiative that the nation keeps the objective of military operations in Iraq as the primary focus. That is to say we must always be aware that our goal is not to overtake Iraq but rather to create an environment free of oppression that is conducive to the formation of a self sustaining government that can be carried out by the citizens of Iraq. The lack of this conscious objective in Northern Ireland is to be learned from.

Partnering with the aforementioned inconsistency is the "double dealing" of the British government. This causes their primary objectives to be entirely unclear. The United States must also understand that, much like Northern Ireland, the enemy force that the nation faces is not a large centrally massed enemy, but rather a force that hides among its own people. The conflict in Iraq has taken the United States back to a truly guerilla style of warfare that cannot be won without the synergy of our forces in the air as well as on the ground. The United Kingdom still to this day suffers casualties of citizens in Northern Ireland because they do not comprehend the Nationalist tactic of sporadic and surgical guerilla warfare. At this point it becomes quite obvious that it is the combination of these crucial failures that has deteriorated the already abysmal situation in Northern Ireland. While this is true for Northern Ireland, it is equally opposite in the development of the situation in Iraq. The American Military force and government has been both consistent in application of our force to eradicate terrorists as well as clear on our objectives to develop a framework of government that the Iraqi citizens can build on and operate independently.

Although all operations have not met with the expected outcomes of the U.S. government and many criticize the U.S. military's involvement in the struggles in Iraq, it seems that the unwavering consistency of the nation in carrying out democratic objectives has been the essential tool to the success of recent elections, establishment of native security forces, and endorsement of democracy by the freedom loving people of Iraq. Only the steady perseverance, overcoming of fog and friction associated with fighting a guerilla force, and continuity that has been displayed thus far will see the establishment of a democratic Iraq into fruition. Ignoring these principles, as shown with the conflict in Northern Ireland, could be disastrous to both Iraq and the United States, as well as entrench both sides in a conflict that could last decades with no outcome except loss of human life.

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COERCION AND THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS

By

C4C Christina Wamsley

In light of recent events, the ubiquitous question that lingers asks how the United States will cope with the newly escalated issue of a nuclear North Korea. Among the first foreign policy that comes to mind is coercion. Coercion is generally defined as compelling someone, or a nation, to select one course of action over another by making the coercer's preferred option seem more appealing than its alternative (Johnson 7). This strategy is widely used and can be applied to all four instruments of national power – diplomacy, intelligence, military, and economy (Johnson 8). However, there exist many different types of coercion. If one is to ascertain the effectiveness of coercion as a strategic tool against North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong Il, one must evaluate all possible aspects of coercion in order to select the best form.

There are three basic forms of coercion: accommodation, punishment, and denial. Accommodation coercion is a form of "positive deterrence" that offers incentives for the opposing party for complying with the demands made, yet it is more forceful than mere persuasion. Punitive coercion is when the adversary is threatened with high imposed costs if he does not comply with the coercive demands. This form of coercion does not limit the enemy's ability in any way but rather attacks the enemy's will to resist by making the effort seem too expensive or daunting to be worthwhile (Johnson 16). Denial is the third type of coercion, that seeks to convince the adversary that resisting would be unsuccessful and victory would be hopeless (Johnson 17). Coercion is a vital strategy because it is usually less expensive to convince someone to accede to the given demands than to attack the enemy or start a war (Johnson 9).

Coercion, however, does not hold much credibility if it cannot be reinforced. Therefore, it is not uncommon to see a coercive demand followed by limited use of actual force to back up the threat (Finnis 228). As stated by a military strategist, "Effectiveness of a coercive threat is a function of the target's perception of the coercer's capability, the credibility of the threat, its severity relative to the stakes in the confrontation, and the target's ability to respond to the strategy with coercion of its own" (Johnson 19). Each of these factors contributes to whether or not coercion will be successful. However, in some circumstances, the enemy prefers death over dishonor, in which case, coercion has minimal possibility of success (Johnson 18).

Now, the question remains, would such a military policy render successful over a nation like North Korea? As the potential coercer, the United States does not have difficulty asserting limited force if necessary, but it must first decide its primary objective. If the Bush Administration firmly maintains the primary objective that it informed the public, that is "complete dismantlement and full accounting of fissile materials," (Bill 38) then coercion in the form of accommodation seems to be the best decision at hand.

The nuclear crisis began in the 1980's when North Korea commenced building a nuclear weapons program at the same time they signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Sixteen difficult months later, the Agreed Framework provided a solution that immediately froze the entire North Korean nuclear program and eventually led to its dismantlement (Bill 38). However, at Yongbyon, the home of North Korea's main nuclear complex, the reactors were not officially shut down. In October 2002, North Korea once again began illegally building a new uranium-enrichment factory (Ratnesar 15). This led the Pentagon to review and modify a plan to strike and destroy North Korea's nuclear-production sites, which was originally drafted during the Clinton Administration. Nevertheless, this act of coercion was not successful. Most people did not believe the president would authorize such actions due to the fact that an attack on Pyongyang's nuclear facilities would spread lethal radiation over South Korea, China, and Japan, as well as provoke a strong counterattack by the North Koreans (Ratnesar

17). Then in January 2003, the CIA believed North Korea had enough fissile material to construct one or two bombs (Ratnesar 15). In October 2006, North Korea tested a supposed-nuclear device, and the time was right for the United States to confront Kim Jung Il's cry for attention.

It is apparent that coercion is the appropriate action, for it is in the United States' best interest to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear devices and factories. However, it is less obvious that accommodating coercion is the best approach. Denial and punitive coercion might result in greater damage than intended since the North Korean culture has placed the nation and Kim Jong Il's ego in a fragile situation. Kim Jong Il is preoccupied with national pride and cannot surrender as easily as one would think (Omestad 44). To pursue a denial or punitive coercion might force Kim Jong Il to willingly sacrifice many innocent lives and the collapse of the entire nation before he would unconditionally acquiesce to his adversary's demands.

In examining Kim Jong Il's statements and actions over the recent years, it seems that his rapid nuclear buildup has more than one intention. Since Kim Il Sung's death, North Korea has suffered a collapsing economy and widespread famine that killed over two million people. Populace dissatisfaction has been growing, despite the North Korean citizens' expectations to succumb to their leader and treat him as a demigod. Reports of rising resentment among the elite class has been documented, and the regime is becoming more corrupt as further crises occur (Ratnesar 19). Therefore, it appears that this nuclear arms uprising is not only a cry out to the world but a cry to his own people. It is logical that amidst this internal disarray, taking a world stance might prove to his people that their country still has an impact on the world and that their leader is somewhat of a prominent figure in world politics.

If this is the case, then some military strategists' questions seem reasonable. Why is the U.S. so adamant if North Korea has not explicitly threatened other nations? Unfortunately, the situation is not that simple, and one nation's actions have a large influence on the entire world, especially in the nuclear field. Not only is the United States uneasy with another non-ally nation possessing nuclear arms, but the fear remains that this North Korean nuclear buildup could be the start of a Domino Effect Theory. Currently, South Korea, China, and Japan have agreed not to build any nuclear devices in exchange for United State's promise of protection under our "nuclear umbrella" (Powell 35). However, if these countries feel threatened enough they may begin their own nuclear arms race. This would tempt regions next to Asia, such as the Middle East, to build up even more nuclear power and soon it could become uncontrollable, escalating to a potential Cold War II.

According to some of primary source statements made in 2002 and 2006, it seems that Kim Jung Il is more concerned with additional issues concerning his nation's well-being than sole nuclear power. In 2002, South Koreans advised the United States that the best approach would be to utilize a "climb down" strategy. They claimed that Kim Jong Il is desperate to end his country's isolation and would be willing to agree to give up nuclear ambitions if the United States promised peaceful and normalized relations with North Korea (Ratnesar 19). The Bush Administration had refused to negotiate until Pyongyang disarmed due to fear of Kim not upholding his end of an agreement. However, it seemed Kim, in return, desperately held on to his nuclear weapons in order to maintain some authority on the negotiating table. In support of this theory, Lee Young Kuk, a former bodyguard of Kim Jong Il, has reported in 2002 that "[Kim Jong Il] is afraid of the US. He knows he can't beat them" (Ratnesar 21). In 2006, it was reported that Kim Jong Il's main concerns included, "security assurance, energy assistance, and normalization of relations," (Powell 38) that are most of what Kim's main focus consisted of four years prior. This consistency demonstrates some truth in the matter.

If Kim Jong Il is afraid of US power, why does he refuse to comply? Simply, even though he knows he cannot win, he knows he can impose enough damage to make the United States

reconsider. Ironically, Kim Jung Il is using his own tactic of punitive coercion against the United States. Currently, North Korea has a standing army of one million people, resulting in the world's fourth largest army, in addition to about 4.7 million reserves. Further, North Korea keeps massive stores of artillery shells and hundreds of Scud missiles that could be potentially loaded with biological and chemical agents to rain down upon South Korea and the 37,000 American troops stationed there (Ratnesar 17). This demonstrates enough potential threat to make the American government reconsider forceful actions.

It is wise for the United States to consider other methods of coercing North Korea if necessary – economic sanctions. With Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing agreeing with the U.S., it is possible to exercise painful sanctions that would starve the nation (Powell 38). South Korea provides trade, investment, and humanitarian aid to North Korea. China provides them with fuel, food, and investment. Japan provides a trading market and tourist sites (Omestad 43). Additionally, the US naval ships could block North Korea's missile exports, depriving them of their only source of income (Ratnesar 19). Although China may become a potential problem in uniting against North Korea, since it uses the latter as a communist buffer against the United States, currently, their fear of being attacked with nuclear weapons has convinced them to stand with the U.S. (Powell 39). The containment policy could be negatively perceived and Washington's moral credibility challenged since the U.S. would be starving North Korea into submission, harming citizens when it is their leader we are trying to persuade (Ratnesar 21).

The last primary concern for the United States is the fear that in times of economic need, as now, North Korea could begin to sell their nuclear weapons to our enemies and terrorist organizations (Powell 35). Although this is a possibility, it is highly unlikely unless Kim Jong Il wishes to seal an agreement on national suicide. If Kim does sell his weapons to terrorists, even though the United States may not be able to track down the terrorists' location, North Korea cannot hide and the US could potentially destroy it. Therefore, with this as its deterrent, it seems unlikely and unwise for Kim Jung Il to pursue this route.

In a country where the economy and standard of living is in shreds, the fear of invasion, and thus the requirement for protection escalates, and the attitude of having very little to lose yet everything to gain, a belligerent attack would not be the correct approach. If it truly is protection and assistance that North Korea wants yet are too proud to ask, some agreement could be negotiated in exchange for nuclear disarmament. Accommodation coercion is the best method. The United States will still be successful in obtaining its primary objective, while simultaneously helping revive a nation from its possible demise.

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